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Our brains handle vast amounts of information incoming through our senses. 
Continuously exposed to sensory input, the sense of touch, however, may miss tactile 
stimuli, no matter how much attention we pay to them. In four empirical studies, this 
thesis tested (1) the feasibility of investigating undetectable stimulation by electrical finger 
nerve pulses, (2) how its neural correlates dissociate from detectable stimulation and (3) 
whether and how selective somatosensory attention nevertheless affects the neural 
representation of undetectable stimuli. The first two studies showed that there is a natural 
range of electrical stimulation intensities that cannot be detected. A rigorous statistical 
evaluation with Bayes factor analysis indicated that the evidence of chance performance 
after undetectable stimulation reliably outweighed evidence of above-chance performance. 
A subsequent study applying electroencephalography (EEG) revealed qualitative 
differences between the processing of detectable and undetectable stimulation, which is 
evident in altered event-related potentials (ERP). Specifically, undetectable stimulation 
evokes a single component that is not predictive of stimulus detectability, but lacks a 
subsequent component, which correlates with upcoming stimulus detection. The final 
study showed that attention nevertheless affects neural processing of undetectable stimuli 
in a top-down manner as it does for detectable stimuli and fosters the view of attention 
and awareness being two separate and mostly independent mechanisms. The influence 
of the pre-stimulus oscillatory (~10 Hz) alpha amplitude—a putative marker of 
attentional deployment—on the ERP depended on the current attentional state and 
indicats that both processes are interacting but not functionally matching.  
   
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“[…] Die Theorie ist das Netz das wir auswerfen, um ‘die Welt’ einzufangen, - sie zu 
rationalisieren, zu erklären und zu beherrschen. Wir arbeiten daran, die Maschen des Netzes immer 
enger zu machen.“ (Karl Popper, p. 31 in ‘Logik der Forschung’, Tübingen, 1973) 
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1 Touch, Consciousness, And Attention – Theoretical 
Considerations 
The sense of touch is the most intimate link to everyone’s environment and, from an 
evolutionary point of view, of utmost importance. We can shut our eyes, close our 
mouth, cover our ears, or hold our nose. However, “silencing” touch may not be 
achieved as easily (cf. Low, 2009). E.g., it requires considerable mental effort to not 
withdraw a finger from a needle perturbating the skin. Signaling proximate and 
potentially harmful interactions with the external world is of central importance for the 
survival of an individual and the species as a whole.  
Moreover, this perpetual immediacy constitutes our feeling of an integrated, i.e., 
unitary self and thereby enables us to distinguish ourselves consciously from our 
surroundings (Grunwald, 2008). Given its unmatched heterogeneous structure 
comprised of a variety of mechano-, chemo-, thermoreceptors as well as noci- and 
proprioceptors, we will easily miss many somatic sensations if we do not pay attention 
to them: the touch of the clothes that we are wearing while reading a book, the body 
position or gesticulation during an intense discussion, just to mention a few. Under 
optimal conditions, however, humans may consciously perceive skin indentations of the 
fingertip as small as 11 µm (Johansson & Vallbo, 1979). Here, this thesis examines the 
possibility of sensory events escaping conscious access and the puzzling question 
whether there are correlates of such unconscious sensations in the brain. What do these 
neural markers—or the absence of those that are present during conscious 
perception—tell us about the mechanisms precluding awareness and what is the role of 
cognitive factors, foremost attention, in modulating such perceptual processes. 
After a short introduction into the empirical study of consciousness (section 1.1), 
detection thresholds (section 1.3) and selective attention (section 1.4), this dissertation 
is comprised of four studies, first investigating the validity of undetectable electrical 
stimulation in touch through psychophysics (section 2.2). Next, suitable central neural 
markers related to these sensations will be identified (section 2.3). The final study 
(section 2.4) utilizes those neural correlates to investigate their potential modulation by 
attention and supports our understanding of a general neural signature for attentional 
deployment that is independent of conscious perception (Koch & Tsuchiya, 2007). 
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1.1 A Neural Account To (Un-) Consciousness 
Contrary to the collective intuition of experiencing a unitary consciousness, the meaning 
of the term varies broadly in its scientific study. In order to address the results of the 
current thesis adequately, one has to define those aspects of consciousness, to which 
the studies explicitly refer. Unless stated otherwise, this thesis confines the meaning of 
consciousness to two aspects. First, in distinguishing between global states of arousal 
ranging from coma to alertness (Kiefer, 2002), this thesis is exclusively concerned with 
fully awake participants that can communicate in an experimental environment. Various 
states of this aspect not only pose the necessary condition to perceptual awareness, but 
they may additionally gate, which objects (Brentano, 1874) or contents our cognitive 
system might represent (Bayne, Hohwy, & Owen, 2016). That is, investigations on 
conscious and unconscious perception of external somatosensory stimulation have to 
control for the participant’s global state of arousal. Awake participants that are engaged 
in an experimental situation can perceive externally driven excitation. This capacity, 
however, might be absent or degraded for other states of arousal, in which we 
nevertheless experience a feeling of having a unitary consciousness (e.g., in lucid 
dreaming).  
The second constriction to the term of consciousness builds on an operational 
definition of what happens when we are aware of specific content or when we are not.  
 
“Using a broad definition, conscious information can be considered any stimulus, either externally- or 
internally-generated, which we are aware of at any given time - thus, these items are 'in mind'. In 
contrast, unconscious stimuli are those items, which are currently not in awareness, and have no 
reportability.” (Gilchrist & Cowan, 2010) 
 
Such an assessment will allow revealing the description of what underlies a conscious 
or unconscious percept but importantly does not provide any explanation the sort of 
“what is it like to be a bat?” (Nagel, 1974). The former is sometimes referred to as being 
the easy problem in consciousness research (Chalmers, 1996) and is related to the study 
of the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC, Mormann & Koch, 2007) that we will 
address more thoroughly below. The latter—referred to as the hard problem (Chalmers, 
1996)—reflects the first-person-perspective of having a private and subjective 
experience about something. Having a first-person-perspective—e.g., coined by mental 
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content like “I think” or “I perceive”—implicitly requires a model of one’s mental self 
(Craig, 2002; Park & Tallon-Baudry, 2014; Prinz, 2017a, 2017b). Cognitive 
neuroscientists argued that only a self-model allows a subjective perspective on external 
(e.g., sensory) and internal (e.g., thoughts) representations (Metzinger, 2007) and that 
representations representing the self therefore pose a necessary condition for being 
conscious at all (Metzinger, 2004; Prinz, 2017b). Although empirical approaches to the 
study of selfhood are feasible and actually undertaken (Blanke & Metzinger, 2009; Prinz, 
2017b), most literature in the field of consciousness research is focusing on descriptions 
of neural substrates and processes correlating with conscious and unconscious 
perception, memory and behavior (Aru, Bachmann, Singer, & Melloni, 2012; Baars, 
1997; Crick & Koch, 1990, 2003; Dehaene & Naccache, 2001; Victor A. F. Lamme, 
2006; Ruhnau, Hauswald, & Weisz, 2014; Samaha, 2015; Silverstein, Snodgrass, Shevrin, 
& Kushwaha, 2015a; Tononi & Koch, 2015). The studies of the present thesis build on 
an already developed first-person-perspective of the studied participants and ask the 
question, which brain processes add to their subjective, self-referential experience when 
they report an external stimulus, as compared to the subjective experience of an external 
stimulus reported being absent.  
Indeed, both invasive and non-invasive brain imaging techniques as, first of all, 
electroencephalography (EEG) and later magnetoencephalography (MEG) and 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) uncovered a wealth of finely resolved 
brain responses related to perceiving and acting human subjects since 1929 (Berger, 
1929). None so far, however, has identified a unique neural correlate of conscious 
content everyone agrees on (for an overview see Aru et al., 2012; Verleger, 2010). An 
intricate difficulty arising when identifying NCCs comes with the requirement for any 
report with which the participant has to indicate his or her awareness of something 
(Hesselmann, Hebart, & Malach, 2011). Genuine markers of conscious content—the 
so-called NCC proper (Aru et al., 2012)—therefore appear to be conflated with other 
brain processes either preceding or following conscious perception, such as expectation, 
attention or decision-related processes. For example, Hillyard and colleagues (Hillyard, 
Squires, Bauer, & Lindsay, 1971) presented college students weak tones embedded into 
white background noise in a way that these tones were perceived on one trial but not 
on the other. Students’ task was to indicate after each trial whether they detected the 
tone or not. Because of concurrently measuring EEG, Hillyard et al. (1971) identified a 
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positive deflection in the event-related potential (ERP) about 300ms after tone 
presentation—a so-called P300 (see section 2.1.4 and 2.1.5 for further details)—that 
showed an increased amplitude when students detected the tone as compared to when 
they reported it to be absent. This increase indicates that the P300 component relates 
to conscious content. To reflect a proper marker of consciousness, however, it must 
also be present when participants are not engaged in a task and nevertheless experience 
the tone consciously. The P300, though, vanished utterly, when participants were 
passively receiving those tone intensities that they previously detected. Thus, the P300 
seems to reflect decisional processes that rely on a conscious percept and does not 
resemble a proper NCC but rather a consequence of it (Aru et al., 2012). Another 
obstacle for distinguishing proper markers of consciousness concerns the type of 
report, with which participants are asked to respond. Observers may report having 
nothing perceived but still perform better than chance (Adams, 1957). Accordingly, one 
distinguishes between subjective and objective measures of behavioral responses, where 
the former might be not sensitive enough to grasp partial consciousness, and the latter 
may be too conservative to allow it (Haynes, 2013). Experiments applying stimulation 
at the objective threshold belong to this latter kind, and we will discuss them more 
closely in the next section (1.2). 
The bottom line of this short excursion is that, in the current thesis, I will 
circumnavigate the quest of identifying proper NCC by shedding light on processes 
arising without the smallest sign of conscious perception, i.e., without partial conscious 
awareness, and trying to recognize those neural substrates that probably do not reflect 
the NCC (Aru et al., 2012). Such markers might be necessary for conscious perception 
but do not pose a sufficient condition. Specifically, investigating unconscious 
perception may reveal neural phenomena that may keep us from conscious perception 
and thereby showing qualitative distinctions between the neural processing of detectable 
and undetectable stimuli (Merikle & Daneman, 1998). The first step, however, is to 
identify a suitable procedure that allows stimulating reliably at the objective detection 
threshold or below, which is the topic of the next section. 
1.2 Controlling detectability of external stimulation 
There are two common ways to render stimuli undetectable. One is stimulus masking, 
of which the so-called backward masking is probably the most prominent (Breitmeyer 
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& Ogmen, 2007; Enns & Lollo, 2000; Meador, Ray, Day, Ghelani, & Loring, 1998; 
Schubert, Blankenburg, Lemm, Villringer, & Curio, 2006) and the other is by restricting 
the stimulation energy as a function of stimulus intensity and duration (Iliopoulos, 
Nierhaus, & Villringer, 2014; Shevrin, 2001). When applying backward masking in 
vision, for example, a briefly presented target stimulus turns invisible when followed by 
a non-target stimulus within tens of milliseconds (Enns & Lollo, 2000). 
Electrophysiological studies explained this effect by assuming interrupted cortical 
processing of the target stimulus by the processing of the mask and indeed, provided 
evidence for suppressed neural activity in early sensory areas after masked compared to 
unmasked stimulation (Fahrenfort, Scholte, & Lamme, 2007; Lamme, Zipser, & 
Spekreijse, 2002; Schubert et al., 2006). Thus, masking may preclude observations 
unique to neural processes below consciousness elicited by unmasked but undetectable 
stimulation. This difference seems highly relevant especially concerning early responses 
in the EEG evoked by the stimulus. Backward masking paradigms obscure early ERP 
modulations since the masking stimulus is applied only after the onset of those early 
components that were shown to be related to conscious perception (Auksztulewicz & 
Blankenburg, 2013; Auksztulewicz, Spitzer, & Blankenburg, 2012; Palva, Linkenkaer-
Hansen, Näätänen, & Palva, 2005; Schubert et al., 2006). Importantly, stimulus masking 
may not allow revealing any qualitative differences between conscious and unconscious 
perception during early phases of stimulus processing. 
Accordingly, in the current thesis, I controlled detectability of somatosensory events 
by manipulation of stimulus energy. The question then is, “is it possible to tune the 
energy of stimulation in such a way that observers are unaware of it even without a 
backward mask?” Physiological studies showed that Meissner corpuscles—one type of 
principal mechanoreceptors in the glabrous skin—respond to fingertip skin 
indentations as small as 11 µm and, furthermore, that a single action potential of an 
isolated axon innervating receptive fields of the hand might suffice for detection 
(Goodwin & Wheat, 2008; Johansson & Vallbo, 1979; Vallbo & Johansson, 1984). In 
other words, the absolute threshold for stimulus detection appears to be identical to the 
sensory threshold of the receptor. On the other hand, different studies applied 
transcutaneous electrical nerve stimulation either to a finger or the median nerve, for 
which participants were reported to be completely unaware (Baumgarten, Königs, 
Schnitzler, & Lange, 2017; Blankenburg et al., 2003; Ferrè, Sahani, & Haggard, 2016; 
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Iliopoulos et al., 2014; Klostermann et al., 2009; Libet, Alberts, Wright, & Feinstein, 
1967; Ray et al., 1999a; Taskin, Holtze, Krause, & Villringer, 2008). These studies 
defined undetectable stimulation magnitudes proportional to the intensity of the 
individually assessed detection threshold—typically 10 to 20% below the threshold and 
termed these either “subliminal” or “subthreshold.” However, the term threshold is 
mostly not described at all. In the psychophysical literature, a "threshold" defines a point 
on a psychometric function that satisfies a statistical criterion, i.e., the stimulus intensity 
required for 50% correct performance. Thus, any stimulus intensity below the threshold 
is considered "subthreshold." Stimulus intensities below the 50% threshold, therefore 
are still perceived consciously on a portion of the trials.  
Furthermore, the mentioned studies did not rigorously test—at least they did not 
report it—whether applied intensities below detection threshold were reliably 
undetectable. If any, retrospective subjective reports or a small number of test trials 
were acquired to validate the usage of a specific subthreshold intensity (Ferrè et al., 
2016; Taskin et al., 2008). As discussed above, subjective reports such as the presence 
of a signal or the rating of its magnitude (for an overview see Sandberg et al., 2010) are 
inappropriate for the investigation of unconscious stimulus processing as they might be 
insensitive to the availability of partially conscious information (Haynes, 2013).  
In contrast, objective reports refer to forced-choice procedures, where the observer 
is required to discriminate at least between two randomly presented stimulus conditions 
(Reingold, 1988), e.g., target-present and target-absent, resulting in four possible 
behavioral outcomes regarding correct and incorrect classification. To show the 
relevance of the distinction between subjective and objective reports neurally, 
Hesselmann et al. (2011) recently could dissociate blood-oxygen-level-dependent 
(BOLD) activation patterns of subjective visibility ratings and discrimination 
performance either in higher-order visual areas or in early visual areas, respectively. 
Importantly, although rated as invisible, observers’ performance was above chance 
(>25%) when asked to discriminate, in which of the four possible locations the target 
appeared. 
Thus, investigations on neural processes below conscious perception must prove 
objective performance being at the chance level for a specific stimulus claimed to be 
undetectable. However, objective measures of awareness (as subjective measures) might 
be susceptible to response biases, i.e., the observer’s contingent tendency to prefer a 
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particular response category often called “criterion.” In a forced-choice detection task, 
for example, an observer may be overly lenient in reporting the presence of a stimulus 
in order to increase stimulus detection probability. Conversely, a somewhat 
conservative response strategy would decrease false positives when in fact no stimulus 
is presented. In both cases, the observer’s sensitivity to a specific stimulation intensity 
could be the same, though the response strategy, i.e., the bias, is different. Signal 
detection theory (SDT) provides means to keep these factors apart, which influence 
observers’ decisions. Developed in the 50s and 60s by Tanner, Swets and Green (Green 
& Swets, 1966; Swets, 1964; Tanner & Swets, 1954) SDT is, until today, recognized as 
one of the most influential theories in basic Psychology (Macmillan & Creelman, 2004). 
Its notion of a perceptual continuum cast doubt on the existence of thresholds 
(Goldstein, 2009). Nevertheless, the term threshold is still widely used throughout the 
literature (Haynes, 2013; Kingdom & Prins, 2009). Therefore, the next section dedicates 
a few hopefully clarifying thoughts to the use of the term threshold under signal 
detection theory. 
 
1.3 Thresholds in the light of signal detection theory 
In SDT the process leading to the decision about presence or absence of a sensory 
stimulus, i.e., the signal, rests—apart from sensory sensitivity—on the internal, i.e., 
psychological, evaluation of a chosen decision criterion. If the stimulus—or more 
precisely the internal activation it produces—exceeds the criterion, the observer 
confirms its presence and vice versa. Importantly, another stimulation condition, e.g., 
without any stimulus, will be evaluated on the same grounds. Despite stimulation 
absence, the observer reports the detection of a “stimulus” due to baseline activity of 
the sensory system—often referred to as being noise—if this activity exceeds the 
criterion. Thus, the report of the presence or absence of a stimulus varies with the 
strategy or criterion the observer adopts in order to cope with the experimental 
situation.  
Classical psychophysics researchers noted the variability of behavioral reports, too, 
and proposed a statistical definition of a threshold being an “arbitrary point within a 
range of variability” (Stevens, 1951). However, whereas SDT assumes perception to 
happen on a continuum (Macmillan & Creelman, 2004), threshold theory conceives an 
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in-built limit within the observing system that divides experience into different discrete 
states, in one of which we consciously perceive sensory stimuli and in the other we do 
not have conscious access. Discredit for the usage of the term threshold mainly comes 
from the latter. For threshold theory, i.e., more specific “high-threshold theory,” 
undetected signals directly correspond to the state below the threshold and “yes”-
responses to stimulus absent trials (catch trials)—false alarms in SDT—are treated as 
guesses. Sensitivity threshold then is merely the proportion of detected signal trials 
corrected for guessing (Macmillan & Creelman, 2004). A threshold defined in this way 
implies chance performance below that very threshold because behavioral responses 
here may only arise from the state below consciousness. However, in a rating 
experiment, in which Swets (1961) presented both stimulus and catch trials and asked 
observers to indicate the likelihood of stimulus presence on a six-point scale. High-
threshold theory predicts that below threshold no ordering regarding the likelihood of 
stimulus presence should be possible. Nevertheless, in Swets study (1961) classifications 
of stimulus likelihood did predict the proportion of detection even below the threshold. 
On the contrary, a continuous perception proposed by SDT explains this ordering very 
well, because there is no internal state not capable of perceptual processing. 
Alongside this internal threshold definition, researchers often operationally assess 
the relation between stimulus intensity and psychological detection, so-called 
psychometric functions. Along with such functions, one may define any threshold 
magnitude about an arbitrarily chosen, preselected performance level (Macmillan & 
Creelman, 2004). As we have seen, SDT provides a measure for the observer’s response 
criterion that is independent of the empirical threshold measure. SDT, therefore, 
controls for decision-related processes occluding inferences on sensory sensitivity from 
overt behavior, which was not possible in classical psychophysics (Dixon, 1971; Swets, 
1961). Thus, throughout the thesis, I will empirically define any subthreshold stimulation 
to exert zero sensitive responses that are independent of observer’s response criterion 
(see also section 2.1.3 for the statistical proof of zero sensitivity). I.e., the terms absolute 
detection threshold and subthreshold stimulation refer exclusively to the ability or 
inability of observers to detect, i.e., report, stimuli without their decisional tendency to 
prefer one answer over the other. 
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1.4 Selective attention in touch 
In the previous section, we have seen that the observer’s chosen response criterion 
determines the behavioral report irrespective of actual stimulus presence. On the other 
hand, it is clear that the probability of detecting a “true” stimulus depends on how well 
its elicited activity within the observer separates from neural baseline activity (noise). 
Long before the advent of neuroimaging techniques, William James’ imposing 
phenomenal description of selective attention, pointed to its involvement in improving 
detection by sharpening sensory percepts to “catch an impression of extreme faintness” 
or “discriminate a sensation merged in a mass of others that are similar” (James, 1890). 
Extensive empirical research on this topic ever since conjectured two complementary, 
i.e., mutually non-exclusive, mechanisms serving selective attention. First, enhancement 
of signal activation that can be observed in psychophysical experiments by a reduced 
contrast threshold (Herrmann, Montaser-Kouhsari, Carrasco, & Heeger, 2010) or, in 
the brain, by an activity gain in the neural response of the stimulus coding population 
(Carrasco, 2011). Second, the reduction of noise—external, i.e., sensory, or internal 
noise, i.e., neural activity unrelated to the task—that has been shown to sharpen neural 
response tuning curves, e.g. in feature-based attention (David, Hayden, Mazer, & 
Gallant, 2008; Ling, Liu, & Carrasco, 2009). Thus, selective attention may play a crucial 
role in dissociating relevant sensory input from noise (Carrasco, 2011). For a distracted 
observer, a stimulus might pass by undetected if the stimulus’ neural response is small 
and close to baseline activity. However, the very same stimulus could be consciously 
perceived if the observer pays attention to it.  
A large body of neurocognitive research illustrates the selective prioritization of 
those neural responses that are most relevant for the current behavioral goals 
(Buschman & Kastner, 2015). For now, we will focus on work studying attention in 
touch (for an overview see Gomez-Ramirez et al., 2016). Studies showing enhanced 
activity of single cells in primary and secondary somatosensory cortex (SI and SII; Hsiao 
et al., 1993), increased neural population responses in the EEG (Forster & Eimer, 2004), 
and whole neural network modulations (Goltz et al., 2015; Goltz, Pleger, Thiel, 
Villringer, & Müller, 2013) during attention agree with a signal gain mechanism. 
Furthermore, in an ERP study Forster and Eimer (2005) observed—relative to a neutral 
cue condition, in which participants had no information about the location of an 
upcoming vibrotactile target—an increased N140 amplitude after the target when it 
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appeared at the cued hand, however, a reduction of N140 when it appeared at the 
uncued side. This points to the co-occurrence of signal gain at attended locations and 
suppression of irrelevant information coming from unattended locations mediating the 
effect of attention (Forster & Eimer, 2005).  
Another potential marker for noise suppression is oscillatory neural activity in the 
alpha-band (~10Hz; Foxe & Snyder, 2011). Neural oscillations are thought to emerge 
from the rhythmic firing of neural populations and may coordinate distributed network 
activity (Buschman & Kastner, 2015; Buzsaki, 2011). The advantage of firing in 
synchrony is increasing the effectiveness of neurons (in influencing others) without 
changing their firing rate (the so-called temporal synchronization hypothesis, Singer & 
Gray, 1995). In a MEG study, Jones and colleagues (2010) observed less rolandic alpha 
amplitudes (i.e., mu, alpha oscillatory activity over somatosensory regions) in 
somatotopically localized hand area in primary somatosensory cortex (SI) after cueing 
attention to the hand compared to when cueing attention to the foot. Furthermore, in 
a simple detection task, they found pre-stimulus mu power negatively correlated with 
the detection probability of a small tap to right-hand fingertips. Other studies also 
suggest a close relationship between mu-activity and both performance and attention 
(Haegens, Händel, & Jensen, 2011; Haegens, Luther, & Jensen, 2011) leading to the 
hypothesis that attention suppresses irrelevant or distracting stimuli by up-regulating 
alpha activity (Foxe & Snyder, 2011; Gomez-Ramirez et al., 2016). However, as we will 
discuss later (section 2.4), this view is not always supported by empirical data.  
In summary, this thesis takes advantage of the EEG method—specifically by 
analyzing the ERP and mu-alpha (i.e., sensorimotor or rolandic alpha or simply mu) 
amplitudes, respectively—in order to study signal enhancement and noise suppression 
in stimulus perception. 
 
Concerning the tight relationship of attention and consciousness, the unmatched 
William James already noted that “but without it [attention] the consciousness of every 
creature would be a gray chaotic indiscriminateness, impossible for us even to conceive” 
(James, 1890). Without selective attention, we are dazed and “the foreground of 
consciousness is filled, if by anything, by a sort of solemn sense of surrender to the 
empty passing of time” (p. 404, ibid.). However, interrelatedness does not imply a strict 
dependence of attention on conscious percepts or vice versa (Koch & Tsuchiya, 2007). 
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So-called blindsight patients suffering from a lesion within primary visual cortices give 
one of the most intriguing examples of attention without consciousness (for an 
overview see Kiefer (2002) and Weiskrantz (2007)). Those patients are not aware of 
stimuli occurring in the affected visual field but can point towards them, discriminate 
targets among other stimuli, and show shorter reaction times to targets that match the 
location indicated by a previous but unseen cue (Kentridge, Heywood, & Weiskrantz, 
1999). This phenomenon has been observed in touch as well (Rossetti, Rode, & 
Boisson, 1995), however, instead emerging from a thalamic lesion. The existence of 
blindsight or blind touch shows that selective attention may operate without the 
presence of conscious percepts and therefore does not represent a sufficient condition 
for conscious detection. A full dissociation of both concepts, leading to a four-way 
classification scheme, is not subject to the current work. This is discussed at length in 
the review by Koch and Tsuchiya (2007), who enlist empirical findings for all four 
combinations of the alleged different processes: attention with consciousness (e.g. 
verbal reportability), no or minimal attention without consciousness (e.g. negative 
afterimages), attention without consciousness (see blindsight example above) and 
consciousness without attention (gist extraction of unattended peripheral scenes). 
With stimulus intensities producing chance performance (see section 1.2), 
manipulation of top-down selective attention, and concurrently measuring EEG 
responses, the current thesis quantifies attentional processes in the absence of conscious 
perception in healthy human participants. Contrary to the proposition of representing 
selective attention and subthreshold perception as endpoints on a continuum of 
information handling (Dixon, 1971), this work exploits and compares neural processing 
of both attended and ignored detectable stimulation as well as sensory perturbations 
that may never become consciously perceived.  
 
1.5 Research questions 
In this thesis, I set out to investigate neural processes related to undetectable 
somatosensory stimuli and examined mechanisms precluding conscious awareness. 
Furthermore, I asked whether attentional modulation is limited to consciously 
perceivable stimuli, or also applies to undetectable stimulation that is empirically defined 
to exert objective performance at the chance level, independent of observer’s response 
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criterion. For this, two psychophysical (n=22) and two electrophysiological (n=80) 
studies explored perception for various stimulation intensities along the individual 
psychometric function in an overall sample of 102 participants.  
The primary research questions are: (1) Is it possible to adjust the intensity of 
unmasked electrical somatosensory stimulation in a way that observers’ behavioral 
performance is reliably at the chance level? Study I (section 2.2.1) establishes a fast and 
reliable, manual threshold assessment procedure in order to estimate observers’ 
absolute detection thresholds (ADTH) below which they produce a chance-level 
performance. Study II (section 2.2.2) validates this threshold assessment procedure by 
applying a one-alternative-forced-choice (1AFC, i.e., yes-no detection) task for stimuli 
ranging from intensities below absolute detection threshold to intensities clearly above 
it, but still below the pain threshold. Importantly, the design includes trials without any 
stimulation (catch trials) to allow for the estimation of perceptual sensitivity (d-prime) 
and response bias (criterion) according to signal detection theory and statistically proves 
the chance performance of stimulation intensities below ADTH by Bayes factor null-
hypothesis testing (see section 2.1.3 for details). 
Section 2.3 asks (2) whether there are measurable neural correlates of subthreshold 
stimulation intensities. If so, are there qualitative differences between stimulation below 
and above ADTH concerning the stimulus-evoked response and oscillatory activity that 
may prevent access to conscious experience in the case of subthreshold stimulation? 
Furthermore, (3) which features of the earliest neural responses (amplitude and latency 
of the somatosensory evoked potential, SEP) after somatosensory stimulation are 
predictive of its detection and do these post-stimulus features interact with pre-stimulus 
intrinsic oscillatory activity in the alpha-band that has been surmised to regulate the 
excitability of sensory cortices awaiting stimulus input? Study III (section 2.3.2) was 
therefore designed as an EEG adaptation of study II and investigates these neural 
stimulus-locked responses for various stimulation intensities. 
As discussed in section 1.4, selective attention plays a crucial role in stimulus 
detection by increasing the target signal response and suppressing task-irrelevant noise. 
Furthermore, attention affects both SEPs and alpha-band activity. Thus, study IV 
(section 2.4) investigates the modulatory role of selective spatial attention in 
somatosensory stimulus processing across awareness conditions by its relation to early 
SEPs and oscillatory mu-alpha activity. Precisely, (4) does attention modulate neural 
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processing of subthreshold somatosensory stimuli and (5) what is the role of 
sensorimotor alpha-band activity to the effect of attention? 
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2 Empirical Evidence 
 
2.1 General methods 
This chapter summarizes the most important methods used throughout the empirical 
investigations. It is not meant, however, only to collect facts about the experiments but, 
importantly, also contains central reasoning within this thesis: the direct proof of 
unconscious stimulus processing, the topic of section 2.1.3 and 2.1.4. So, dear reader, 
please keep on reading. The method sections of the specific studies hold additional 
methodological details. 
2.1.1 Stimulation 
All studies used constant-current stimulators (DS7/DS7A, Digitimer, Welwyn Garden 
City, Hertfordshire, United Kingdom) for electrical finger nerve stimulation. Single 
current pulses (quantified in milliampere, mA) are adjusted to have a monophasic square 
wave shape with duration of 200µs consistent with previous studies (Blankenburg et al., 
2003; Iliopoulos et al., 2014; Taskin et al., 2008). The experimenter adjusted stimulation 
magnitudes directly at the device and triggered pulses manually during threshold 
assessment (see next section) or automatically during the main experiments by custom 
scripts running in the stimulation software “Presentation” (Neurobehavioral Systems, 
San Francisco, U.S.A.). A pair of steel wire ring electrodes attached to the middle 
(anode) and the proximal (cathode) phalanx of the left (and for the attention study of 
section 2.4 right) index finger delivered the stimulator output. 
2.1.2 Threshold assessment procedure 
All studies defined the absolute detection threshold (ADTH) empirically as the lowest 
current intensity at which participants just reported a sensation. ADTH was assessed 
manually by the experimenter employing a two-step procedure that involves one trial 
method of limits with ascending intensities for a rough estimation followed by a one-
alternative-forced-choice task (1AFC, i.e., yes-no detection) for fine adjustment. In the 
former task, the experimenter gradually increases stimulation intensity until the 
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participant verbally reports a conscious percept. The latter task involves a semi-random 
presentation of stimulation intensities around the previously estimated rough threshold. 
The participant has to respond (forced-choice) either having detected a stimulus (“yes”) 
or not (“no”). Importantly, the experimenter applies trials without any stimulation 
(“catch trials”), too, in about 20% of all trials (usually 30–60). These catch trials allow 
estimating the participant’s tendency towards responding with “yes” despite no 
stimulation (“false alarms” or simply fA). ADTH is then the smallest stimulus 
magnitude for which the participant’s detection rate (“hit-rate”) exceeds the fA-rate of 
the catch trials, which is equivalent to calculate stimulus sensitivity in signal detection 
theory that is independent of the individual response bias (see next section). This 
procedure is relatively fast, as, in each trial, stimulation and verbal response require 
roughly five seconds. 
In most of the current studies, a stimulation intensity above ADTH (i.e., 
suprathreshold) but well below pain threshold was directly estimated during threshold 
assessment either depending on the participants’ subjective reports of experiencing a 
clear (i.e., conscious) percept or by applying the method of constant stimuli. For the 
latter, the experimenter presented several different stimulation intensities and 
participants responded according to the 1AFC scheme (see above). The suprathreshold 
stimulus (STH) then refers to the smallest intensity that exerts (close to) perfect 
detection performance, i.e., hit-rates of roughly 100%. 
 
2.1.3 Behavioral analysis 
All studies report the hit- and false alarm rates (HR, FAR), i.e., the probability of 
responding “yes” when a stimulus was presented or responding “no” when there was 
no stimulation, respectively. Both measures are affected by the observer’s perceptual 
sensitivity to a stimulation intensity and an individual response tendency towards 
reporting or not reporting a signal, independent of its actual presence (Green & Swets, 
1966; Kingdom & Prins, 2009; Macmillan & Creelman, 2004; Swets, 1961, 1964). 
Therefore, in those studies that include catch trials, perceptual sensitivity is calculated 
as D-prime (Macmillan & Creelman, 2004): 
 
 =  − 
, 
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where the function z(x) is the inverse-normal transformation and converts hit and false 
alarm rates ranging from 0 to 1 to z scores having zero mean and a standard deviation 
of one. D-prime is then the distance between the two z-scores representing the 
observers’ internal response to a signal and noise, respectively. This distance is 
mathematically independent of a possible response tendency of the observer being 
either lenient (bias towards saying “yes”) or stringent (bias towards saying “no”). With 
d’ values of zero, observers are not able to discriminate a stimulus at all, i.e., HR = FAR. 
A stimulus that exerts zero perceptual sensitivity, i.e., a detection probability that is no 
different from “yes” responses to null events, therefore satisfies the condition of 
escaping conscious perception, because objective performance is at the chance level. 
This situation, though, is hard to meet, since a satisfying precision for the statistical 
estimate of the true value would require an impractical amount of data. 
Furthermore, testing the null hypothesis (NH), i.e., proving chance performance, 
cannot be accomplished by classical test theoretic procedures. Frequentist statistics are 
designed to reject the null and to be sensitive for the alternative hypothesis (AH, Rouder 
et al., 2009). This sensitivity for the AH is, e.g., evident for the simple t statistic of a 
one-sample t-test, which—despite constant mean difference and variance—increases 
by ramping up the sample. Conversely, if the null hypothesis is true, p-values are equally 
likely and may take on any value between 0 and 1 (Rouder et al., 2009). Unconsciousness 
in this framework, therefore, cannot be proven. Although this led the research field to 
propel productive questions of qualitative differences on the consequence of 
unconscious perception from the consequences of conscious perception (Merikle & 
Daneman, 1998), also methodologically motivated alternatives to classical test theory 
have been suggested (Rouder, Morey, Speckman, & Pratte, 2007; Rouder et al., 2009). 
However, these are almost unnoticed in the core field of unconscious perception 
research (Haynes, 2013; Kiefer, 2012; Peters & Lau, 2016; Silverstein et al., 2015a; Soon, 
Brass, Heinze, & Haynes, 2008; Wiens, 2008).  
Bayes factors, instead, evaluate probabilities of at least two hypotheses conditional 
on observed data (Rouder et al., 2009). In the case of comparing the evidence for the 
NH against the evidence for the alternative, a Bayes factor calculates the posterior odds 
ratio of the probability of the NH given the data against the probability of the alternative 
hypothesis (AH) given the data: 
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where H0 and H1 denote null and alternative hypothesis, respectively (Rouder et al., 
2009). An odds ratio of two means in this case that the NH is two times more likely 
than the alternative. A convention by Lee and Wagenmakers (2013) classifies odds ratios 
of more than three as moderate and more than ten as strong evidence in favor of the 
hypothesis in the nominator. In order to calculate the probabilities of the competing 
hypotheses, prior information about the hypotheses’ parameters have to be 
incorporated. Under the null hypothesis, i.e., chance performance, the true standardized 
difference between the perceptual sensitivity to a stimulus intensity is assumed to be 
zero. Under the alternative, a distribution of different weights on different effect sizes 
expresses this prior information. For an objective statistical proof of chance 
performance exerted by subthreshold stimulation in the current thesis, we need priors 
with minimal assumptions about the range of effect sizes under the alternative. 
Therefore, I rely on the Cauchy distribution (one degree of freedom t distribution) of 
effect sizes together with the Jeffreys prior on variance (Jeffreys, 1961). The zero-
centered Cauchy does not favor a direction of effect sizes in the two-sided test case and 
further assumes them to be normally distributed (Rouder et al., 2009). The so-called 
JZS prior, i.e., the combination of the Cauchy distribution on effect size and Jeffreys 
prior on variance (ibid.), might be scaled when smaller or larger effect sizes are expected 
a priori (ibid.). However, the Bayes factor analysis in this thesis considers a range of 
scales, r, to relax strong expectations about the effect size. 
The computational implementation of the above procedures, I mainly realized in 
two software packages: 1) Matlab (Mathworks, Natick, MA, USA, RRID: SCR_001622) 
for the basic statistical comparisons of experimental conditions, e.g., condition contrasts 
with t-test statistics and 2) the R environment (R Core Team, 2014) for more advanced 
modeling, like Bayesian statistical inference. 
2.1.4 Electrophysiological measurement 
To analyze the rapid changes (<500 milliseconds) underlying the processing of sensory 
events supposed to distinguish conscious from unconscious perception, a temporally 
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exemplary resolved method is required. Non-invasive electroencephalography (EEG) 
measures little potential changes by placing many small electrodes over the (human) 
scalp. These scalp potentials are generated by synchronized and spatially aligned current 
dipoles in the brain and propagate through the insulating, anatomical layers of the brain, 
cerebral spinal fluid (CSF), dura and scalp (Jackson & Bolger, 2014)—the so-called 
volume conduction. Coherently oriented pyramidal dendritic trunks form cortical 
macro-columns that are thought to contribute to EEG signals (Pizzagalli, 2007) mainly. 
Synchronized input to these macro-columns by excitatory and inhibitory post-synaptic 
potentials (EPSP and IPSP) sums up and composes the signal that the scalp electrodes 
measure. The polarity of these scalp potentials depends on the depth of the post-
synaptic potentials relative to the Pyramidal cells (soma or apical dendrite) and the 
position of the scalp electrode relative to the radially or tangentially oriented dipoles. 
Neural source modeling of sensory evoked responses showed that EEG may be both 
sensitive to the initial feedforward sweep from thalamus to granular layers (4/5) of SI 
as well as feedback connections from either local or distant brain areas like secondary 
somatosensory cortex (SII) frontal cortex (FC) or posterior parietal cortex (PPC; 
Auksztulewicz & Blankenburg, 2013; Auksztulewicz et al., 2012; Jones et al., 2009; 
Jones, Pritchett, Stufflebeam, Hämäläinen, & Moore, 2007). 
Either 32-channel caps (study section 2.4) or 62-channel caps (study section 2.3.2) 
realized EEG recordings using the BrainAmp amplifier (Brain Products, Munich, 
Germany) together with the Brain Vision Recorder to record the signals of active 
Ag/AgCl electrodes arranged according to the international 10-20 system or its 
extended version, respectively. The midfrontal electrode (FCz) served as an online 
reference and a sternum electrode as ground. Impedances were checked at the 
beginning of each session and reduced below five kΩ for all channels. The method 
sections of the EEG studies (section 2.3.2 and 2.4) detail all information of the specific 
EEG acquisition. In the following two sections, I describe the general analysis 
procedures behind the central EEG measures investigated in the current thesis: event-
related potentials (ERP, section 2.1.5) and the time-frequency response (TFR, section 
2.1.6). 
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2.1.5 Analysis of event-related potentials 
An event-related potential captures neural activity that is generally phase- or time-locked 
to a specific event, be it the onset of a stimulus or the onset of a behavioral response. 
In the remainder, I will refer to stimulus-related potentials exclusively. The ERP in a 
single trial is overlaid by steadily varying background activity (see next section), whereas 
the event-related response, i.e., the transmission of electrical current after transducing 
an incoming stimulus by the receptor (sometimes called evoked potential, see Luck, 
2005), is thought to be relatively invariant with respect to time. To distill the evoked 
response, averaging many trials will cancel the time-varying components (background 
and induced activity) in the signal and leave the stimulus-locked components. Early 
components, i.e., roughly up to 100ms following stimulus onset, usually have a marked 
peak either in the positive or negative direction and mainly depend on external factors 
like stimulus magnitude (“exogenous components”; Luck, 2005). Endogenous 
components, instead, depend on internal factors like awareness of stimulation, 
attentional deployment or reporting related activity (Pitts, Metzler, & Hillyard, 2014; 
Silverstein et al., 2015a). Potential amplitudes across time for a specific channel or group 
of channels illustrate such evoked components where zero marks the onset of the 
stimulus. Complementary, one calculates the potential amplitude at a specific time, e.g., 
at the peak of a specific component, for all channels as a topographic map. Because this 
thesis investigates event-related potentials to somatosensory stimulation, topographic 
maps show maximum component peak distributions close to central gyrus, i.e., at 
midline EEG channels. As a convention, I will call these ERPs “somatosensory evoked 
potentials” (SEP).  
 
2.1.6 Spectral Analysis resolved over time 
As mentioned in the previous section, EEG also captures activity that is not strictly 
phase-locked to the onset of an external stimulus. Simply averaging single trials would 
suppress such signal variations. Often these variations show a certain periodicity over 
time. Hans Berger (1929) gave the first record of a ten times per second (i.e., 10 Hz) 
waxing and waning human EEG, the so-called alpha rhythm. One way to extract such 
rhythms is by convolving the single trial data with so-called morlet wavelets (MW). 
Morlet wavelets are complex valued sinusoids of the frequency of interest (f) multiplied 
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by a Gaussian window. Convolution of the single trial signal with the MW results in a 
time-frequency response of the trial that enhances frequency components that are 
similar to the MW and suppresses others (Cohen, 2014). The TFR is a smoothed 
representation of f localized in time (t), i.e., it depends on neighboring time points and 
frequencies. This smoothing—or the precision of the TFR—can be controlled by 
adjusting the width of the Gaussian window with  =  ⁄ 2 ∗ , where c is the 
number of cycles of f the MW should “look for” in the signal. With a wider Gaussian 
window, i.e., more frequency cycles, more sustained oscillatory effects can be extracted. 
Accordingly, narrow Gaussian windows track more transient changes. Importantly, this 
comes with a trade-off with respect to frequency precision: the more localized in time, 
the broader the smoothing across frequencies and vice versa. The following formula 
constructs a complex morlet wavelet for a discrete time period t and the just introduced 
parameters: 
 
  = !"
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The first part of the formula is the Gaussian window that is multiplied by a complex 
sinusoid, indicated by the i, of the second part. The literature discusses at length some 
further details to the method (e.g., Cohen, 2014). The point here was to illustrate why 
averaging of single-trial TFRs may not suppress activity that is not phase-locked. 
Depending on the amount of temporal smoothing it is less critical whether an oscillatory 
activity appears several milliseconds earlier or later across the to-be-averaged trials as 
long as the time window of the MW can capture it.  
If the oscillatory activity is related to the onset of a stimulus but not strictly phase-
locked to it, one often refers to as induced time-frequency response (iTFR). iTFR 
amplitudes in the alpha (8–14 Hz) and beta band (15–30 Hz) are known to decrease 
upon stimulus presentation with respect to a pre-stimulus baseline (van Ede, Szebényi, 
& Maris, 2014), which has been attributed to serve different functions ranging from 
processing of the incoming stimulation to higher cognitive processes (Neuper & 
Klimesch, 2006; Nierhaus, Schön, Becker, Ritter, & Villringer, 2009; Pfurtscheller & 
Lopes da Silva, 1999; Sauseng et al., 2005). 
However, oscillatory rhythms may also fluctuate spontaneously, i.e., without being 
evoked or induced by a stimulus, e.g., in the resting state (Papo, 2013) or the period 
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before a stimulation (the “baseline”), the so-called background activity (Nierhaus et al., 
2009). There are at least three different background rhythms in the 8–14 Hz range 
related to the brain area processing the sensory modality: the occipital alpha rhythm 
(visual alpha), the Rolandic alpha rhythm (somatosensory alpha or mu) and the tau 
rhythm (auditory alpha, Nierhaus et al., 2009). The mu rhythm amplitude, which is 
central to the current thesis, has been shown to inversely correlate with BOLD signal 
activity (Ritter, Moosmann, & Villringer, 2009; Yin, Liu, & Ding, 2016) and reduced 
amplitude values to be predictive for upcoming stimulus detection (Schubert, Haufe, 
Blankenburg, Villringer, & Curio, 2008) and greater attentional deployment (van Ede et 
al., 2014). 
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2.2 Psychophysical assessment of subthreshold stimulation 
In this chapter, means for assessing the individual threshold are explored and validated. 
The goal was to derive a practical assessment procedure that is both fast in the 
application (section 2.2.1) and reliable in its estimation of an absolute detection 
threshold (section 2.2.2). 
 
2.2.1 A method for assessing the individual absolute detection threshold 
(ADTH) 
It is known that longer stimulation of cortical areas increases the probability of reporting 
a sensation (Libet et al., 1967; Ray et al., 1999a), which suggests the duration of neuronal 
activation to be an essential factor determining conscious and unconscious experience. 
E.g., Ray and colleagues (1999) reported the lowest (cortical) absolute detection 
thresholds for stimulus trains lasting ≥ 1000ms resulting from averaged trials of 
ascending and descending electrical current intensities (method of limits, see section 
2.1.2). Shorter stimulation trains resulted in increased ADTH, i.e., the more electrical 
current had to be applied in order to exert a conscious percept. This result is congruent 
with our experience from the laboratory for ADTH assessment with healthy volunteers. 
It is usually much easier (and faster) for participants to get an idea of the perceptual 
quality of electrical stimulation presented with longer stimulus durations (e.g., 1sec of 7 
Hz monophasic current stimulation) rather than irregular sub-Hz single pulses, 
especially for untrained participants. Thus, manipulating the duration of peripheral 
electrical stimulation may lead to lower ADTH for longer stimulation trains than for 
single pulses; however, no one, so far, reported a systematic assessment with such 
stimuli. 
Furthermore, the primary concern with stimulation intensities below ADTH is 
whether they are indeed “subthreshold,” i.e., whether those stimuli exert chance 
performance or, more precisely, observers do not respond more often with “yes” (hit-
rate) than for trials without any stimulation (false-alarm-rate, fA-rate). Comparing 
response rates is straightforward if the fA-rate is greater than zero indicating that the 
individual criterion is placed within the internal noise distribution (see also section 1.3 
and 2.1.3). However, both measures—hit-rates to subthreshold stimulation and false-
alarm-rates—being zero might blur a true sensitivity to subthreshold stimulation if the 
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observer rather tends to respond with “no” (overly conservative response bias). Thus, 
despite showing chance performance to subthreshold stimulation, internal signal and 
noise distribution might be separated. Assessing ADTH with longer stimulation 
durations than applied during the main experiment would, at least partly, account for 
this problem when an observer’s criterion is low (i.e., overly conservative). 
In order to test stimulation duration effects on ADTH, we ran a psychophysics 
experiment comparing the estimates of our manual DS7 threshold assessment 
procedure (section 2.1.2) conducted with either 7 Hz stimulation or irregular single 
pulse stimulation (roughly around 0.5 Hz).  
 
Methods 
Participants 
Eight participants (age range 22–29 yrs, mean 25.4 ± 2.6 yrs S.D.; 7 females) volunteered 
and gave their informed consent to take part in the study. The local ethics committee 
at the medical faculty of the University of Leipzig approved the study. 
 
Experimental Procedures 
Somatosensory Stimulation and Task Design 
The Experimenter manually assessed ADTH of the left index finger as described in 
section 2.1.2 via electrical stimulation through a pair of steel wire ring electrodes 
controlled by a constant current stimulator (DS7). The electrical current step size for 
the fine adjustment was 0.05 mA. Participants underwent a threshold assessment two 
times for two different stimulation conditions: 7Hz pulse trains and single irregular 
pulses (ISP). Repetition of threshold assessment allowed estimating threshold stability 
over time. The order of stimulation conditions alternated after, an across participants, 
randomized starting condition. Stimulation duration within a trial was 2–3 seconds to 
allow at least two pulses in the ISP condition triggered at a stimulation rate of roughly 
0.5Hz, i.e., every two seconds on average with a pseudo-random jitter of ±300ms. Each 
threshold assessment took about 5 minutes, which makes up 20 minutes per participant 
for the whole experiment. 
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Behavioral Analysis 
ADTH values (in mA) for all conditions were statistically analyzed in a 2 by 2 within-
subject repeated measurement analysis of variance (ANOVA) with the factors 
“stimulation frequency” (7Hz, ISP) and “measurement” (1,2) using the “ez-package” 
(Lawrence, 2013) in R, as well as post hoc t-tests for condition contrasts. The 
visualization was produced with a custom Matlab script.  
 
Results 
Threshold assessment resulted in lower current values (in milliampere) for the 7Hz 
condition (M=1.6 mA; SD=0.38 mA; range: 1.1–2.08 mA) as compared to the ISP 
condition (M=1.88 mA; SD=0.44 mA; range: 1.2–2.25 mA). We found a small but 
significant interaction effect between stimulation frequency and measurement 
(F(1,7)=7, p=0.033, ƞ2G=0.0003) indicating that a threshold shift within the sample after 
roughly 10 minutes depends on stimulation frequency. Furthermore, there was a 
significant main effect of stimulation frequency (F(1,7)=7.81, p=0.027, ƞ2G=0.11), 
whereas factor measurement was not significant (F(1,7)<1.2). Threshold assessment 
with 7Hz stimulation consistently resulted in lower ADTH values than stimulation with 
single irregular pulses at a rate of 0.5Hz. 7Hz ADTH current values were lowest for all 
participants as can be observed in figure 1. Post hoc t-tests for the measurement factor 
contrasts of 7Hz and 0.5Hz irregular single pulse stimulation did not reveal a significant 
effect (t(7)=-0.36, p=0.7 and t(7)=-1.67, p=0.14, respectively). Descriptively, ADTH for 
7Hz stimulation on average increased by 0.006mA and for ISP by 0.03mA from the 
first to the second measurement (time difference ~10 minutes). 
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Discussion 
This experiment set out to test the influence of stimulation repetition rate on individual 
ADTH estimates of monophasic electrical currents across time. The results show that 
the threshold assessment with stimulation trains (7Hz) results in lower ADTH estimates 
than threshold assessment with short single irregular pulses at 0.5Hz. Furthermore, 
threshold estimates are relatively stable throughout at least 10 minutes. The interaction 
between stimulation condition and measurement, together with the post hoc t-tests, 
points toward a possible threshold shift for 0.5Hz stimulation. However, effect size 
here is tiny, and the average shift is smaller than the resolution of the threshold 
procedure (current step size was 0.05mA).  
Figure 1. ADTH current values in milliampere for all conditions and all participants (empty circles) 
showing lower thresholds when stimulated with regular 7Hz compared to jittered 0.5Hz pulses. 
Consecutive measurements are indicated by the label suffixes “Meas1” for the first and “Meas2” 
for the second measurement. Lines connect ADTH values from the different stimulation 
conditions for each participant. 
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The results of peripheral stimulation show a striking concordance with studies in 
which cortical sensory areas were stimulated directly in order to exert a tactile sensation 
(Libet et al., 1967; Ray et al., 1999a): the longer the stimulation, the lower the ADTH 
flooring at stimulation train duration ≥ 1000ms. Thus, extensive neural activation may 
lead to a higher probability of consciously perceiving sensory stimulation.  
The stability 7Hz ADTH estimate over time allows further studies the application 
of stimulation near ADTH for which variations in stimulus detection probability caused 
by threshold shifts is unlikely for at least 10 minutes. It has to be noted, however, that 
the experiment did not test more extended measurement periods. Vigilance drifts may 
play a role and could lead to ADTH variations earlier than 10 minutes for longer 
experimental sessions. Furthermore, ADTH assessment with higher stimulation 
repetition rates than applied during the main experiment should have an advantage 
when the experimenter strives for chance performance (e.g., during subthreshold 
stimulation), but false alarm rates of a participant are virtually zero. The criterion of 
such a participant cannot be estimated reliably and might hide an actual separation of 
internal signal and noise distribution. Referencing intensities of single irregular 
subthreshold stimulation to a long duration ADTH (e.g., 7Hz) will put the internal 
signal distribution of the former closer to the internal noise distribution thereby 
approaching zero sensitivity for subthreshold stimulation. The latter result warrants one 
of the central experimental manipulations of the following studies, namely the 
imperceptibility of subthreshold stimulation. 
In sum, manual threshold assessment with 7Hz stimuli of 2–3 seconds is a practical, 
reliable and relatively fast procedure to estimate the individual ADTH. 
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2.2.2 Validation of absolute detection threshold assessment by signal 
detection theory measures and Bayesian Null-Hypothesis testing 
 
This section partly originates in Forschack, N., Nierhaus, T., Müller, M. M., 
& Villringer, A. (2017). Alpha-Band Brain Oscillations Shape the Processing 
of Perceptible as well as Imperceptible Somatosensory Stimuli during 
Selective Attention. The Journal of Neuroscience, 37(29), 6983-6994, but 
addresses the psychophysics experiment and its results in detail. 
 
While the previous study described a successful setup for measuring the ADTH, chance 
performance for stimulation intensities below ADTH yet remains to be shown. In this 
psychophysics study, we, therefore, evaluated the observer’s performance in a signal 
detection theory (SDT) framework allowing the estimation of perceptual sensitivity 
independent of the observer’s response bias (Swets, 1964). Thus, the design included 
catch trials, i.e., trials without any stimulation. However, as in a classical SDT 
experiment, observers discriminate only between two situations (trials with or without 
a stimulus of fixed intensity), this will likely result in significant variations of observers’ 
vigilance in the case of either presenting catch trials or stimuli below ADTH, i.e., 
subthreshold and putative imperceptible stimulation. We, therefore, applied a variant of 
the classical design called two-response classification, in which several stimulus 
intensities are randomly chosen on each trial (Macmillan & Creelman, 2004). 
Specifically, stimulus magnitudes ranged from subthreshold to consciously 
perceivable—however not painful—suprathreshold intensities making the task more 
engaging. As the name “two-response” suggests, the participant responds “yes” if a 
current pulse can be felt and “no” otherwise. Importantly, we applied the very same 
procedure for ADTH determination as in the previous experiment and determined 
perceptual sensitivity (d’) for seven stimulation intensities along the individual 
psychometric function. 
The crucial test for rejecting conscious perception is to show zero perceptual 
sensitivity (d’=0) that indicates chance performance by the observers. However, as we 
have seen previously (section 2.1.3), this is testing the null-hypothesis (NH) and cannot 
be accomplished with classical test theoretic statistics. Therefore, we used a Bayes-factor 
approach (Rouder et al., 2009) in order to evaluate evidence for the NH—i.e., 
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subthreshold stimulation exerts zero perceptual performance—against the alternative 
hypothesis that observers perceive it above chance. 
 
Methods 
Participants 
We invited 14 volunteers (age range 22–32 yrs, mean 26.7 ± 2.8 yrs S.D.; 7 females) 
that were all right-handed (mean 90.4 ± 11.7 S.D.) and included in the analysis. The 
local ethics committee at the medical faculty of the University of Leipzig approved the 
study. 
 
Experimental Procedures 
Somatosensory Stimulation 
The same stimulator and electrode setup as in the previous study was used, except that 
a custom-built interface to the DS7 allowed automatic adjustment of stimulation 
magnitudes in steps of 0.1mA. Custom scripts running in the stimulation software 
“Presentation” (Neurobehavioral Systems, San Francisco, U.S.A.) triggered electrical 
pulses. 
 
Threshold Assessment and Task Design 
The experimental session was divided into five blocks (duration ~7-8 minutes per 
block) each containing 120 trials with or without stimulation. Preceding each block, a 
trained experimenter manually assessed the individual ADTH with the two-step 
procedure described in section 2.1.2, i.e., in the same way as in the previous study. A 
stimulation trial during the experimental session contained a single current pulse scaled 
with one out of seven different intensities defined relative to the ADTH. There were 
trials with two different subthreshold intensities (subTH-30%, subTH-15%, i.e., 70% 
and 85% of ADTH intensity, 100 trials each), the ADTH intensity (60 trials), three near-
threshold intensities (NTH25%, NTH50%, NTH75%, 60 trials each), whose current 
intensities equally divided the distance (in mA) between ADTH and the suprathreshold 
intensity (STH, 60 trials). The latter was individually adjusted to be the first that the 
participant perceived throughout all trials during a stimulus detection run preceding 
each block. This assessment applied five different intensities above ADTH and 
separated by 0.1mA (five repetitions for each and five catch trials) that remained 
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constant for two minutes (method of constants). If the experimenter could not identify 
the STH intensity, the participant conducted further stimulus detection runs, with 
stimulation intensities increased by 0.2mA, until STH criterion was reached. 
During an experimental trial, participants performed a forced-choice Yes/No 
detection (1AFC) task. A trial started with gaze fixation at a centrally presented cross 
on a monitor screen in front of the participants. In a period of 500ms up to 2500ms 
after fixation onset, participants either received a pseudo-randomly presented single 
current pulse scaled by one of the seven individually defined intensities (500 trials) or 
no stimulation (100 catch trials). Upon switch from fixation cross to question mark, 
participants indicated detection of a stimulus by pressing the left (“detected”) or the 
right button (“nothing detected”) of a response box with the index or middle finger of 
the right hand, respectively. As soon as participants pressed either button, the question 
mark disappeared, and a new trial started. 
 
Behavioral Analysis 
Hit- and false alarm rates as well as d-prime (see section 2.1.3) were calculated across 
blocks. Individual response tendency, i.e., the criterion, in a two-response classification 
task is given by: 
 
+, !+,-. = −
, 
 
where the function z(x) is the inverse-normal transform and converts the false alarm 
rate to a z-score (Macmillan & Creelman, 2004). For any stimulation magnitude for 
which perceptual sensitivity, i.e., d’, is below this z–score, participants will have decided 
to have nothing perceived on more than half of the trials for the specific stimulation 
magnitude. 
D-prime values of all stimulation intensities are tested against zero by one-sample 
t-tests and visualized via boxplots using Matlab. Stimulation conditions that did not 
show any significant effect were submitted to a Bayes factor analysis incorporating the 
non-informative JZS-prior (scaling factor r=√2/2≈0.707) in order to evaluate the 
evidence for the null hypothesis against the alternative (see section 2.1.3 for details). 
This approach was implemented in R using the “BayesFactor”-package. Because 
different JZS prior widths alter the odds ratio of evidence of competing hypotheses, 
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Bayes factor analysis was repeated for different r ranging from 0.1 to 1.5 putting 
relatively more weight on small to large effect sizes, respectively. The prior scaling effect 
has been visualized using the statistics software JASP (JASP Team, 2018). Additionally, 
to test whether observers are still able to classify stimulation below ADTH, d’ values 
for the subthreshold stimulation intensities were compared via a paired Bayes factor 
test.  
 
Results 
Single electrical current pulses were applied in seven different intensities fitted to the 
individual psychometric function and ranged from intensities below absolute detection 
threshold to consciously perceivable intensities (table 1): 
 
Table 1 shows the average applied electrical current in milliampere (mA) for all stimulation 
conditions: 1=subTH-30%, 2=subTH-15%, 3=ADTH, 4=NTH25%, 5=NTH50%, 6=NTH75%, 
7=STH. 1 and 2 are defined relative to ADTH intensity. 4, 5 and 6 divide the ADTH-STH interval 
equally. M = mean, SD = standard deviation. 
CONDITION 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
M (mA) 1.07 1.29 1.51 1.81 2.12 2.39 2.67 
SD (mA) 0.32 0.38 0.45 0.47 0.54 0.62 0.72 
Range (mA) 0.64–
1.74 
0.78–
2.08 
0.9–
2.46 
1.18–
2.68 
1.3–
3.12 
1.4–
3.54 
1.5–
4.04 
Rel. Intensity 0.71 0.85 1 1.22 1.44 1.64 1.85 
 
Participant’s sensitivity to single electrical current pulses increased, as expected, with 
the size of stimulation magnitude from ADTH to STH (ADTH: d’=0.12; t(13)=1.28; 
p=0.11; NTH25%: d’=0.37; t(13)=2.96; p<0.01; NTH50%: d’=0.79; t(13)=6.06; 
p<0.0001; NTH75%: d’=1.62; t(13)=6.64; p<0.00001; STH: d’=2.56; t(13)=10.66; 
p<0.0000001). Subthreshold stimulation trials, however, exerted d’ values close to zero 
(figure 2; subTH-30%: d’=0.04; subTH-15%: d’=-0.09; all t(13)<0.53). Observers’ 
response criteria ranged from 0.49 to 2.58 (M=1.73; SD=0.68) indicating that, in this 
experiment, observers mainly reported to detect stimuli 5 to 7, but not stimuli 1 to 4.  
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D-prime of ADTH intensities and below are not significantly different from zero and 
therefore, were submitted to a Bayes factor analysis to test whether the evidence for 
chance performance outweighs evidence for the alternative hypothesis of above chance 
performance. Bayes factors of the one-sided test of d’ values confirm chance 
performance for both subthreshold stimulation magnitudes with positive to moderate 
evidence in favor for the NH (BF01: 2.409 (subTH-30%); 6.88 (subTH-15%)). Widely 
different scaling of the JZS prior revealed that evidence for the null hypothesis, i.e., 
chance performance after subthreshold stimulation, outweighs evidence for the 
alternative for virtually all prior widths between 0.1 and 1.5 (figure 3). Evidence for the 
ADTH data is ambiguous, with the posterior odds instead favoring the alternative when 
the expected effect size is small (i.e., narrow prior) than when the prior weights more 
prominent effects more strongly (wide prior, figure 3). 
 
Figure 2. Boxplots depict individually averaged D-prime values across the sample for the seven 
different stimulation intensity categories showing that participants are zero sensitive to 
stimulation intensities below the individually adjusted ADTH. Absolute detection threshold 
served as individual reference for decreasing subTH stimulation intensities by 15% or 30%. NTH 
intensities were tuned to 25%, 50%, or 75% of the distance between absolute detection threshold
and 100% STH. Raw hit and false alarm rates were corrected according to Hautus (1995) to account 
for extreme values (i.e., no responses to target or catch trials). Notches indicate 95% confidence 
intervals. 
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Figure 3. Bayes factor tests of the d-prime values of subTH-30% (top left), subTH-15% (top right) 
and ADTH (bottom) stimulus intensities. Evidence for the null hypothesis (not different from 
zero) against the alternative hypothesis (greater than zero) along various Cauchy prior widths is 
depicted as likelihood values greater than one. The grey filled circle marks the prior width used in 
the main analysis. 
 
The Bayes factor for d’ values of stimulation intensities 85% against 70% of ADTH 
electrical current (JZS prior width r=√2/2) revealed that there is 9.16 times more 
evidence that perceptual sensitivity to both subthreshold intensities (subTH-15% and 
subTH-30%) is essentially the same. 
 
Discussion 
This experiment set out to validate the threshold assessment procedure described in the 
previous study (section 2.2.1). Specifically, we asked whether the definition of individual 
subthreshold intensities relative to ADTH results in zero perceptual sensitivity (i.e., d’) 
to these stimulation conditions, i.e., whether these stimuli are reliably undetectable. 
Indeed, results of the two-response classification task revealed that, contrary to 
stimulation intensities above the absolute detection threshold, sensitivity exerted by 
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intensities below ADTH did not vary significantly from zero. Model evidence of chance 
performance for subthreshold stimulation outperforms the model of above chance 
performance as shown by Bayes factor statistics. Reasonable variations of the prior 
width did not change the qualitative conclusion of evidence favoring the NH, which 
indicates that Bayes factor results are robust. 
Importantly, the experiment included catch-trials, i.e., trials without any stimulation. 
Forced responses to catch-trials allowed the calculation of perceptual sensitivity that is 
independent of individual response bias. Thus, the absence of a behavioral effect for 
subthreshold stimulation cannot be explained by observers’ tendencies to rather 
respond with “no,” i.e., applying a conservative decision criterion. Criterion values per 
se varied over a range of more than two standard deviations across participants. Even 
for the most “liberal” measured criteria (about half a standard deviation above zero), 
perceptual sensitivity to subthreshold stimulation remained largely below decision 
criterion. In three cases, however, false alarm rates floored to zero. For these observers, 
the estimate of response bias might not be reliable and could, therefore, “mask” partial 
conscious processing of applied subthreshold intensities. Three arguments speak against 
this: (1) Criteria were set to the maximum value according to the log-linear rule (Hautus, 
1995). Applying the log-linear rule adds 0.5 to all four cells of the contingency table, 
thereby increasing the number of stimulus-present trials and catch-trials by one each. 
Simulations showed that for at least 100 trials of a 1AFC detection task, this method 
resulted in accurate and unbiased sensitivity values when the true d’ and false alarm rates 
were equal or smaller than one and 0.05, respectively (Hautus, 1995). In the current 
study, hits and false alarm rates were based on 100 trials for each subthreshold intensity 
and catch trials. (2) For threshold assessment, we used a 7Hz train of 1-second of 
electrical pulses. As we have seen before, stimulating at a higher rate results in a lower 
detection threshold estimate. Accordingly, the definition of subthreshold intensities 
relative to 7Hz detection threshold should converge the signal distribution of 
stimulation presented at lower rates to the internal noise distribution. (3) The same 
argument holds for the fact that intensities for subthreshold stimulation were at least 
15% lower than ADTH. Therefore, it is unlikely that the three observers showing zero 
false alarm rates are partially sensitive to subthreshold stimulation. 
Despite that a single action potential of an isolated axon innervating the receptive 
field of mechanoreceptors (Meissner corpuscles) in the glabrous skin might suffice to 
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exert above chance performance (Goodwin & Wheat, 2008; Johansson & Vallbo, 1979; 
Vallbo & Johansson, 1984), we could present transcutaneous electrical current 
stimulation that is reliably reported to be absent. This discrepancy might be explained 
by the convergence of receptive fields in higher-order stages of the somatosensory 
perceptual system, e.g., in primary somatosensory cortex (SI). There, lateral inhibitory 
connections may suppress neurons of neighboring receptive fields (Gardner & Kandel, 
2000; Kim, Gomez-Ramirez, Thakur, & Hsiao, 2015). Activation of many receptive 
fields by transcutaneous electrical stimulation might evoke mutual inhibition of the 
different types of neurons responding to the very receptive fields. The net activation is 
then smaller as compared to a circumscribed stimulation of a few mechanoreceptors 
specifically responding to spatially localized skin indentation. The critical question is 
whether subthreshold stimulation that is defined relative to ADTH still reaches higher 
order processing stages like SI. If this is the case, cortical activation to subthreshold 
stimulation may dissociate from cortical processing of suprathreshold stimulation. 
Thus, event-related potentials and functional magnetic resonance imaging might help 
to elucidate a putative difference, and that is the central topic of the next section.  
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2.3 Non-invasive neural markers of unconscious perception 
2.3.1 Neural Correlates of Undetectable Somatosensory Stimulation in EEG 
and fMRI 
In the previous section, we saw that transcutaneous electrical current stimulation allows 
tuning individual detection performance to chance level by adjusting stimulation 
intensities below ADTH. Here, I will shortly review findings in the literature and own 
work regarding the neural processing of putatively subthreshold, i.e., undetectable, 
stimulation for which a rigorous statistical validation was so far missing. Furthermore, 
I will discuss how quantitative measures of undetectable stimulation differ from 
detectable stimulation. 
In a set of experiments, we recently investigated the neural correlates of 
subthreshold stimulus processing both with EEG and with fMRI (Nierhaus et al., 2015). 
For this, stimulation intensities 15% below the ADTH were presented every four 
seconds on average with a presentation jitter of one second. Importantly, we assessed 
ADTH in the same way as described in study 2.2.1. Participants had no specific task 
and did not report any felt stimulation after every 15 minutes block out of three in the 
EEG or the 6 minutes blocks of the fMRI experiments of subthreshold stimulation. 
The former included an additional block of suprathreshold stimulation only. The latter 
consisted of two sessions with a different sample each, in which the first underwent a 
resting and a subthreshold stimulation block and the second additionally received a 
suprathreshold stimulation block. In the EEG, somatosensory evoked potentials (SEP) 
revealed a single positive deflection 60ms after subthreshold stimulus presentation (P1) 
over somatomotor areas contralateral to the stimulation site.  
On the contrary, suprathreshold stimulation caused a bigger P1 that was followed 
by a negative component around 170ms.  
Furthermore, Rolandic alpha amplitudes increased relative to a pre-stimulus 
baseline contralateral to subthreshold stimulation and decreased for suprathreshold 
stimulation. A follow-up study with a slightly adjusted design that included infrequently 
occurring suprathreshold stimuli in addition to the subthreshold stimulation confirmed 
the increase of Rolandic alpha amplitude after the latter, showing that this effect is 
robust.  
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In the first fMRI session, data-driven and spatially assumption-free functional 
connectivity via eigenvector centrality mapping (ECM, (Lohmann et al., 2001) showed 
a decoupling of BOLD activity of the somatosensory areas (SI) from whole brain 
activity during subthreshold stimulation compared to stimulation-free blocks. 
Suprathreshold stimulation in session two did not varied EC compared to rest, but 
functional coupling was more substantial than in subthreshold stimulation blocks. 
This study showed for the first time non-invasively electroencephalographic 
components that may indicate processing of putatively unconscious perception, i.e., 
undetectable stimulation. Previously, this has been observed in small patient samples 
undergoing brain surgery (Libet et al., 1967; Ray et al., 1999). Interestingly, both 
observed a stimulus-evoked component 50–60ms following subthreshold stimulation 
that closely corresponds to the evoked activity measured by Nierhaus et al. (2015). 
Furthermore, functional connectivity results are in line with previous fMRI studies 
showing a negative BOLD contrast for subthreshold stimulation in SI (Blankenburg et 
al., 2003) and a reduced response to suprathreshold stimulation when intermingled with 
subthreshold stimulation trains to the adjacent finger (Taskin et al., 2008).  
Together, these results strongly suggest that perception of stimulation below 
ADTH dissociates qualitatively from stimulation above ADTH, illustrating neural 
processes rather dominant in unconscious and conscious perception, respectively 
(Merikle, Joordens, & Stolz, 1995). In Nierhaus et al. (2015), a single early small positive 
potential and importantly no detectable later ERP response characterized the processing 
of subthreshold stimulation. As these later ERP components have been associated with 
subjective awareness (Auksztulewicz & Blankenburg, 2013; Auksztulewicz et al., 2012), 
it seems that the subthreshold stimuli do not “proceed” to a pre-conscious or conscious 
state. Interestingly, in Nierhaus et al. (2015) participants had no task. Therefore, the 
N170 component that was only present after suprathreshold, i.e., consciously 
perceivable stimulation, but not following subthreshold stimuli, might indicate a proper 
marker of the neural correlates of consciousness (Aru et al., 2012; Hillyard et al., 1971). 
However, different stimulation strengths or the absence of conscious perception might 
cause this effect. One could speculate that it is both: along with the reduced stimulation 
strength, there is no neural correlate related to conscious processing (Nierhaus et al., 
2015). To investigate this further, an EEG design that contrasts perceived versus 
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unperceived stimuli with the same stimulation strength may reveal neural correlates 
related to detection rather than stimulation intensity (see next section). 
Another qualitative difference is that the commonly found event-related decrease 
of the alpha band after suprathreshold stimulation turns into an increase when 
participants are receiving subthreshold stimuli. Post-stimulus decreases in alpha 
amplitude are usually interpreted as an indicator of local ongoing sensory processing 
whereas an increase in amplitude indicates inhibition of the respective brain area 
(Buzsaki, 2011; Jensen & Mazaheri, 2010; Moosmann et al., 2003; Neuper & Klimesch, 
2006; Pfurtscheller, 1989; Pfurtscheller & Lopes da Silva, 1999; Ritter et al., 2009; 
Scheeringa, Petersson, Kleinschmidt, Jensen, & Bastiaansen, 2012). An increase after 
subthreshold stimulation is remarkable given the fact that undetected near-threshold 
stimuli, i.e., above ADTH, have been reported to induce a decrease just as 
suprathreshold stimulation (Palva et al., 2005). It is tempting to speculate that this 
finding (by Palva et al. 2005) may be an indicator of residual conscious processing 
despite being classified as undetected (near-threshold) by the subjective response. 
Alongside the reduced seed-based correlation from SI to frontal-parietal BOLD activity 
in Nierhaus et al. (2015), the increased alpha amplitude supports the notion that 
processing of subthreshold stimulation is terminated at an early stage in SI probably due 
to prevalent local inhibition. 
The search for neural correlates of unconsciousness requires stimulus energies as 
small as possible but sufficient to evoke a measurable signal. In turn, to show compelling 
unconscious behavioral or neural effects, any study on the topic must provide evidence 
for qualitative dissociations in the data or chance performance for the alleged below 
consciousness condition (Merikle et al., 1995). Nierhaus et al. (2015) have shown the 
former. In the next study, I will show both by concurrently measuring detection 
performance and the neural correlates of unconsciousness: can we observe qualitative 
neural differences between supra- and subthreshold stimulation for which we prove 
observers’ perceptual sensitivity being at the chance level? 
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2.3.2 Prediction of stimulus perception by features of the evoked potential 
for different stimulation intensities along the psychometric function 
 
Investigating neural processes of perception without awareness may disclose neural 
phenomena that preclude conscious perception (Baumgarten et al., 2017; Forschack, 
Nierhaus, Müller, & Villringer, 2017; Merikle & Daneman, 1998; Nierhaus et al., 2015). 
Additionally, it may reveal markers that are necessary but, apparently, not sufficient for 
conscious perception and therefore might reflect prerequisites of the neural correlates 
of consciousness (NCC, Aru et al., 2012). Research dedicated to the identification of 
electrophysiological predictors of somatosensory detection agrees on the involvement 
of mid-range event-related components occurring after stimulus presentation, however, 
differs on the involvement of earlier event-related processes, specifically regarding the 
strength of the P50 (Auksztulewicz & Blankenburg, 2013; Auksztulewicz et al., 2012; 
Frey et al., 2016; Palva et al., 2005). These studies typically applied stimulation 
magnitudes individually tuned to exert detection on 50% of the trials, often called “near-
threshold” (NTH) stimulation. Whereas Auksztulewicz and colleagues (2012, 2013) 
found the most prominent effect of perceptual awareness to occur as a negative 
potential over contralateral somatosensory areas roughly peaking 140 ms after stimulus 
presentation, both Frey and colleagues (2016) and Palva et al. (2005) reported global 
awareness differences even before 60 ms.  
A different line of research investigated electrophysiological to stimulation below 
the absolute detection threshold (ADTH, Forschack et al., 2017; Libet et al., 1967; 
Nierhaus et al., 2015; Ray et al., 1999). For such imperceptible stimuli, observers exert 
equal detection probability as compared to catch trials, i.e., trials without any 
stimulation. Stimulation below ADTH (i.e., subthreshold) evokes a P50 but no further 
components. While these results agree to the notion that the mere presence of the P50 
is not sufficient for stimulus detection, a proper test to the hypothesis that its amplitude 
or latency might play a role in the detection of stimulation along the individual 
psychometric function, is hitherto absent. On the contrary, data from a somatosensory 
extinction patient revealed that attenuation rather than elimination of somatosensory 
responses in the damaged hemisphere might cause tactile extinction (Eimer, Maravita, 
Van Velzen, Husain, & Driver, 2002).  
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Thus, the current study set out to quantify the contribution of somatosensory 
electrophysiological response strength in stimulus detection by explicitly manipulating 
stimulation intensities along the individual psychometric function of healthy human 
volunteers. Specifically, we asked (1) do features (amplitude and latency) of stimulus-
evoked potentials in the EEG change gradually for varying stimulation magnitudes and 
(2), which features predict stimulus detection. Furthermore, as it has been observed 
previously that pre-stimulus oscillatory amplitude influences tactile perception 
(Anderson & Ding, 2011; Baumgarten, Schnitzler, & Lange, 2016; Forschack et al., 
2017; Linkenkaer-Hansen, Nikulin, Palva, Ilmoniemi, & Palva, 2004; Schubert, Haufe, 
et al., 2008; Weisz, Müller, Jatzev, & Bertrand, 2014; Zhang & Ding, 2009), we explored 
(3) the possible modulation of features of the evoked potential by pre-stimulus 
somatosensory alpha-band amplitudes. 
 
Methods 
Participants 
The local ethics committee at the medical faculty of the University of Leipzig approved 
the study. Before participation, all volunteers underwent a comprehensive neurological 
examination that screened for a history of neurological or psychiatric diseases or any 
medication. Forty healthy volunteers participated (age range 20–35 yrs, mean 27.2 ± 3.8 
yrs S.D.; 21 females); all were right-handed (laterality score according to the Oldfield 
questionnaire: mean 92.4 ± 12.8 S.D., over a range of –100 (entirely left-handed) to 100 
(entirely right-handed), (Oldfield, 1971). Data of four participants were discarded due 
to defective (2) or artifactual (2) EEG recordings, and so 36 datasets in total were 
analyzed. 
 
Experimental Procedures 
Somatosensory Stimulation 
Hardware, stimulation setup and threshold assessment for ADTH and STH were 
identical to the previous study. The experimental session comprised ten blocks 
(duration ~7 minutes per block) each starting with the threshold assessment. Every 
block contained 134 trials with or without stimulation (i.e., 1340 trial overall). Six 
different intensities were defined relative to the ADTH. There were trials with two 
different subthreshold intensities (subTH-30%, subTH-15%, i.e. 70% and 85% of 
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ADTH intensity, 420 trials each), the ADTH intensity (100 trials), two near-threshold 
intensities (NTH33%, NTH66%: 100 trials each), whose current intensities equally 
divided the interval (in mA) between ADTH and the suprathreshold intensity (STH: 
100 trials). 
 
Task Design 
During an experimental trial, participants performed a forced-choice Yes/No detection 
(1AFC) task. Trial duration was fixed to 3000 ms and started with gaze fixation at a 
centrally presented cross on a monitor screen in front of the participants. In a period of 
1200 ms up to 2000 ms after fixation onset, a stimulation routine either presented a 
single current pulse scaled by one of the six individually defined intensities pseudo-
randomly (1240 trials), or no stimulation (100 catch trials). Upon switch from fixation 
cross to question mark (i.e., at 2000 ms after stimulation onset), participants indicated 
detection of a stimulus by pressing the left (“detected”) or the right button (“nothing 
detected”) of a response box with the index or middle finger of the right hand, 
respectively. The question mark either disappeared after 1000ms or as soon as 
participants pressed either button; then a new trial started. 
 
EEG acquisition 
During 10 stimulation blocks each lasting roughly seven minutes, a BrainAmp actiCap 
system (Brain Products, Munich, Germany) recorded EEG continuously from 62 scalp 
channels (61 scalp electrodes plus 1 electrode recording the VEOG below the right eye) 
attached according to the 10-10 system (Oostenveld & Praamstra, 2001), referenced to 
midfrontal electrode (FCz) and grounded to an electrode placed at the sternum. 
Impedances were kept below five kΩ for all channels, sampling frequency 2.5 kHz, 
analog filter low-cutoff at 0.1 Hz and high cutoff at 1000 Hz, and a low-pass finite 
impulse response filter (high cut-off: 150 Hz, transition bandwidth: 50 Hz) was applied 
before downsampling EEG time courses to 500 Hz. 
 
Behavioral Analysis 
In most aspects, behavioral data analysis was identical to the previous study. However, 
because in the current study there were fewer catch trials (by a factor of four) than trials 
with subthreshold stimulation intensities, the former were expected to show more 
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variance concerning the probability of “yes”-responses. The z-transformation used for 
the calculation of d-prime values would artificially amplify differences especially for 
response rates below 0.1 that might result in d-prime values below zero. Therefore, 
Bayes factor analysis was implemented as paired one-sample tests of hit rates to 
subthreshold stimulation versus false alarm rates to catch trials. As in the previous study, 
d’ values for the subthreshold stimulation intensities were compared via a paired Bayes 
factor test to check whether observers are still able to classify stimulation below ADTH. 
 
EEG Data Analysis 
Preprocessing 
As a first step, we ran the standardized early-stage EEG processing pipeline (PREP, 
Bigdely-Shamlo, Mullen, Kreutz-Delgado, & Makeig, 2013) on the down-sampled data. 
This algorithm combines 50 Hz line noise removal by a sliding window multi-taper 
spectral regression approach (Mullen, 2012) and robust average referencing by 
iteratively detecting and interpolating noisy channels. Next, individual datasets 
underwent independent component analysis (ICA, adaptive mixture of independent 
component analyzers (AMICA, Palmer et al., 2011) both to remove sources of ocular 
and muscle artifacts as well as signals of other non-neural origin (Chaumon, Bishop, & 
Busch, 2015; Delorme, Palmer, Onton, Oostenveld, & Makeig, 2012; Li, Ma, Lu, & Li, 
2006). Before ICA, datasets were prepared by applying the following procedures: 
training datasets for ICA were high-pass filtered with 1 Hz, all blocks were 
concatenated, and contiguous epochs of one second were extracted, corrected for the 
average epoch potential, screened for non-stereotypical artifacts and rejected if 
contaminated. Then, an initial ICA was performed after which artifactual epochs were 
identified in ICA space using improbable data estimation on single and across all 
components and removed semi-automatically (function “pop_jointprob”, threshold 
limit for single channels: 4.5 SD, threshold limit for all channels: 2.5 SD, Delorme et al., 
2007). The resulting datasets were submitted to a second ICA (again using AMICA 
algorithm). We visually inspected the new set of components and identified artifactual 
components based on various features of IC topographies and time courses calculated 
by SASICA (Semi-Automated Selection of Independent Components of the 
electroencephalogram for Artifact correction, Chaumon et al., 2015). Specifically, we 
regarded components showing correlations with VEOG channel higher than 0.6 or 
 Empirical Evidence 
 2-55 
horizontal EOG (bipolarized potential of channel “FT7” and “FT8”) higher than 0.4, 
blink or eye movement typical topographies and IC source activity, abnormal frequency 
spectrum, i.e., high frequency or line noise, focal topographies as indicative of non-
neural origin. Only the unmixing and sphering matrices of artifact-free components 
were forward-projected to high-pass filtered continuous datasets for the subsequent 
analysis steps (function “pop_firws” Widmann et al., 2015); low cut-off of 0.1 Hz, 
maximum pass-band deviation: 0.001 and transition bandwidth: 0.02 Hz with filter 
order of 9056). On average, 24.6 (4.5 SD) components per participant were rejected 
(average median component number when sorted from highest to lowest explained 
variance: 33). 
After rejecting artifactual components, data for ERP analysis was downsampled to 
250 Hz (high cut-off: 75 Hz, transition bandwidth: 25 Hz) and low-pass filtered by a 
Kaiser windowed sinc finite impulse response filter with a high cut-off of 41 Hz (high 
cut-off maximum pass-band deviation: 0.0001 and transition bandwidth: 10.25 Hz with 
a filter order of 124). Proper epochs were cut from the continuous channel signals 
ranging from -1200 to 3600 ms relative to stimulus onset (t=0), from which the 
individual epoch mean was subtracted. Epochs that exceeded the joint logarithmic 
probability of 4.5 or 2.5 SD within or across independent components, respectively, 
were discarded after manually reviewing the alleged artifactual epochs (Delorme et al., 
2007). Additionally, trials that contained behavioral responses within -800 to 800 ms 
relative to stimulus onset as well as reaction times smaller than 150 ms or higher than 
1100 ms have been excluded. These epoch rejection steps resulted in the following 
average number of trials per stimulation condition: 374 (21 S.D.) subTH-30%, 371 (22 
S.D.) subTH-15%, 90 (5 S.D.) ADTH, 90 (5 S.D.) NTH33%, 88 (6 S.D.) NTH66%, 87 
(6 S.D.) STH and 89 (5 S.D.) for catch trials. Linear detrending was applied on the 
remaining trials over a time range of -0.6–1.2 ms to remove any sustained potential 
drifts. 
 
Amplitude and latency extraction of SEP components and their statistical analysis concerning 
stimulation intensity and pulse detection  
Analysis of SEP components was based on the average signal of an ad-hoc selection of 
contralateral central electrode sites (“C2”, “C4”, “C6”, “CP2”, “CP4”, and “CP6”). A 
topographical test of the post-stimulus period (0–300 ms) averaged across all 
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stimulation conditions compared to a pre-stimulus baseline ranging from -100 to 0 ms 
to stimulus onset was conducted to estimate the sensibility of this selection. For multiple 
comparison correction, we applied threshold-free cluster enhancement (TFCE) with a 
cluster threshold of p = 0.05 (cluster size exponent E = 0.5, statistical intensity exponent 
H = 2, Mensen & Khatami, 2013; Smith & Nichols, 2009). For this, topographical 
isocontour voltage maps of P50 and N150 component peaks are represented. 
Baseline corrected (-100 to 0 ms) P50 and N150 ERP peak amplitudes and latencies 
of the stimulation condition averages have been extracted for each participant for the 
averaged contralateral central electrode cluster signal as neural markers indicative of 
perceptual changes along the psychometric response function. To this end, we ran a 
peak and latency detection algorithm within time windows of interest: 32 to 76 ms for 
the P50 peak latency and 128 to 172 for the N150 peak latency. Average maximal 
component amplitudes and latency values were plotted together with respective within-
subject confidence intervals (Cousineau, Montréal, Paradis, & For, 2005; Loftus & 
Masson, 1994; Morey, 2008). Pairwise two-tailed t-tests (p<0.05) were calculated for 
each stimulation condition pair and corrected for multiple comparisons using false 
discovery rate (fdr, q=0.05, Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995; Genovese, Lazar, & Nichols, 
2002). 
We tested the effect of stimulus detection and stimulation intensity on 
somatosensory electrophysiological response strength by calculating SEPs separately 
for detected and rejected STH and NTH66% trials. Average potentials were required to 
consist of, at least, ten trials per condition to assure reasonable noise reduction. 
Therefore, data of four additional participants were rejected for this specific analysis. 
P50 and N150 amplitudes of the remaining 32 participants were subjected to a 2 x 2 
repeated measures ANOVA with factors “detection” (stimulus detected vs. rejected) 
and “stimulus intensity” (STH vs. NTH66%). ANOVA statistics and bootstrapped 
confidence intervals (resampling of subject indices for each condition with 10,000 
iterations) were computed with the ez-package developed by Mike Lawrence (2013, 
version 4.2-2, https://github.com/mike-lawrence/ez). Effect sizes were quantified as 
generalized eta-squared (η0
% , Bakeman, 2005). 
The six different stimulation intensities were fixed within each block. To test whether 
detected and rejected trials are comparable concerning stimulation intensities across 
blocks, we calculated the average stimulation current for each participant and 
 Empirical Evidence 
 2-57 
stimulation condition, separately for all trials classified being detected and rejected, 
respectively. Resulting values were submitted to a paired one-sample t-test. 
 
Rolandic Rhythms 
To discern Rolandic rhythms from occipital alpha activity, I used the same preselection 
of the central contralateral electrode cluster as in the ERP analysis above, which is 
consistent with electrodes found to be predictive for somatosensory masking (Schubert, 
Haufe, et al., 2008). For this, I convolved every single trial of all stimulation conditions 
with complex morlet wavelets tuned to include 5.5 cycles of frequencies ranging from 
4 to 42 Hz. Frequency bands of interest were defined based on the results by Schubert 
et al. (2008). However, neighboring alpha and beta bands in Schubert and colleagues 
(2008) were slightly overlapping. I, therefore, redefined frequency bands of interest to 
be more distinct. I.e., the alpha band ranged from 9 to 14 Hz and the beta band from 
20 to 35 Hz. Wavelet parameters resulted in the following frequency and time 
smoothing: 3.85 Hz at full-width-half-maximum (FWHM) and 114.5ms (+/- FWHM) 
at 9 Hz; 5.99 Hz (FWHM) and 73.6 ms (+/- FWHM) at 14 Hz; 8.56 Hz (FWHM) and 
51.5 ms at 20 Hz (+/- FWHM); and 14.99 Hz (FWHM) and 29.4 ms (+/- FWHM) at 
35 Hz. For the pre-stimulus window that is going to be tested for its predictive value in 
stimulus detection, I chose it to be as close as possible to stimulus presentation but 
without smearing into the post-stimulus window; i.e., this window should not include 
latencies higher than -114.5 ms relative to stimulus onset for the 9 Hz frequency 
response. This window I defined from -400 to -150 ms relative to stimulus onset, which 
is following the time window in which Schubert and colleagues (2008) found the 
frequency band effects. Statistical analysis was performed by testing the pre-stimulus 
time-frequency-band-of-interest response of the central contralateral electrode cluster 
for detected versus rejected stimulation (NTH66% and STH only) with cluster-based 
two-tailed paired t-tests (p-level was set to 0.01 and corrected for multiple comparisons 
by tfce, Mensen & Khatami, 2013). 
 
Prediction of stimulus detection by evoked potentials and Rolandic alpha amplitude 
To identify further neural markers predictive for stimulus detection, I calculated SEPs 
at averaged central contralateral electrode sites separately for detected and rejected 
finger pulses and averaged these across NTH66% and STH stimulation intensities. 
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Specifically, we tested whether P50 and N150 latency and amplitude are predictive for 
behavioral classification. To this end, I applied binomial regularized logistic regression 
together with six-fold cross-validation (James, Witten, Hastie, & Tibshirani, 2015) to 
select the essential neural markers for stimulus detection. This procedure selects the 
best model out of a set of predictors. Regularization was achieved by adding the so-
called lasso penalty—or ℓ1 norm—to the standard maximum-likelihood model 
coefficient optimization. The influence of this penalty was controlled by the tuning 
parameter λ ranging from 0 to 100, where zero puts no penalty on the coefficients of 
the full model and corresponds to standard generalized linear modeling (glm). With 
increasing λ, predictor coefficients are shrunk towards zero depending on their 
predictive value for behavioral response classification; thus, the higher λ, the simpler 
the model. For model selection, I chose the model that shows the smallest cross-
validation error (CVE) across all λ. 
To assess a probable influence of pre-stimulus Rolandic alpha amplitude on neural 
markers of stimulus processing and detection, i.e. ERPs, I averaged spectral amplitudes 
within the alpha band (9 to 14 Hz) for each participant across those time-frames that 
showed a significant difference between detected and rejected trials for averaged near-
threshold stimulation conditions (i.e. NTH66% and STH). After normalizing to the 
individual condition mean (Cousineau et al., 2005), these alpha band amplitudes were 
added as an additional factor to the model mentioned above and allowed to interact 
with the P50 and N150 amplitude. Again, I used 6-fold cross-validation in order to 
identify the optimal tuning parameter for regularization of the logistic regression model. 
Regularized logistic regression was implemented with the “glmnet” package in R 
(Friedman, Hastie, & Tibshirani, 2010). 
 
Results 
Behavioral responses  
Single electrical current pulses were applied in six different intensities fitted to the 
individual psychometric function and ranged from magnitudes below absolute detection 
threshold to consciously perceivable intensities (table 2): 
 
Table 2 shows the average applied electrical current in milliampere (mA) for all stimulation 
conditions: 1=subTH-30%, 2=subTH-15%, 3=ADTH, 4=NTH33%, 5=NTH66%, 6=STH. For 
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the relative intensities, stimulation magnitudes have been normalized to ADTH. M = mean, SD 
= standard deviation. 
CONDITION 1 2 3 4 5 6 
M (mA) 1.12 1.35 1.59 2.01 2.42 2.84 
SD (mA) 0.41 0.51 0.59 0.61 0.67 0.75 
Range (mA) 0.47–2.03 0.52–2.5 0.66–2.91 0.91–3.39 1.11–3.87 1.24–4.35 
Rel. Intensity 0.70 0.85 1 1.3 1.6 1.9 
 
Participant’s sensitivity to single electrical current pulses increased, as expected, with 
the size of stimulation magnitude from ADTH to STH (ADTH: d’=0.05; t(35)=0.82; 
p=0.21; NTH33%: d’=0.48; t(35)=5.81; p<0.000001; NTH66%: d’=1.53; t(35)=16.87; 
p<1.0*10^-15; STH: d’=3.03; t(35)=34.77; p<1.0*10^-15). Subthreshold stimulation 
trials, however, exerted d’ values close to zero (Figure 4, subTH-30%: d’=-0.16; subTH-
15%: d’=-0.19; all t(35)<-2.5). Observers’ response criteria ranged from 1.1 to 2.58 
(M=2.16; SD=0.41) indicating that, in this experiment, observers mainly reported to 
detect stimuli 5 to 6, but not stimuli 1 to 4.  
 
 
Figure 4. Boxplots depict individually averaged d-prime values across the sample for the six 
different stimulation intensity categories showing that participants are zero sensitive to 
stimulation intensities below the individually adjusted ADTH. Absolute detection threshold 
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served as an individual reference for decreasing subTH stimulation intensities by 15% or 30%. 
NTH intensities were tuned to 33% or 66% of the interval between the absolute detection threshold 
and 100% STH. Raw hit and false alarm rates were corrected according to Hautus (1995) to account 
for extreme values (i.e., no responses to target or catch trials). Notches indicate 95% confidence 
intervals. 
 
D-prime of ADTH intensities and below are not significantly higher than zero. This 
null-difference is, however, not proof of chance performance (NH) and therefore 
evidence for the null model was evaluated against evidence for the alternative hypothesis 
of above chance performance by Bayes factor statistics (Rouder et al., 2009). As 
subthreshold intensities might suffer from oversampling compared to catch-trials, the 
z-transformation of low “yes”-response rates would artificially amplify any difference 
between both conditions concerning d’ values. Thus, Bayes factors are calculated as 
paired one-sample one-sided test of the hit against false alarm rates and confirmed 
chance performance with moderate to strong evidence in favor for the NH 
(FAR=0.018; subTH-30%: HR=0.018, BF01=6.1; subTH-15%: HR=0.016, BF01=10.8). 
Widely different scaling of the JZS prior revealed that evidence for the null hypothesis, 
i.e., chance performance after subthreshold stimulation, outweighs evidence for the 
alternative for virtually all prior widths between 0.1 and 1.5 (Figure 5 b-c, left). Evidence 
for the ADTH data is mixed: the posterior odds favor the alternative when the expected 
effect size is small (i.e., narrow prior, r=0.0757) as compared to when the prior weights 
bigger effects more strongly (wide prior, Figure 5 d, left). Sequential tests show that the 
Bayes Factor reliably favors the NH across different sample sizes. 
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Figure 5. A: Distributions of “yes”-response rates across all participants (dots) for those 
stimulation conditions for which d-prime values were not different from zero and the condition 
without stimulation (catch trials). The horizontal black line indicates the average false alarm rate. 
B-D: Bayes factor tests of hit rates of subTH-30% (B), subTH-15% (C) and ADTH (D) stimulus 
intensities against catch trial condition. Evidence for the null hypothesis (hit rates not different 
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from false alarm rates) against the alternative hypothesis (hit rates greater than false alarm rates) 
along various Cauchy prior widths (left) is depicted as likelihood values higher than one. The grey 
filled circle marks the prior width used in the main analysis. On the right, sequential tests show 
evidence accumulation when adding single participants until the final sample size for three 
different prior widths. For subthreshold intensities, there is at least moderate evidence favoring 
the null hypothesis for all sample sizes.  
 
To further the evidence for the NH, we calculated a Bayes factor meta-analysis (Rouder 
& Morey, 2011) based on the current detection rates of subthreshold stimulation 
intensities and the similar psychophysics dataset from section 2.2.2. Accumulated 
evidence moderately to strongly favors chance performance for subthreshold 
stimulation intensities (r=√2/2, subTH-30%: BF01=6.73, subTH-15%: BF01=12.18). 
The Bayes factor for the comparison between d’ values of stimulation intensities 85% 
against 70% of ADTH electrical current (JZS prior width r=√2/2) revealed 8.14 times 
more evidence favoring the null hypothesis instead of the alternative that perceptual 
sensitivity for the higher subthreshold intensity (subTH-15%) is equal to the lower 
intensity (subTH-30%). 
 
SEP amplitudes and latencies change along the psychometric function 
The grand-average SEP across all stimulation conditions over contralateral central 
electrode sites (Figure 6) revealed a positive and negative deflection that peaked around 
56 ms (P50) and 148 ms (N150) after stimulus onset, respectively. Statistical comparison 
of the post-stimulus window (0 to 300 ms) against pre-stimulus baseline (-100 to 0 ms) 
via TFCE showed C4 and CP5 being significant for the P50 and a cluster of contralateral 
electrodes (C2, C4, CP2, CP4, P4, FP4, FP6) being significant for the N150. As most 
of these electrodes correspond to our initially selected electrode cluster, I kept the latter 
for all further statistical tests (accepting that those might be conservative estimates of 
the true effects). 
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Figure 6 shows the grand-average SEP waveform across all stimulation conditions together with 
topographic voltage maps at component peaks of interest: P50 and N150. Shaded areas around the 
curve represent 95% confidence intervals of a running t-test for each time point against the 
averaged baseline. Purple-colored electrodes in the topographic maps mark significant voltage 
changes compared to baseline at the indicated time point tested with a non-parametric 
permutation test (10000 iterations) of the time window from 0 to 300 ms post-stimulus. Correction 
for multiple comparisons for achieved by tfce (Mensen & Khatami, 2013). 
 
Undetectable stimulation (d-prime~0, both subTH-30%, and subTH-15%) elicited a 
P50 after stimulation, but no N150 (Figure 7). In contrast, above threshold stimulation 
evoked both components. Stimulation at ADTH did not result in measurable 
components, probably due to the small number of averaged trials at this comparably 
low stimulation magnitude and are therefore not reproduced here. 
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Figure 7. Grand average SEP waveforms for all stimulation conditions extracted from the averaged 
contralateral electrode cluster indicated by the bottom right plot in red. Shaded areas around the 
curve represent 95% confidence intervals of a running t-test for each time point against the 
averaged baseline. subTH-averaged: all trials with stimulus intensities below absolute detection 
threshold (ADTH) averaged. Note the different ordinate scaling, esp. the negative (i.e., upwards) 
direction when comparing the two near-threshold stimulation conditions (NTH33% and 
NTH66%). 
 
Generally, both P50 and N150 component peak amplitudes were largest (i.e,. the N150 
most negative) for the highest and lowest (N150 highest) for the smallest stimulation 
intensity, respectively. In Figure 8, sample means for each condition are plotted together 
with within-subject 95%-confidence intervals, so that significant differences are directly 
observable. Pairwise t-tests for all possible stimulation magnitude condition pairs 
revealed significant P50 amplitude differences (fdr-corrected) from both subthreshold 
intensities to all above threshold intensities (all t(35) < -3.08, pfdr < 0.01). NTH33% P50 
amplitude was marginally smaller (t(35) = -2.06, pfdr = 0.059) and P50 amplitude of 
NTH66% was significantly smaller than P50 amplitude of STH (t(35) = -4.17, pfdr < 
0.001). No statistical difference was observed between the P50 amplitudes of the 
subthreshold stimulation conditions (subTH-33%-subTH-15%: t(35) = -0.06, pfdr = 
0.95) and the near-threshold conditions (NTH33%-NTH66%: t(35) = 1.47, pfdr = 0.17). 
Estimates of N150 amplitudes of the subthreshold stimulation conditions were not 
different from zero and significantly smaller than all other N150 amplitudes of the 
above threshold stimulation conditions (all t(35) > 2.9, pfdr < 0.01). N150 amplitudes of 
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above threshold stimulation conditions showed no significant difference (NTH33%-
NTH66%: t(35) = 1.94, pfdr = 0.087; NTH33%-STH: t(35) = 1.8, pfdr = 0.1; NTH66%-
STH: t(35) = 0.09, pfdr = 0.93). 
In two previous studies (Forschack et al., 2017; Nierhaus et al., 2015), we noticed a 
P50 latency shift for subTH-15% to STH stimulation intensities but did not explicitly 
test this difference. Here, a direct test of the two conditions revealed a small but 
significant effect of roughly 4 ms (t(35) = 2.04, p = 0.049, pfdr = 0.16). Also, the P50 of 
the near-threshold stimulation intensities were significantly later than the P50 of the 
STH intensity. However, no test survived correction for multiple comparisons when all 
possible condition combinations were tested (NTH33%-STH: t(35) = 2.56, p = 0.015, 
pfdr = 0.075; NTH66%-STH: t(35) = 2.56, p = 0.015, pfdr = 0.075; all other: -1.3 < t(35) 
< 1.4). N150 latencies were not significantly different (all -1.4 < t(35) < 1.7). 
 
 
Figure 8. Individual peak SEP amplitudes and latencies have been extracted, and the sample 
average is produced here as colored circles for each stimulation condition. Circle outlines 
represent the SEP component of interest; circle fill corresponds to the stimulation condition. 
Estimates are plotted together with within-subject error bars (i.e., between-subject variance 
removed, according to Morey, 2008), both for amplitude (vertical bars) and latency (horizontal 
bars). 
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P50 amplitude is sensitive to stimulation intensity but not detection 
To test the influence of stimulation intensity and detection on the early event-related 
potential, I modeled the P50 and N150 amplitudes following detected and rejected 
NTH66% and STH stimulation intensities in a repeated measures design. The ANOVA 
revealed a significant main effect of stimulation intensity on the P50 amplitude (F(1,31) 
= 6.51, p = 0.016, 12
% = 0.028), but interestingly, neither the effect of detecting a 
successive stimulus (F(1,31) < 0.6) nor the interaction of intensity and detection was 
significant (F(1,31) < 2.3). In contrast, both factors showed a pronounced effect on the 
N150 amplitude (stimulation intensity: F(1,31) = 9.71, p = 0.004, 12
% = 0.028, detection: 
F(1,31) = 15.86, p < 0.001, 12
% = 0.15). ERP average amplitudes and confidence intervals 
are reproduced in Figure 9. All conditions show a measurable P50. Except for undetected 
suprathreshold intensities, this is also true for the presence of the N150 as indicated by 
the bootstrapped confidence intervals.  
Average stimulation currents across blocks differed significantly between detected 
and rejected trials for STH stimulation condition (Mdetected = 2.84 mA, Mrejected = 2.79 mA, 
t(31) = 3.53, p  = 0.0013, maximum difference: 0.23 mA, i.e., two step sizes of the 
constant current stimulator, median difference: 0.04 mA), but not for NTH66% (Mdetected 
= 2.43 mA, Mrejected = 2.42 mA, t(31) = 1.26, p  = 0.22, maximum difference: 0.17 mA, 
median difference: 0.01 mA).  
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Figure 9. Average P50 and N150 amplitudes for the strongest stimulation intensities (NTH66% 
and STH) plotted for the factors stimulation intensity and behavioral response. Bootstrapped 95% 
confidence intervals, obtained by shuffling condition labels across participants 10000 times, 
indicate the presence of the component within the specific condition if not overlapping with the 
zero lines (i.e., the amplitude is significant from zero). 
 
Pre-stimulus Rolandic alpha amplitude predicts stimulus detection 
I assessed the overall effect of pre-stimulus frequency band amplitude (alpha band: 9–
14 Hz, beta band: 20–35 Hz) on near-threshold stimulus detection by comparing the 
averaged STH and NTH66% stimulation conditions between detected and rejected 
stimuli at the contralateral central electrode cluster. As indicated in Figure 10, there was 
no significant difference in the beta band as in Schuber and colleagues (2008).  
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Figure 10. Pre-stimulus oscillatory amplitudes effects on subsequent stimulus detection for a 
contralateral central electrode cluster and a time window of interest according to Schubert et al. 
(2008). Left: Pre-stimulus time-frequency amplitude difference of averaged NTH66% and STH 
stimulation conditions at the averaged central contralateral electrode cluster highlighted as red 
dots in the topographic map inset. The black boxes mark the time-windows for subsequent 
statistical analysis of alpha- and beta band responses, respectively. Middle: Alpha- and beta band 
pre-stimulus time courses for detected and undetected upcoming near-threshold stimulation. 
Average values are plotted together with within-subject confidence intervals of detection-by-time 
repeated measures ANOVA according to Cousineau et al. (2005) and Morey (2008). The horizontal 
dotted line indicates a paired cluster based t-test, which is thresholded at p = 0.01 and corrected 
for multiple comparisons with tfce (Mensen & Khatami, 2013). The bold line depicts the period 
with amplitude differences exceeding this threshold. Vertical lines indicate the amplitude 
difference showing the smallest p-value, subsequently used for representing the topographic 
changes across all electrodes. Right: Topographic amplitude difference at the most prominent 
time frame for both alpha- and beta band. None of the electrode tests survived multiple 
comparison correction. 
 
However, there is a definite alpha band amplitude difference with alpha being lower for 
successively detected stimuli as compared to undetected stimuli that survive multiple 
comparison correction at p < 0.01 for a time range that extended from -336 to -232 ms 
relative to stimulus onset (middle part of Figure 10).  
 
Pre-stimulus alpha and N150 amplitude best explain stimulus detection 
To assess whether further neural features despite amplitude are relevant for stimulus 
detection and rejection, I conducted regularized binomial logistic regression modeling 
including both P50, N150 amplitude and latency for various λ. Figure 11 shows the 
predicted detection probabilities of the model with a lasso penalty having the smallest 
cross-validation error. This model only contains N150 amplitude as a predictor for 
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stimulus detection and is accurate in 72.2% of the tested cases (p = 0.0001). Shrinking 
non-predictive coefficients excluded N150 latency and P50 amplitude and latency to 
zero.  
 
 
Figure 11. Detection probability predicted by the lasso regularized binomial logistic model 
showing the smallest cross-validation error (empty circles) together with the actual subject-level 
response data (filled circles) for averaged NTH66% and STH stimulus conditions. A: This model 
only contains N150 amplitude as a predictor for behavioral responses. Grey lines represent the 
model error, the shorter, the better. Black circles correspond to correctly and red circles to 
incorrectly classified responses. B: Winning model when including pre-stimulus contralateral 
alpha amplitudes averaged at 268 ms preceding detected and rejected stimuli. This model correctly 
classifies 76.4% of the cases. The between-subject variance was removed for alpha band amplitude 
values in order to center them along the behavioral response differences. 
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Because in the previous analysis, the pre-stimulus alpha amplitude is higher during 
rejected stimulation than during detected stimulation, I included alpha as a factor in the 
binomial regression model and allowed it to interact with P50 and N150 amplitude. 
Interestingly, the model with the smallest CVE was accurate in 76.4% of the cases and 
only contained alpha amplitude as a main predictor and alpha and N150 amplitude as 
interaction predictor. Alpha and N150 amplitude were significantly correlated by r = 
0.35 (p = 0.003) thereby sharing 12.2% of the variance in the data. 
 
Discussion 
Using a two-response classification task for various stimulation intensities along the 
individual psychometric response function while recording EEG, I investigated, which 
early electrophysiological neural features are related to the encoding of stimulation 
intensity and decoding of stimulus detectability. Importantly, including stimulation 
intensities below absolute detection threshold (ADTH), allowed to ask the question 
how measures of undetectable stimulation (subthreshold) might dissociate from 
stimulation above ADTH that may or may not be detected. For the subthreshold 
stimuli, there was only a P50 component, but no further event-related potentials, 
thereby replicating previous research (Libet et al., 1967; Ray et al., 1999b; Nierhaus et 
al., 2015; Forschack et al., 2017). P50 amplitude scaled with increasing stimulation 
intensities but was not predictive for stimulus detection for each of the two highest 
stimulation intensities. A more negative potential 150 ms after stimulus onset (N150) 
together with pre-stimulus somatosensory alpha amplitude best explained perceptual 
awareness of somatosensory stimulation. 
Stimulation intensity and awareness are highly collinear, i.e., higher stimulus 
intensities lead to enhanced perceptual evidence of having felt something. In the current 
experiment, participants received various stimulation intensities that were tuned to 
provide zero to high perceptual evidence (indicated by the detection rates and d’ values). 
In the framework of classical test theoretic statistics, it is only possible to prove the 
latter but not the former, as this would require testing the NH (null-hypothesis Rouder 
et al., 2009). Therefore, I used a Bayesian statistical framework to test for zero 
perceptual sensitivity (ibid.) Bayes Factors supported that the probability of reporting 
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to feel stimulation below ADTH is identical to make a false positive response upon null 
stimulation.  
In contrast, for stimulation above ADTH, observers showed increasing perceptual 
sensitivity, the higher the stimulation intensity. Thus, the presence of the P50 does not 
provide sufficient evidence for perceptual awareness (Forschack et al., 2017; Nierhaus 
et al., 2015) but, together with the absence of the N150 component, appears to be a 
neural dissociation of perceptual processing for stimulation below ADTH from 
stimulation above it. For the latter, we still measured the N150 even for undetected 
NTH stimuli, again suggesting that its mere presence does provide sufficient evidence 
for perceptual awareness.  
However, the N150 was not present for undetected stimulation at the highest 
intensity. On the one hand, this might be a result of the post hoc condition split into 
detected and rejected stimulation, for which the highest stimulation intensity is based 
on the smallest number of rejected trials, thereby reducing the likelihood of capturing a 
small potential. On the other hand, this could also mean that there is less chance of 
making a negative report (“rejected”) despite having perceived the stimulation, which 
could be related to individual response criteria.  
Furthermore, we observed a roughly 10 ms earlier P50 peak latency from the largest 
to the second largest stimulation intensity. This shift cannot be explained by SNR 
differences, which could influence the smoothness of the potential curve and thereby 
affecting latency estimation, because this latency shift was most pronounced from the 
largest (STH) to the second largest stimulation intensity. At the physiological level, this 
latency shift might indicate a shifted excitation-inhibition balance toward a dominant 
rapid activation of principal excitatory neurons (Isaacson & Scanziani, 2011; Nierhaus 
et al., 2015). On a cognitive level, one might argue that the strongest stimulation 
condition may trigger exogenous attention more reliably than weaker stimulation 
intensities. Thus, ERPs evoked by attended stimuli show a shorter latency than ERPs 
evoked by unattended stimuli, which is known as Titchener’s law of prior entry (see 
Spence & Parise, 2010 for an overview). 
So far, we discussed the effect of perceptual sensitivity and awareness on the 
presence or absence of the P50 and N150. However, sensitivity and awareness might 
be reflected within the component’s amplitude. Despite being positively dependent, our 
results suggest two independent mechanisms for encoding perceptual sensitivity and 
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perceptual awareness within the event-related potential. First, P50 component 
amplitudes are sensitive to stimulus intensity but, second, only the N150 amplitude 
appeared to be distinctive for detecting a given stimulus. This finding seems highly 
relevant for studies investigating perceptual awareness when comparing detected versus 
rejected stimuli at intensities close to the 50% detection threshold. Some studies (Weisz, 
Wühle, et al., 2014; Wühle, Mertiens, Rüter, Ostwald, & Braun, 2010) used an ongoing 
staircase procedure throughout the experimental protocol to control detectability. 
Although this might be (probably) the best method when aiming at almost equal trial 
numbers for the detection contrast, it produces different stimulation intensities for trials 
in which stimulation was detected versus those trials in which stimulation was missed. 
By increasing stimulation strength in the successive trial after the participant reports not 
having felt the stimulus and decreasing it after a positive report, the ongoing staircase 
results in stimulation intensities higher for detected and lower for undetected 
stimulation, thereby conflating effects of stimulation intensity and perceptual report 
concerning ERP amplitudes. To control for stimulation intensity within a specific 
stimulation condition in the current study, I kept stimulation intensities constant for a 
given block; however, adjusted these between blocks to account for threshold shifts. 
Although electrical stimulation currents differed slightly for the STH condition between 
detected and rejected trials (ranging from less than one current step size of the DS7 to 
two current step sizes), there was no significant difference regarding the P50 amplitude, 
which is sensitive for stimulation intensity (see above). Furthermore, stimulation 
currents did not differ for the NTH66% condition, but the N150 nevertheless decreased 
for detected trials. Taken together these results strengthen the assumption that the STH 
electrical current differences were minor and unlikely to affect ERP amplitudes 
concerning the detectability of the stimuli. 
Some previous research, however, found the P50 amplitude to be sensitive for 
stimulus detectability. Eimer and colleagues (2002) studied a patient who had a right-
hemispheric stroke leading to a neurological disorder called extinction. The patient was 
able to recognize left unilateral stimuli to the index finger; however, such contralesional 
stimuli were missed—i.e., extinguished—on 75% of the trials when concurrently 
presented together with a stimulus at the right index finger. Contralateral ERP 
responses to these extinguished left stimulations contained a P50 and N110, which were 
not present at the same sites during unilateral right stimulation but were numerically 
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smaller—however not statistically—as compared to (felt) unilateral left stimulation. 
Furthermore, unilateral contralesional left stimulation resulted in smaller components 
over the damaged hemisphere as compared to left hemisphere responses found after 
unilateral right stimulation. These results led to the hypothesis that extinction may arise 
from attenuation rather than the absence of early event-related components. 
Interestingly, components over the damaged hemisphere on bilateral extinguished trials 
were not different from felt unilateral left stimulation, suggesting that concurrent right 
tactile events might trigger competitive mechanisms that influence initial tactile 
processing. Modulations of P50 amplitude affecting perceptual awareness, therefore, 
could be less pronounced when stimuli are presented in isolation (Eimer et al., 2002), 
as it is the case for the current study.  
Regarding the role of the N150 as a marker of stimulus detection, the current results 
are well in line with previous research (Auksztulewicz et al., 2012; Cauller & Kulics, 
1991; Schubert et al., 2006; Zhang & Ding, 2009). However, none of these studies, 
including the current one, provide evidence for a proper neural correlate of 
consciousness (NCC, Aru et al., 2012), because all task paradigms will necessarily 
conflate perceptual awareness with decisional processes. It has been pointed out that a 
proper candidate component for NCC must not cease when participants passively 
perceive suprathreshold stimuli in the absence of a task (Hillyard et al., 1971; Squires, 
Hillyard, & Lindsay, 1973; Verleger, 2010). In our previous study (Nierhaus et al., 2015), 
we did find the N150 during electrical finger stimulation well above ADTH while 
participants had no task, which provides initial suggestive evidence for the N150 
resembling an NCC proper (Aru et al., 2012). Future studies, however, should ideally 
include a passive and an active condition within one experiment while sampling 
intensities close to NTH50% threshold. To re-evaluate the effect of the P50 amplitude 
on perceptual awareness, these studies additionally might present concurrent 
contralateral tactile stimuli that trigger competitive early-stage processes and hence 
could increase the influence of P50 amplitude on the perceptual fate of near-threshold 
stimuli (Eimer et al., 2002). 
Finally, the current study replicates a large body of previous research showing that pre-
stimulus alpha amplitude is predictive for the detectability of an upcoming event 
(Chaumon & Busch, 2014; Iemi et al., 2017; Limbach & Corballis, 2016; Linkenkaer-
Hansen et al., 2004; Ruhnau et al., 2014; Schubert, Haufe, et al., 2008; Weisz et al., 2014; 
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Zhang & Ding, 2009). Like these studies, I found that increased pre-stimulus alpha is 
related to negative behavioral responses regarding the presence of a stimulus. 
Specifically, there is a positive correlation between alpha amplitude and successive N150 
amplitude. I.e., the larger the alpha, the closer the N150 to zero. This result is in line 
with the results by Zhang and Ding (2009) who reported an inverse u-shape relationship 
between pre-stimulus alpha amplitude and both N150 amplitude and detection rate. 
Here, I tested in a single model whether there are further electrophysiological markers 
despite pre-stimulus alpha and N150 amplitude predicting stimulus detection, as, e.g., 
ERP peak latencies and P50 amplitude and failed to see an effect. Future studies might 
prove whether these features become relevant when attention and stimulus competition 
are experimentally manipulated. 
In conclusion, using Bayesian statistical inference, I fostered results from our previous 
studies that reliably undetectable stimulation, for which observers do not provide any 
sign of perceptual awareness, generates an early event-related potential, the P50. This 
component does not sufficiently predict upcoming stimulus detection but is driven by 
stimulation intensity. The successive N150 best explains behavioral responses and 
interacts with pre-stimulus oscillatory amplitude dynamics in the alpha band. Thus, 
alpha band amplitudes may describe a brain state that renders upcoming stimulation 
being reportable or not (Weisz et al., 2014). A thrilling question is whether the latter 
indicates the amount of attentional deployment to the sensory modality where a 
stimulus arrives and whether this still shapes the neural fate of undetectable and 
supposedly irrelevant stimulation. These questions are the central topic of the next and 
final study. 
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2.4 The role of Rolandic Alpha Activity in Somatosensation and its 
Relation to Attention 
 
Based on 
Forschack, N., Nierhaus, T., Müller, M. M., & Villringer, A. (2017). 
Alpha-Band Brain Oscillations Shape the Processing of Perceptible as 
well as Imperceptible Somatosensory Stimuli during Selective Attention 
 
As discussed in section 1.4, selective attention is “a mechanism by which information 
relevant to a perceptual decision is filtered or weighted, in the service providing the 
observer with the most efficient and accurate interpretation of the local sensory 
environment” (Summerfield & Egner, 2014). Attention facilitates conscious perception 
across sensory domains (Schröger, Marzecová, & SanMiguel, 2015; Dehaene, 
Changeux, Naccache, Sackur, & Sergent, 2006), as indexed by its well-documented 
influence on evoked potentials, evoked fMRI/PET signals or oscillatory activity 
(somatosensory evoked potentials, SEP: Desmedt and Robertson, 1977; Zopf et al., 
2004; Schubert et al., 2008b; visually evoked potentials, VEP: Eason et al., 1969; 
auditory evoked potentials, AEP: Hillyard et al., 1973; somatosensory fMRI: Johansen-
Berg et al., 2000; Goltz et al., 2013, 2015; visual fMRI: Gandhi et al., 1999; auditory 
fMRI: Alho et al., 1999; PET: Wu et al., 2007; brain rhythms: Clayton et al., 2015). 
However, attention processes do not necessarily depend on conscious percepts 
(Graziano, 2013; Kentridge, Nijboer, & Heywood, 2008; Koch & Tsuchiya, 2007). 
Attention effects on subliminal processing have been shown in the visual modality 
(Boxtel, Tsuchiya, & Koch, 2010; de Haan, Stoll, & Karnath, 2015; Watanabe et al., 
2011), but based on paradigms involving masking or extinction. However, subliminal 
brain responses to masked stimuli have been shown to be interrupted by the brain 
responses of the mask (Fahrenfort et al., 2007; Victor A. F. Lamme et al., 2002), which 
may preclude observations unique to genuine processes below consciousness elicited 
by unmasked subliminal stimulation. Neural markers for cerebral processing of 
somatosensory stimuli below absolute detection threshold (i.e., stimulation is never 
reported: subthreshold) have been described previously. However, these were only 
based on invasive studies using subdural electrodes under clinical conditions (Libet et 
al., 1967; Ray et al., 1999a) limiting potential investigations. Recently, Nierhaus et al. 
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(2015) have identified an event-related potential in response to subthreshold stimulation 
(a positive deflection occurring about 60 ms after stimulation: P1). First, these findings 
allowed us to address the question whether attention also modulates neural processing 
of subthreshold, that is, undetectable, somatosensory stimuli as it has been suggested 
previously (Dehaene et al., 2006). Second, we examined the role of alpha-band brain 
oscillations activity to the effect of attention. While several studies conclude that 
attention decreases the amplitude of baseline (pre-stimulus) alpha rhythm (Anderson & 
Ding, 2011; Haegens, Händel, et al., 2011; Haegens, Nácher, Luna, Romo, & Jensen, 
2011; Jensen, Bonnefond, & VanRullen, 2012; S. R. Jones et al., 2010; Palva & Palva, 
2007), evidence for the relationship of pre-stimulus alpha power on the amplitudes of 
evoked potentials is ambiguous. Both linear (Nikouline, Wikström, et al., 2000; 
Reinacher, Becker, Villringer, & Ritter, 2009; Roberts, Fedota, Buzzell, Parasuraman, & 
McDonald, 2014) and non-linear relationships (Anderson & Ding, 2011; Zhang & Ding, 
2009) have been reported. While the latter findings challenge the view of alpha activity 
directly reflecting cortical excitation (Foxe & Snyder, 2011; Jensen & Mazaheri, 2010), 
one might still argue that the variation of pre-stimulus alpha activity in spatial attention 
leads to a modulation of evoked activity (Haegens, Händel, et al., 2011; Haegens, Luther, 
et al., 2011; Jensen et al., 2012; S. R. Jones et al., 2010). Consequently, with attention, 
the highest P1 amplitudes should be accompanied by low pre-stimulus alpha power in 
the case of a linear relationship, or by intermediate power ranges in the non-linear case 
(Anderson & Ding, 2011). 
 
This study investigated the role of pre-stimulus peri-Rolandic alpha, that is, 
sensorimotor alpha or simply mu, amplitude and its (modulatory) impact on central 
stimulus processing using EEG recordings and event-related potentials in humans. We 
presented subthreshold and—at a lesser number—irregularly intermingled 
suprathreshold single electrical current pulses to the index fingers of both hands during 
variation of spatial attention. Thus, we tested whether attention and alpha activity 
operate analogously both for subthreshold and suprathreshold stimuli. Figure 12 
illustrates potential functional relationships between attention, mu rhythm activity, and 
evoked brain activity. 
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Figure 12. Three different models of possible relationships between attention, pre-stimulus 
somatosensory alpha (mu), and ERP/SEP amplitude. A: The mediator model: pre-stimulus mu 
mediates the effect of attention. B: Attention influences both pre-stimulus mu and SEP amplitude, 
but SEP modulation is independent of pre-stimulus mu amplitude (independence model). C, The 
interaction model: the relationship between pre-stimulus mu and SEP amplitude depends on the 
attentional state. 
 
Methods 
Participants 
The local ethics committee at the medical faculty of the University of Leipzig approved 
the study. Before participation, all volunteers underwent a comprehensive neurological 
examination. They had no history of neurological or psychiatric diseases and were not 
on any medication. Forty healthy volunteers participated (age range 20–32 yrs, mean 
25.1 ± 2.9 yrs S.D.; 20 females); all were right-handed (laterality score according to the 
Oldfield questionnaire: mean 91.6 ± 10.2 S.D., over a range of –100 (entirely left-
handed) to 100 (entirely right-handed), (Oldfield, 1971). Data of three subjects were 
discarded due to defective or artifactual EEG recordings, so in total 37 datasets were 
analyzed. 
 
Experimental Procedures 
Somatosensory Stimulation and Task Design 
A pair of steel wire ring electrodes was attached to the left and right index finger and 
delivered stimulation as described in section 2.1.1. A trained experimenter manually 
assessed ADTH, which—again—was defined as the lowest current intensity (for 
continuous 7 Hz electrical stimulation) at which participants just reported a sensation. 
A rough estimate of this detection threshold was derived by applying one trial of the 
method of limits with ascending intensities separately for the left and right index finger 
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(just before the first block). In order to control for threshold stability and to readjust 
stimulus intensities in case of a threshold shift, we precisely determined (0.05 mA 
precision) absolute detection thresholds before each EEG acquisition block using a 
yes/no detection procedure (one-alternative forced-choice, 1AFC, Kingdom and Prins, 
2009, not included in the EEG recording of ~8 min duration per block). Thus, the 
experimenter presented current intensities (at 7 Hz for one second each) around the 
previously estimated rough detection threshold (or the previous precise threshold for 
block numbers > 1) as well as catch/ blank trials (20% of all 1AFC trials) to control for 
potential response bias. From our experience, false alarm rates are mainly zero for this 
specific procedure, and this was also true for the current threshold assessments. 
Participants responded with “yes” if they felt a stimulus and “no” if otherwise. 
Intensities were selected adaptively, according to the participant’s responses; for 
example, if an observer perceived a given stimulus, the intensity for the following trial 
was usually (but not necessarily) decreased and vice versa. However, occasionally a 
stimulus at a high intensity was presented reminding the observer what to “look” for. 
The range of applied intensities was also decreased successively until an intensity was 
identified which satisfied the above definition of an absolute detection threshold, that 
is, an intensity that enables a stimulus to be just discriminated from its null (Kingdom 
and Prins, 2009). For instance, if an observer reliably responded with “No” to a given 
intensity “x” but reported to perceive the next higher intensity “x + 0.05 mA” on a 
fraction of the trials, the latter intensity value served as detection threshold (30–60 trials 
which took maximally 5 minutes). To ensure imperceptibility of subthreshold stimuli 
during the entire experiment, subthreshold stimulation intensity (left finger) was set to 
15% below absolute detection threshold and tested to be reliably imperceptible when 
presented as single pulses. The intensity of suprathreshold stimulation was adjusted 
within a range of 25 to 200% above detection threshold (Table 3) depending on the 
participants’ subjective report of experiencing a clear (i.e., conscious) isointense but 
innocuous percept on both fingers. During experimental blocks, sub- and 
suprathreshold stimulation intensities were kept constant and subthreshold stimulation 
was applied to the left hand only (Figure 13). Participants were instructed to respond to 
perceived stimuli only to the cued hand (left or right) via button press with their right 
foot. 
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Figure 13. Experimental setup and stimulation paradigm. Forty subjects received 936 
imperceptible electrical pulses to the left index finger via the DS7A (Digitimer) over 26 two-minute 
blocks. In each block, up to four perceptible stimuli were randomly presented to the left or right 
hand (in total 104). Absolute detection thresholds were determined initially using the method of 
limits (one ascending trial) and a subsequent yes/no adaptive detection task consisting of 30–60 
trials (maximally 5 min, including blank/ catch trials) and subsequently every four measurement 
blocks. 
 
Accordingly, the following stimulation conditions were presented during the 
experiment: subthreshold stimulation to the left hand that was either attended 
(“subthreshold left attended” condition) or unattended (“subthreshold left unattended” 
condition) and four conditions, in which suprathreshold stimulation to the left or the 
right hand was attended or unattended, respectively (“suprathreshold left attended”, 
“suprathreshold left unattended”, “suprathreshold right attended”, “suprathreshold 
right unattended” conditions). In the offline analysis, we only focused on left-hand 
stimulation (data on right-hand stimulation was not considered, Table 3). 
 
Table 3. Stimulation conditions and parameters. The intensity of stimuli is given in milliampere 
(mA). ADTH, absolute detection threshold; M, Mean; SD, Standard Deviation. 
 Stimulation left Stimulation right 
subthreshold ISI 3.2 s, ±1.0 s jitter 
936 stimuli, 36 per block 
1.48 mA (M), 0.45 mA (SD)  
15% below ADTH 
- 
suprathreshold pseudo-randomized 
52 stimuli, up to 4 per block 
2.94 mA, 0.65 SD 
pseudo-randomized 
52 stimuli, up to 4 per block 
3.05 mA, 0.66 SD 
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28–200% above detection 
threshold: 79% (M), 41% (SD) 
24–192% above perception 
threshold: 83% (M), 37% (SD) 
 
 
EEG acquisition 
During stimulation blocks, EEG was recorded continuously from 32 scalp channels 
(international 10-20 system; actiCap, BrainAmp, Brain Products, Munich, Germany): 
midfrontal electrode (FCz) as reference and a sternum electrode as ground with 
impedances ≤5 kΩ for all channels, sampling frequency 1 kHz, a low-pass finite impulse 
response filter (250 Hz) was applied before downsampling EEG time courses to 500 
Hz. 
To allow for reliable detection of SEPs and Rolandic rhythms, stimuli were 
presented at comparatively long interstimulus intervals, that is, subthreshold stimuli at 
a mean interstimulus interval of 3.2 s (jitter of ±1000ms during a block of ~2 min, in 
total 26 blocks, i.e., 936 trials per subject). Moreover, in each block no or up to four 
suprathreshold stimuli were presented pseudo-randomly to the left or the right hand 
(total 52 suprathreshold stimuli on either hand). Subjects were instructed to report the 
perception of stimuli only when presented to the cued side and to “ignore” stimuli to 
the non-cued hand. Finally, two additional blocks were appended comprising only 
suprathreshold stimulation of the left and right index finger without attention task 
(stimulation frequency every 1.6 ± 0.3 s, resulting in 360 trials, ~5 min block duration), 
so we obtained a sufficient number of trials with suprathreshold stimulation (for a 
criterion-guided independent component selection in later steps of the analysis 
procedure, see below). 
 
EEG Data Analysis 
Preprocessing 
EEG data analysis was performed offline using custom-built Matlab scripts 
(Mathworks, Natick, MA, USA, RRID: SCR_001622) and toolbox algorithms from 
EEGLAB (Delorme and Makeig, 2004, RRID: SCR_007292). Individual datasets 
underwent an independent component analysis (ICA, infomax extended) both to 
remove sources of ocular and muscle artifacts (Delorme et al., 2012; Li et al., 2006) and 
to select components resembling mu activity sources. Before ICA, datasets were 
prepared by applying the following procedures: training datasets for ICA were high-
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pass filtered with 1 Hz, all blocks were concatenated, contiguous epochs of 1 s were 
extracted, screened for non-stereotypical artifacts and rejected if contaminated. Then, 
an initial ICA was performed that removed artifactual epochs semi-automatically using 
improbable data estimation on single and across all components (function 
“pop_jointprob,” Delorme et al., 2007). The resulting datasets were submitted to a 
second ICA: The new set of components was visually inspected, artifactual components 
were identified (i.e., correlation with EOG channel higher than 0.8, blink or eye 
movement typical topographies and IC source activity, abnormal frequency spectrum, 
i.e., high frequency or line noise, focal topographies). Only the unmixing and sphering 
matrices of artifact-free components were forward-projected to the unfiltered datasets 
for the subsequent analysis steps. 
 
SEPs 
Epochs were defined ranging from -1200 to 2200 ms relative to stimulus onset (t=0), 
from which the individual epoch mean was subtracted. Those epochs, which exceeded 
the joint logarithmic probability of 4.5 or 2.5 SD within or across independent 
components, respectively, were discarded after manually reviewing the alleged 
artifactual epochs (Delorme et al., 2007). This resulted in an average number of 420 
trials (+/-14 S.D.) for attending left subthreshold stimulation and 420 trials (+/-13 
S.D.) for “ignoring” left subthreshold stimulation (i.e., attending right); 23 trials (+/-3 
S.D.) for attending left suprathreshold stimulation and 24 trials (+/-2 S.D.) for ignoring 
left suprathreshold stimulation. In a next step, data was low-pass filtered applying the 
standard EEGLAB Hamming windowed sinc finite impulse response filter (zero-phase 
FIR, passband edge: 41 Hz, high cut-off (-6 dB): 46.125 Hz, filter order 162, Widmann 
et al., 2015). Trials with behavioral responses following or preceding subthreshold 
stimulation were very rare and excluded from further analysis (only eight participants 
responded to subthreshold stimulation once or twice out of 960 trials). 
 
Topographical analysis via isocontour voltage maps 50 to 60 ms post-stimulation 
revealed that contralateral somatosensory areas were most sensitive to somatosensory 
stimulation in comparison to pre-stimulus baseline (paired t-tests, fdr-corrected). 
Therefore, statistical analysis of SEP amplitude was performed on electrode CP4 (i.e., 
in close vicinity to somatosensory cortex contralateral to stimulation site that has been 
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also previously found to exert maximum SEP amplitudes, Nierhaus et al., 2015), by 
averaging the amplitude of time points 50 to 60 ms post-subthreshold stimulation (P60) 
and performing a paired two-tailed t-test (p<0.05) against baseline (-100 to -20 ms 
relative to stimulus onset, Zhang and Ding, 2009). The definition of a time range of 
interest was hypothesis-driven because previously we only found the P60 and no 
additional components to be indicative of subthreshold somatosensory processing 
(Nierhaus et al., 2015). A known marker for early attention modulation of 
suprathreshold stimulation, the P50–N80 complex (Michie, Bearparic, Crawford, & 
Glue, 1987), was extracted by subtracting averaged amplitudes around 80 to 100 ms 
(N80) from averaged amplitudes around 50 to 60 ms (P50) post-stimulus. As for the 
P60, the amplitude of the P50N80 complex was tested between attention conditions 
using a paired t-test against the baseline. In order to test for the presence of further 
evoked potentials, each sample point of a 400 ms post-stimulus epoch was successively 
compared with the mean pre-stimulus baseline value (paired t-tests (p<0.05), multiple 
comparisons correction with fdr, not shown).  
 
Rolandic Rhythms 
In order to discern Rolandic rhythms from dominating occipital alpha activity, a 
preselection of "central" ICA components was performed before trial segmentation. 
For this purpose, all blocks (including the pure suprathreshold stimulation blocks) were 
concatenated to run a subject wise ICA. As in Nierhaus et al. (2015), we selected 
Rolandic background rhythms according to three criteria for each subject: (1) a central 
localization, (2) two peaks in the power spectrum, at alpha (8–15 Hz) and beta (16–30 
Hz) frequency bands, respectively, and (3) a pronounced power reduction of these 
bands after suprathreshold stimulation. Using this procedure, 1–4 (mean 2 ± 1 S.D.) 
ICs per subject were selected (all 37 participants showed at least one right hemispheric 
lateralized mu component, 24 showed a left-lateralized mu component additionally). 
Only these components were forward projected and included in the further analysis of 
somatosensory oscillatory activity. After forward projection of the "central" ICs and 
segmentation of sub- and suprathreshold epochs as defined above (-1200 to 2200 ms), 
wavelet analysis was performed for frequencies from 6–30 Hz in 1 Hz increments to 
allow for time-resolved frequency analysis of event-related power modulation. The 
wavelet transformation was performed on every single trial using wavelet cycle lengths 
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from 4 to 7 cycles increasing with frequency in linear steps. Subsequently, the resulting 
time-frequency response was averaged over trials.  
Statistical analysis was performed on electrode CP4 (located over SI contralateral to 
the stimulation site on the left hand and also showing maximal weights in independent 
component maps) by means of two-tailed paired t-tests of post-stimulus time points 
against frequency specific baseline average (p-level was fdr-corrected with q=0.05, 
Genovese et al., 2002, with a pre-stimulus baseline of -700 to -200 ms). In order to test 
the condition contrast across post-stimulus values, we compared baseline-normalized 
alpha band values (8–15 Hz) for attended and unattended sub- and suprathreshold 
stimulation conditions (fdr-corrected). 
 
Regression of SEPs and behavior on pre-stimulus mu amplitude 
In order to test the relationship between oscillatory brain state (mu amplitude) and 
stimulus processing (SEP amplitude and hit rates), we pooled trials across attention 
conditions on subject level and calculated the average mu amplitude (estimated by a 10 
Hz wavelet kernel with 4.9 cycles) for each trial 300 to 200 ms prior to stimulus onset. 
These values were reordered from smallest to largest amplitude and assembled into five 
consecutive bins (indexed by 1 to 5) with 50% overlap of trials for successive bins. 
Afterward, we separated the trials in each bin according to the attention condition. This 
binning procedure serves as normalization and compensates for inter-individual 
differences in absolute mu amplitude. Importantly, this also yields comparable mu 
amplitudes between attention conditions for any of these bins (tested via two-way 
repeated measures ANOVA with factors power bin (5 levels) and attention (2 levels) 
and mu amplitude as the dependent variable). Effect sizes were quantified as generalized 
eta squared (Bakeman, 2005). It has to be noted, however, that the number of trials 
within each bin may differ between attention conditions, which was tested by paired t-
tests (average number and SEM of trials per bin 1–5 for subthreshold attended: 143 (9), 
143(9), 140 (8), 139 (8), 137 (10); subthreshold unattended: 138 (10), 137 (9), 140 (7), 
141 (7), 144 (9); suprathreshold attended: 8 (2), 8 (1), 8 (2), 8 (2), 7 (2); suprathreshold 
unattended: 8 (1), 8 (2), 8 (2), 8 (2), 8 (2); significant between attention condition trial 
number differences: subthreshold bin 2 (t(36)=2.05, p=0.048); subthreshold bin 5 
(t(36)=-2.3, p=0.027); remaining tests yield absolute t-scores < 1.8). We then calculated 
the sub- and suprathreshold SEP for each bin and attention condition, and extracted 
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the amplitude of the key component (P1) as described above in the section SEPs. Bin-
wise hit rates (HR) were calculated for the suprathreshold left attended condition. 
To assess the grand-average relationship between SEP amplitude and pre-stimulus 
mu amplitude for each attention condition, we calculated a standard linear regression 
with mu amplitude bins serving as predictor (quadratic and linear, including an intercept, 
i.e., the ordinate (SEP amplitude) offset) and bin SEP amplitude (and HR) serving as 
regressor (in fact, there are five values that the predictor can attain). However, this 
approach has some substantial drawbacks as it obscures inter-subject variability. Factors 
like vigilance regulation patterns (Bekhtereva et al., 2014), individual behavior 
adjustments, threshold variations, which are deemed to be random across the sample, 
may influence the relationship between experimentally relevant factors. With linear 
mixed effects modeling (LMM), we acknowledge between- and within-subject 
variations in the data from the model’s fixed effects estimates (i.e., the grand average 
effect). We conducted the LMM analysis in R (R Core Team, 2014), RRID: 
SCR_001905) within the lme4 framework proposed by Bates et al. (2014). For our LMM 
fixed effects, we estimated intercept and weights for a quadratic and linear mu amplitude 
predictor just as for the standard regression in the fixed effects part (i.e., the grand 
average relationship, inter-subject variation ignored).  
Additionally, the same predictor structure was used for the random effects part of 
the model with “participant” as the grouping variable. This has the advantage of (1) 
being the maximal random effect structure required for hypothesis testing as claimed 
by Barr et al. (2013), and (2) it yields subject-specific deviation predictions from the 
fixed effects within a single model estimation instead of multiple by-participant ordinary 
regressions (Baayen, Davidson, & Bates, 2008; Zhang & Ding, 2009). LMMs are defined 
in the following form: outcome ~ predictor(s) + (predictor(s) | subject), which will fit 
predictors of the fixed effect part (next to the “~”) and predictors of the random effects 
part (in brackets) grouped by a factor for which the predictors vary randomly, in our 
case, subject. 
All in all, we computed four LMMs which regressed SEP amplitude on pre-stimulus 
mu amplitude bin separately for each attention (attended, unattended) and stimulation 
condition (P1 amplitude for subthreshold and suprathreshold stimulation) and one 
LMM in which hit rate was the dependent variable. To check the significance of each 
of the five models and the relevance of specific predictors, maximum-likelihood ratio 
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test statistics (which account for model complexity) between the complete (all 
predictors) and reduced models (one model assuming no relationship—i.e., only the 
intercept serves as predictor—and one model assuming a linear relationship, see Table 
4 for detailed model definitions) were parametrically bootstrapped with 10000 
simulations (pbkrtest-package by Halekoh and Højsgaard, 2014). All these models 
describe the relationship between mu amplitude and SEP amplitudes (and HR) but do 
not consider the subjective attentional state (see next paragraph), because fitting was 
done separately for each attention condition.  
 
Assessment of the relationship between pre-stimulus mu amplitude, somatosensory evoked potential, and 
attention 
How does attention affect pre-stimulus mu amplitude and SEP amplitudes? Is a putative 
attention effect on SEP amplitude mediated (or indexed) by pre-stimulus mu? Does 
attention affect both pre-stimulus mu and SEP amplitudes independently? Alternatively, 
do responses of these variables depend on each other, or, in other words, do they 
interact? In order to evaluate these questions, we tested three different types of possible 
relationships depicted in Figure 12. For this purpose, following LMMs were fitted to 
data including both attention conditions, not separately as in the previous paragraph.  
If the influence of attention is solely mediated by pre-stimulus mu amplitude (Figure 
12a, “mediator model”), any form of relation between pre-stimulus mu amplitude and 
SEP amplitude will not be differentiable between the two attention conditions. 
Therefore, we fitted two LMMs to sub- and suprathreshold SEP amplitudes (dependent 
variable) with intercept, linear, and quadratic predictor of pre-stimulus mu amplitude 
both for fixed and random effects grouped by subject (in fact the same model definition 
as for single attention condition fits above), neither of which including attention as 
predictor in the fixed nor random effects part. In other words, it is assumed that the 
attention effect on SEP amplitude is completely reflected in the variation of pre-
stimulus mu amplitude. 
However, if the effect of attention on SEP amplitudes is independent of an 
attention effect on pre-stimulus mu amplitude (Figure 12b, “independence model”), a 
significant relationship between pre-stimulus mu amplitude and SEP amplitudes will 
not be observable. Here, the two LMMs fitted sub- and suprathreshold SEP amplitudes 
with the factors intercept and attention in the fixed effects part and intercept grouped 
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by subject and attention as a within-subject factor in the random effects part (see Table 
4 for detailed model definitions). In short, the relationship between pre-stimulus mu 
amplitude and SEP amplitudes would appear to be flat, but SEP amplitudes between 
attention conditions would differ. (Note that an absence of significant relationships of 
any sort for the single attention conditions (see the previous section) would support the 
independence model). 
Finally, if the type of relationship between pre-stimulus mu amplitude and SEP 
amplitudes essentially depends on the subjective state of attention (Figure 12c, 
“interaction model”), we will observe different relationships for each attention 
condition. The LMM definitions to fit sub- and suprathreshold SEP amplitudes, 
therefore, include the factors intercept, attention, the linear and quadratic mu amplitude 
predictor, as well as the interaction of the latter and attention in the fixed effect part. 
The random effects part contains intercept, the linear and quadratic mu amplitude 
predictor grouped by subject, as well as attention as a within-subject factor (see model 
definitions in Table 4).  
Models were evaluated by their ability to explain the data, here maximum-likelihood, 
and significance was assessed via parametric bootstrapped likelihood ratio tests (10000 
simulations). 
 
Results 
We stimulated the left and right index finger with electrical pulses (Table 3) while 
participants responded to perceived sensations only on the cued side and ignored 
sensations on the other side (Figure 13), thus characterizing the effects of attention on 
central somatosensory stimulus processing. 
 
Behavioral responses  
The resulting average hit and false alarm rates for suprathreshold stimulation of 
attended left (hit rates: 71.06 +/-17.88% S.D, false alarm rates: 0.82 +/-0.17% S.D.) 
and right index finger (hit rates: 73.76 +/-17.59% S.D., false alarm rates: 0.66 +/-0.11% 
S.D.) did not differ significantly (-1<t(36)<1 in all cases). The average number of 
responses to subthreshold stimulation for both attention conditions was negligible (two 
subjects responded twice, six subjects responded once out of 480 subthreshold trials). 
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Responses to sub- and suprathreshold stimulation evolves differentially over time for SEP and 
sensorimotor alpha and beta band power 
SEPs in response to left-hand somatosensory stimulation were lateralized to the right 
hemisphere. As in our previous study (Nierhaus et al., 2015), we restricted our analysis 
to the contralateral hemisphere because only the left index finger received both sub- 
and suprathreshold stimulation. Depending on stimulation intensity (i.e., either above 
or below detection threshold), we observed different evoked components: for 
suprathreshold stimulation, a P50 was followed by an N80 and at least one following 
component (P150). For subthreshold stimuli, we observed a single early positivity 
around 60 ms, roughly 10 ms later than the first component for suprathreshold stimuli 
(Figure 14). 
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Figure 14. Subthreshold (A) and suprathreshold (B) isocontour voltage maps and SEPs. Aa, 
Average voltage topographies for a window of 50–60 ms poststimulus (grand average, GAVG, n=37 
participants) for the subthreshold left attended condition on the left and topographical p-value 
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distribution on the right side (t-tests against a baseline -100 to -20 ms pre-stimulus, fdr-corrected). 
Nonsignificant electrodes (p>0.05) are masked in dark blue, significant electrodes are emphasized 
by large purple discs in the voltage plot. Ab, Grand average SEPs at channel CP4 for the 
subthreshold left attended condition. The bottom plot shows the SEPs on a zoomed scale for the 
yellow shaded area of the top plot. Time is expressed relative to stimulus onset (0 ms). Lightly 
shaded background areas indicate 95% confidence intervals derived from paired t-tests of each 
data point against average baseline activity. Ac, Ba, and Bc are the same as Aa, but for the 
subthreshold left unattended, suprathreshold left attended and suprathreshold left unattended 
conditions, respectively. Note the different scaling of the ordinate for suprathreshold stimulation. 
Ad is the same as Ab but for the subthreshold left unattended condition. Bb and Bd are the same 
as Ab and Ad but for the suprathreshold left attended and suprathreshold left unattended 
conditions, respectively. Note the different scaling of the ordinate. 
 
Regarding mu amplitude, we found opposing effects: a decrease—as compared to 
baseline—after suprathreshold stimulation and an increase after subthreshold 
stimulation, which confirms our previous findings (Nierhaus et al., 2015). It is 
noteworthy that in the condition where the left index finger was unattended (attention 
directed to the right hand), an early increase of mu amplitude (13–15 Hz) and a decrease 
of beta amplitude (20–23 Hz, around 150–200 ms) following subthreshold left index 
finger stimulation was prevalent (t-test, fdr-corrected with p<0.05). When the left index 
finger was attended, an increase in mu amplitude (9–10 Hz) and a concomitant decrease 
in beta amplitude (20–24 Hz) occurred—approximately 200 to 300 ms later (fdr-
corrected, p<0.05; Figure 15). When directly comparing the stimulation effect of the 
averaged somatosensory alpha band (8–15 Hz) between attention conditions, this 
temporal dissociation was not significant (fdr-corrected). 
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Figure 15. Subthreshold stimulation increases, suprathreshold stimulation decreases Rolandic 
rhythms. Grand average time-frequency plots (contralateral to stimulation side at CP4) for 
subthreshold (Aa and Ab) and suprathreshold (Ba and Bb) stimulation after selection and forward 
projection of pericentral independent mu components. Time is expressed relative to stimulation 
onset; oscillatory activity is expressed relative to baseline amplitude (baseline: -700 to -200 ms pre-
stimulus). Light colored areas did not survive fdr-correction for multiple comparisons at q=0.05 
(Genovese et al., 2002). 
 
Sub- and suprathreshold SEPs and pre-stimulus mu amplitude are modulated by selective spatial 
attention 
We tested the main effect of attention on SEPs for averaged amplitudes 50–60 ms post-
stimulus. Subthreshold stimulation evoked a P1 at posterior peri-central electrode sites 
(CP4) that was significantly enhanced when the finger was attended compared to when 
it was unattended (Figure 16a, t(36) = 2.21, p < .04). This confirms our first hypothesis 
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that attention modulates neural processing of subthreshold, that is, unconsciously 
“perceived,” somatosensory stimuli. 
For suprathreshold stimulation, we subtracted averaged amplitudes around 80 to 
100 ms (N80) from averaged amplitudes around 50 to 60 ms (P50) post-stimulus onset. 
The P50–N80 complex (i.e., the peak between P1 and N1) was significantly increased 
during the attended as compared to the unattended condition (Figure 16a, t(36) = 2.22, 
p < .04).  
As expected, attention modulated overall mu amplitude preceding stimulation, with 
higher amplitudes contralateral to the unattended side (Figure 16b, t(36) = -2.34, p < 
.025). 
 
 
Figure 16. For all subplots, blue and red bars depict the attended and unattended conditions, 
respectively. A: Subthreshold (left) and suprathreshold (right) SEPs and (B) grand-average 
attention effect for pre-stimulus mu amplitude (-1000 to -200 ms). Error bars indicate 95% 
confidence intervals of the mean. Asterisks indicate significance at p<0.05. C, Subthreshold 
stimulation: relationship between pre-stimulus mu and SEP amplitudes (Ca) and pre-stimulus mu 
amplitude values averaged across trials within each bin (-300 to -200 ms; Cb). D, Suprathreshold 
stimulation: same as C but for the suprathreshold left attended condition. Da, Additionally, red 
dots show the average hit rates for each mu amplitude bin and the solid red line depicts the fit of 
the LMM for the suprathreshold left attended condition. Overlaid dashed and dotted lines in Ca 
and Da are fits of the LMM for respective SEP amplitudes. Red dots (with 95% confidence 
intervals) in Cb and Db depict the difference in an absolute number of trials of each mu amplitude 
bin between attention conditions. 
The relationship between pre-stimulus mu and SEP amplitude depends on attention 
To investigate the relationship between pre-stimulus mu amplitude (pre-mu) and SEPs 
and hit rates (HR), we aggregated trials for each attention and stimulation condition 
(attended or unattended and sub- or suprathreshold) separately over five bins of 
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increasing mu amplitude. The procedure resulted in mu amplitude bins with comparable 
(almost equal) mu amplitude between attention conditions within a given bin (Figure 
16cb+db, see methods section for details). The repeated measures ANOVA for binned 
mu amplitude preceding subthreshold stimulation reveals a significant main effect of 
both amplitude bin and attention (F(4,144)=1489.6, p[GG]<0.0001, ƞ2G=0.44 and 
F(1,36)=6.7, p<0.014, ƞ2G=0.00003, respectively). Post-hoc comparisons via paired t-
tests identified the bin with the highest mu amplitude as the driver of the attention main 
effect (t(36)=-2.86, p<0.01). A similar ANOVA, testing binned mu amplitude preceding 
suprathreshold stimulation, only showed the expected main effect of amplitude bin 
(F(4,144)=1264.5, p[GG]<0.0001, ƞ2G=0.44). Average bin amplitude values are 
therefore comparable between attention conditions (except for bin 5 preceding 
subthreshold stimulation). 
In order to test the relationship between pre-stimulus mu amplitude and SEP 
amplitude, we calculated a linear mixed effects model (LMM) regression fits with both 
linear and quadratic predictors for each stimulus and attention condition. For 
suprathreshold stimulation, regressions both for attended and unattended stimulation 
turned out to be highly significant compared to an intercept-only model (i.e., a model 
with no relationship assumed, attended: 3%=26.01, p=0.0001; unattended: 3%=46.04, 
p=0.0001, see models 9 and 12 in Table 4). As can be seen in Figure 16da, the relationship 
for the attention conditions is reversed: We find a negative quadratic relationship when 
the stimulated finger is attended and a regular (positive) quadratic relationship when it 
is unattended. For subthreshold stimulation, we again observe a significant negative 
quadratic relationship when the stimulated side is attended (3%=22.25, p=0.0013, see 
model 3 in Table 4), and a positive quadratic relationship when the stimulated side is 
unattended (3%=30.03, p=0.0002, see model 6 in Table 4). 
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Table 4. LMM testing the relationship between pre-stimulus mu amplitude bin and SEP 
amplitude for each attention condition separately (model no. 1–12). The likelihood depicts the 
models’ log transformed likelihood; bigger is better, i.e., the model is more likely. LRT is the 
likelihood ratio test comparing two models for the same dataset [Bigger models (more parameters) 
are compared with respective smaller ones]. This returns a χ² value. However, p values are based 
on parametric bootstrapping (10,000 simulations; Halekoh and Højsgaard, 2014): *<0.05– 0.01, 
**<0.01– 0.001, ***<0.001– 0. 
Condition Model 
No. 
Lmer syntax Likeli-
hood 
LRT 
Subthreshold 
attended 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
P60~1+(1|Subject) 
P60~1+Bin+(1+Bin|Subject)  
P60~1+Bin+I(Bin^2)+ 
(1+Bin+I(Bin^2)|Subject) 
-177.49 
-170.52 
-166.37 
 
χ²=13.94** 
χ²=8.31* 
Subthreshold 
unattended 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
As (1),  
(2),  
(3), respectively 
-176.32 
-170.67 
-161.3 
 
χ²=11.29** 
χ²=18.73*** 
Suprathreshol 
attended 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
P50~1+(1|Subject) 
P50~1+Bin+(1+Bin|Subject) 
P50~1+Bin+I(Bin^2)+ 
(1+Bin+I(Bin^2)|Subject) 
-439.65 
-434.98 
-426.65 
 
χ²=9.34* 
χ²=16.7** 
Suprathreshold 
unattended 
(10) 
(11) 
(12) 
As (7), 
(8), 
(9), respectively 
-458.01 
-452.7 
-435 
 
χ²=10.7** 
χ²=35.34*** 
 
 
We also evaluated the relationship between pre-stimulus mu amplitude and hit rates for 
the suprathreshold attended condition, as this is the one condition in which subjects 
responded to perceived stimuli via a button press. As for the SEPs in the previous 
section, we found a significant quadratic relationship compared to the no-relationship 
(intercept-only) model (3%=42.44, p=0.001, see Table 5 also including the test against a 
pure linear model).  
 
Table 5. LMM testing the relationship between pre-stimulus mu amplitude bin and HR for the 
suprathreshold left attended condition (model no. 13–15). Models are evaluated as in Table 4 
(bootstrapped p values are based on 10,000 simulations): *<0.05–0.01, **<0.01–0.001, ***<0.001–0. 
Condition Model 
No. 
Lmer syntax Likeli-
hood 
LRT 
Suprathreshold 
attended 
(13) 
(14) 
(15) 
HR~1+(1|Subject) 
HR~1+Bin+(1+Bin|Subject) 
HR~1+Bin+I(Bin^2)+ 
(1+Bin+I(Bin^2)|Subject) 
73.02 
82.8 
94.23 
 
χ²=19.57*** 
χ²=22.87*** 
In order to test whether the variation of pre-mu solely reflects tactile attention, we fitted 
the data combining both attention conditions (Figure 12a, the mediator model, see 
 2-94 
paragraph ”Assessment of the relationship between pre-stimulus mu amplitude, 
somatosensory evoked potential and attention” for details) with the very same model 
definition as above. For the case where the effect of attention on SEP amplitudes is 
independent of the effect on pre-mu activity (Figure 12b, independence model), we only 
included “attention” as fixed effect factor and within-subject factor in the random 
effects part in order to model SEP amplitudes across attention condition. Alternatively, 
if the relationship between pre-stimulus mu amplitude and SEP amplitude essentially 
depends on the actual attention state (Figure 12c, interaction model), a model with 
attention included as an interacting factor should better fit the very same dataset. 
Indeed, a bootstrapped likelihood ratio test revealed the attention interaction model to 
be significantly more likely than both the mediator and the independence model for 
both sub- and suprathreshold stimulation (Table 6; subthreshold: 3%=50.22, p=0.0016 
and 3%=45.41, p=0.0001; suprathreshold: 3%=56.94, p=0.024 and 3%=51.4, p=0.0006, 
respectively). 
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Table 6. LMM testing the relationship between pre-stimulus mu amplitude bin and SEP 
amplitude for datasets that combine both attention conditions (model no. 16 –21; Figure 12 A–C). 
The interaction model is compared with the two smaller models (mediator model and 
independence model, indicated by the model number given in the LRT column). Parametric 
bootstrapping was based on 10,000 simulations: *<0.05–0.01, **<0.01–0.001, ***<0.001–0. a For this 
test, we doubled the number of simulations, because the p-value based on 10,000 simulations 
marginally missed significance (p=0.058). 
Condition Model 
No. 
Lmer syntax Likeli-
hood 
LRT 
Subthreshold, 
both attention 
conditions 
(16) As (3), but across conditions, 
mediator model, Figure 12a 
-355.71 (17) 
χ²=-4.8 
(17) P60~1+Att+(1+Att|Subject), 
independence model, Figure 12b 
-353.3  
(18) P60~1+Bin+I(Bin^2)+Bin*Att+ 
I(Bin^2)*Att+ 
(1+Bin+I(Bin^2)|Subject:Att), 
interaction model, Figure 12c 
-330.6 (16) 
χ²=50.22** 
(17) 
χ²=45.41*** 
Suprathreshold, 
both attention 
conditions 
(19) As (9), but across conditions, 
mediator model, Figure 12a 
-894.7 (20) 
χ²=-5.5 
(20) P50~1+Att+(1+Att|Subject) , 
independence model, Figure 12b 
-891.93  
(21) P50~1+Bin+I(Bin^2)+Bin*Att+ 
I(Bin^2)*Att+ 
(1+Bin+I(Bin^2)|Subject:Att), 
interaction model, Figure 12c 
-866.23 (19) 
χ²=56.94*a 
(20) 
χ²=51.4*** 
 
Discussion 
In the present study, we investigated (1) whether spatial attention modulates the 
amplitude of early SEP components in response to electrical left finger nerve 
stimulation both for supra- and subthreshold intensities, and (2) the role of pre-stimulus 
mu activity on this attentional modulation. Taken together, we found that attention 
increases the amplitude for the P1 component for both kinds of stimulation. 
Furthermore, pre-stimulus mu amplitude (pre-mu) interacts with stimulus-related 
responses. Interestingly, pre-mu activity affects both behavioral responses and evoked 
brain activity, the latter differentially depending on the attentional state: With spatial 
attention, there is a negative quadratic relationship between pre-mu and evoked 
amplitudes whereas without spatial attention the relationship is positive quadratic. 
Intermediate and higher mu amplitudes go along with large evoked activity during 
spatial attention and with small evoked activity without attention.  
Sustained attention is widely known to improve perception in a variety of tasks and 
virtually all modalities (Carrasco, 2011; Kastner, Pinsk, De Weerd, Desimone, & 
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Ungerleider, 1999; Marks & Wheeler, 1998; Sathian & Burton, 1991; C. J. Spence & 
Driver, 1994; C. Spence, Kettenmann, Kobal, & McGlone, 2001; C. Spence, Pavani, & 
Driver, 2000). The deployment of attentional resources should facilitate perception to 
any task-relevant sensory input as long as it proceeds along the same bottom-up 
somatosensory pathway (Dehaene et al., 2006; Kiefer, 2012; Schröger et al., 2015). 
Whether this also holds for subthreshold stimuli, however, is not known, since non-
invasive recordings of evoked activity to unmasked subthreshold stimulation have been 
obtained in only a few studies (somatosensation: Nierhaus et al., 2015; vision: Bareither 
et al., 2014; Sperdin et al., 2014) and did not investigate attentional modulation. Our 
results clearly support this postulate by showing an increase in the P1 amplitude with 
spatial attention, 60ms after stimulation. This effect coincides with an attention effect 
in the same time range (P50–N80) for suprathreshold stimulation as it has been shown 
previously (Michie et al. (1987). However, evidence regarding the effect of attention on 
P1 is ambiguous, because Schubert et al. (2008b) found the attention effect on P1 only 
on one side (left but not right) and Zopf et al. (2004) did not find it at all. Interestingly, 
in our study, the attentional modulation of P1 was most clearly evident in the interaction 
between attention, pre-mu activity, and SEP, and the observed non-linear relationship 
between mu and P1 might explain why the effect of attention on P1 has not been seen 
in some previous studies. Future studies need to show whether this is also true for right 
index finger stimulation, for which perceptual differences have been reported (Meador 
et al., 1998). 
 
As we reported previously (Nierhaus et al., 2015), upon subthreshold stimulation, we 
did not observe any further ERP component beyond P1. However, a transient increase 
of mu amplitude has been observed after subthreshold stimulation (Figure 15), which 
contrasts the post-stimulus decrease typically seen after externally triggered near- and 
suprathreshold stimulation (Pfurtscheller, 1989; Nikouline, Linkenkaer-Hansen, et al., 
2000; Palva et al., 2005; Nierhaus et al., 2015). Generally speaking, increases in mu 
amplitude may be induced by the feed-forward inhibition associated with subthreshold 
stimulation as we have discussed previously (Blankenburg et al., 2003; Nierhaus et al., 
2015; Taskin et al., 2008).  
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With respect to the attention effect on pre-mu activity, our results are in line with several 
studies reporting that attention leads to a decrease of alpha power contralateral to where 
spatial attention is directed compared to ipsilateral sites (somatosensory: Pfurtscheller 
and Lopes da Silva, 1999; Jones et al., 2010; Anderson and Ding, 2011; Haegens et al., 
2011a, 2011b; visually: Thut et al., 2006; auditory: Weisz et al., 2014a; Wöstmann et al., 
2016). This strongly supports the assumption of selective attention relying on intrinsic 
oscillatory activity in the somatosensory cortex already prior to the incoming stimulus 
(Thut et al., 2006). 
Regarding the relationship between pre-mu activity and perceptual performance, we 
show detection rates to be largest for intermediate pre-mu and lowest for either minimal 
or maximal pre-mu, which is in line with previous research reporting inverse U-shaped 
relationships (Linkenkaer-Hansen et al., 2004; Zhang & Ding, 2009). Consistent with 
this, some studies reported a co-modulation of pre-stimulus mu activity and early SEP 
components in response to near- and suprathreshold electrical stimuli (Zhang and Ding 
2009; Anderson and Ding 2011), both cases exhibiting an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between pre-stimulus mu power and the respective N1.  
Contrasting two alpha power ranges (e.g., “high” and “low”) can allow only for 
describing linear effects as done in other studies. Here, we extracted five bins of pre-
mu that resulted in comparable mu amplitudes between attention conditions for each 
bin (Figure 16cb, db). We observe a non-linear influence of pre-mu activity on P1 
amplitudes for both attention conditions, which is in line with the findings of Zhang 
and Ding (2009) and Anderson and Ding (2011). Moreover, we find that the very same 
alpha amplitudes (intermediate to highest) are related to the highest SEP amplitudes 
under attention but also to the lowest SEP amplitudes during inattention. Thus, 
attention might alter the functional relationship between pre-mu activity and stimulus-
related processing (SEP components) according to the task requirements. Rather than 
serving the deployment of attention alone, mu activity may maximize evoked activity 
related to the “to-be-attended” stimulus (facilitation), but at the same time minimizes 
evoked neural processing related to the “to-be-unattended” stimulus (suppression).  
 
At first glance, this interpretation seems to contradict the initial hypothesis that alpha 
mediates the effect of attention: The very same pre-mu activity would convey the same 
attentional influence, and the relation between pre-mu activity and SEP amplitude 
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would not be differentiable between the two attention conditions. Indeed, a different 
role for alpha has been suggested in recent studies which indicate that it might reflect 
the expectation of upcoming events (Bauer, Stenner, Friston, & Dolan, 2014; Sedley et 
al., 2016) rather than attention (Anderson & Ding, 2011; Foxe & Snyder, 2011; Zhang 
& Ding, 2009). However, in our study, neither frequency nor timing of an upcoming 
perceivable event differed between attention conditions, so it is improbable that the 
differential influence of mu activity on SEP amplitudes concerning attention reflects 
differences in expectation. Admittedly, individual variations in the ability to predict an 
upcoming stimulation within a specific attentional state, which, then, might be related 
to different pre-mu activity, cannot be excluded. Whether this also holds for 
subthreshold stimulation is an interesting question, which we address by experimentally 
manipulating both attention and expectation in the future. 
Second, the underlying local spatial pattern of alpha distribution across the cortex 
might differ between the two conditions, which is possibly smeared given the limited 
spatial resolution of EEG (Lopes da Silva, van Rotterdam, Barts, van Heusden, & Burr, 
1976; Palva & Palva, 2007; Suffczynski, Kalitzin, Pfurtscheller, & Lopes da Silva, 2001). 
For the visual cortex, it is well-established that selective attention to a particular location 
or stimulus feature enhances the response of the coding receptive field while 
suppressing the immediate surrounding and leaving the further surrounding unaffected 
(Harvey et al., 2013). This is known as the “Mexican hat” distribution of selective 
attention (N. G. Müller & Kleinschmidt, 2004; N. G. Müller, Mollenhauer, Rösler, & 
Kleinschmidt, 2005; Treue, 2014). Such a distribution improves the internal signal-to-
noise ratio and could explain why the attention–mu relationship is not linear in our case: 
The mu rhythm (based on ICA) that was measured over an electrode (CP4) contralateral 
to the stimulation site is most probably a compound of rhythmic activities in adjacent 
brain areas. Thus, the intermediate overall mu amplitude may reflect a balance between 
decreased mu in the brain regions representing the receptive field of the attended finger 
(facilitation) and increased mu in adjacent topological fields (surround suppression, 
Suffczynski et al., 2001). 
Interestingly, this framework predicts smallest SEP amplitudes for intermediate mu 
activity as a consequence of compound rhythmic activities originating from adjacent 
brain areas: The response of the to-be-ignored receptive field is suppressed, thereby 
exhibiting higher mu activity while at the same time adjacent fields might be less 
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suppressed. Following this concept, the effect of attention is mediated by mu activity, 
albeit on a more local spatial scale than can be resolved with the common EEG 
approach. In future studies, simultaneous EEG-fMRI (in which the fMRI correlate of 
mu rhythm is expected to differ between the different attention conditions) or invasive 
electrocorticography may help to elucidate this question.  
In conclusion, our results show that although access to conscious perception is 
prevented, attention nevertheless affects neural processing of subthreshold stimuli in a 
top-down manner as it does for suprathreshold stimuli. Furthermore, pre-stimulus mu 
activity differentially influences neural processing to enable optimal performance in a 
given task and we suggest this to be a general neural signature for attentional 
deployment as it encompasses both conscious and unconscious perception. 
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3 General Discussion and Conclusions 
3.1 Summary of empirical results 
In the course of four empirical studies, I tested (1) the feasibility of investigating 
undetectable stimulation by unmasked electrical finger nerve pulses, (2) how its neural 
correlates dissociate from detectable stimulation and (3) whether and how selective 
somatosensory attention nevertheless affects the neural representation of stimuli 
destined to go by unnoticed. 
Study 1 showed that the intensity of just detectable stimulation (i.e., at ADTH) is 
lower for short repetitive pulse trains compared to single pulses. Defining subthreshold 
intensities relative to the ADTH of pulse trains lowers the sensory evidence for the 
same stimulation intensities of single electrical pulses and thereby minimizes possible 
effects of partial consciousness. Therefore, stimulus intensities in all subsequent 
experiments were derived from threshold assessments applying a higher repetition rate 
(here 7 Hz) of electrical pulses than in the actual experiments. 
Study 2 provided definitive proof that observers are zero sensitive to electrical 
finger stimulation intensities below ADTH. I showed that there is a physical range of 
electrical stimulation intensities that cannot be detected. Processing of subthreshold 
stimulation has been reported previously (Baumgarten et al., 2017; Blankenburg et al., 
2003; Ferrè et al., 2016; Iliopoulos et al., 2014; Klostermann et al., 2009; Libet et al., 
1967; Ray et al., 1999a; Taskin et al., 2008), however, a rigorous statistical evaluation of 
its un-detectability has not been shown yet. By the assessment of the bias-free measure 
of perceptual sensitivity, Bayes factor statistical inference indicated that the evidence of 
chance performance after subthreshold stimulation reliably outweighed evidence of 
above-chance performance. 
Study 3 set out to investigate how the neural correlates of subthreshold stimulation 
differ from neural processing above ADTH all the way up to clearly detectable stimuli 
with respect to electrophysiological recordings in humans. This study was designed to 
comply with signal detection theoretical analyses and could, therefore, like study 2, 
control for perceptual sensitivity at each stimulus intensity independent of subjective 
response tendencies. Together with own previous work applying similar subthreshold 
stimulation during resting-state functional magnetic resonance imaging, these data 
 3-102 
revealed qualitative differences between detectable and undetectable stimulus 
processing evident in altered event-related potentials, induced oscillatory activity, blood-
oxygen-level-dependent responses, and functional connectivity. 
Finally, study 4 investigated how the deployment of attentional resources might 
shape the neural processing of undetectable somatosensory stimulation and contrasted 
this to the processing of detectable stimuli. Attention modulated early SEP amplitudes 
to both detectable and undetectable stimulation fostering the view of attention and 
awareness being two separate and mostly independent mechanisms. Furthermore, this 
study tested the effect of pre-stimulus Rolandic alpha amplitude on early somatosensory 
evoked potentials and its putative relationship to the guidance of selective spatial 
attention. The results clearly show that pre-stimulus Rolandic alpha was predictive for 
the upcoming SEP amplitude. However, the relationship of pre-stimulus alpha and SEP 
amplitude depended on the current attentional state indicating that both processes are 
interacting but not functionally matching. 
 
3.2 Neural processing of undetectable stimulation 
This work strongly supports the view that neural effects to undetectable somatosensory 
stimulation are a valid source of information to understand the underpinnings of 
functional brain activity. This view is not self-evident and has been debated 
controversially in the past. In a set of physiological studies, Johansson and Vallbo (1979) 
recorded peripheral nerve impulses from single fibers in the median nerve while 
perturbing single mechanosensitive afferent units in the glabrous skin of human 
participants. They found that in the most sensitive areas (the volar aspect of the fingers 
and peripheral parts of the palm) psychophysiological thresholds were identical to the 
physiological thresholds of the afferent. Moreover, participants’ false alarm rates in the 
1AFC task were close to zero. The correspondence of psychophysiological and 
physiological threshold together with low false alarm rates to catch trials generally speak 
for a low noise afferent signal transmission to the brain and leaves no space for neural 
processing of undetectable stimulation. 
It is conceivable that different stimulation types—mechanical or electrical—might 
play a role and could explain why minimal neurographic responses to mechanical touch 
lead to above chance performance whereas the current thesis showed brain 
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physiological responses to electrical finger stimulation for which behavioral 
performance is indeed at the chance level. Whereas little mechanical indentation mainly 
recruits afferent fibers innervating confined receptive fields containing rather few 
receptors (Goodwin & Wheat, 2008; Johansson & Vallbo, 1983), the flow of a small 
electrical current would depolarize all afferent fibers between the two terminals of a 
voltage source irrespective of their innervated receptor types. Intuitively, one should 
think that the more innervated afferents, the better the detection. Textbook knowledge, 
however, suggests the parallel processing of different stimulus attributes through 
converging and diverging afferent fibers (Gardner & Martin, 2000; Pei, Denchev, Hsiao, 
Craig, & Bensmaia, 2009) onto higher order relay (projection) neurons and its feature 
selective mapping in different areas of the cortex (Gardner & Kandel, 2000; Kim et al., 
2015). This spread of neural activity might dampen the overall response to concurrently 
activated, adjacent receptive fields by local phenomena of surround or lateral inhibition 
(ibid.; Goldstein, 2009) in the case of transcutaneous electrical stimulation and thereby 
allowing a divergence of psychophysical and sensory receptor threshold. 
Undetectable somatosensory stimulation applied here was tuned to intensities 30–
15% below ADTH and reliably produced sensitivity values of zero. Nevertheless, these 
subthreshold stimuli lead to a positive potential change about 50 milliseconds after their 
onset, the P50. Despite this early component, no further significant deflection has been 
observed. The absence of later components is remarkable in the light of earlier work on 
unconscious word processing in the visual domain (see Shevrin, 2001, for an overview). 
In 1968, Shevrin and Fritzler reported that the ERPs of detected and undetected stimuli 
appear to have a similar structure, however, ERP amplitudes of unconscious stimuli 
being at least four times smaller than conscious stimuli (see also Bernat, Bunce, & 
Shevrin, 2001 for similar results on unconscious valence recognition). In a set of other 
studies the same group (Bernat, Shevrin, & Snodgrass, 2001; Silverstein et al., 2015a; 
Snodgrass, Bernat, & Shevrin, 2004; Snodgrass & Shevrin, 2006) suggested that 
conscious and unconscious perception are functionally exclusive and should 
qualitatively dissociate from each other, which is at odds with the finding of similar ERP 
structure but weaker component amplitudes for unconscious stimuli. Effects that are 
just a weaker version of conscious perception effects do not strongly indicate 
unconscious perception and could point to residual conscious perception and therefore 
obey the so-called single process conscious perception model (ibid.). Data in the current 
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thesis and previous work suggests qualitative different processing of undetectable 
compared to detectable somatosensory stimulation in several aspects: (1) the absence 
of late components (study 3, 4 and Nierhaus et al., 2015, esp. the N150 that is indicative 
of stimulus detection (study 3), (2) increased instead of decreased event-related 
somatosensory alpha amplitude (study 4), (3) reduced instead of elevated BOLD activity 
(Blankenburg et al., 2003) as well as (4) reduced functional connectivity of primary 
somatosensory cortex to areas associated with conscious and higher somatosensory 
processing (Nierhaus et al., 2015). Despite the apparent difference of stimulus 
presentation modality in the studies by the Shevrin group and the current thesis, a 
couple of potentially relevant factors may have led to the diverging ERP findings. First, 
the visual studies (Bernat, Shevrin, et al., 2001; Silverstein et al., 2015) applied stimulus 
material that conveyed rather complex semantic information as compared to the small 
electrical pulses in the current studies. Such stimulation differences may have triggered 
effects in components beyond the initial processing stages, which is indicated by their 
frontal spatial origin. Second, it might be the case that subthreshold electrical 
somatosensory stimuli recruit more divergent fibers than the short flashing of words do 
(see the similar argumentation at the beginning of the section). This could cause 
relatively more mutual inhibition to occur in the neighboring neurons of primary 
sensory cortices coding adjacent receptive fields, which impede further processing. 
Likewise, subthreshold somatosensory stimulation might shift the excitation-inhibition-
balance (Isaacson & Scanziani, 2011) toward inhibition indicated by high stimulus-
related alpha amplitude and decreased functional connectivity as Nierhaus et al. (2015) 
have argued and thereby preventing perceptual awareness at later stages. 
 
3.3 Attention, awareness and neural oscillatory activity 
Study three (section 2.3.2) showed contralateral N150 to be the earliest component 
indicative of stimulus detection, which mirrors previous research (Auksztulewicz & 
Blankenburg, 2013; Auksztulewicz et al., 2012; Schubert et al., 2006). Auksztulewicz and 
colleagues (2012) stimulated the median nerve with a single near-threshold intensity. 
Besides an elevated N150 amplitude for detected compared to rejected stimulation, 
source connectivity modeling indicated that this component might reflect increased 
recurrent (both feedforward and feedback) processing between primary and secondary 
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somatosensory cortex (ibid.). Absence of N150, as I reported (study 3 and 4), for 
subthreshold, i.e., undetectable, stimulation then could point to an unmodulated 
connection between primary sensory cortices relative to baseline activity or even to 
reduced connectivity of S1 to the frontal-parietal network (Nierhaus et al., 2015). As I 
discussed earlier (section 2.3.1), the presence of N150 seems to be independent of the 
experimental context as Nierhaus and colleagues (2015) did not require participants to 
engage in a detection task but rather let them passively observe suprathreshold, i.e., 
detectable, stimulation. Its presence during passively observed detectable stimulation 
makes the N150 a candidate for a proper neural correlate of consciousness (Aru et al., 
2012; Verleger, 2010). In a visual backward masking study, a mid-latency negativity 
(VAN) indicated visual awareness of stimuli that were not task-relevant, but it was 
absent when participants did not perceived the stimuli (Pitts et al., 2014). Similarly, the 
posterior-contralateral negativity with a latency of roughly 200 ms (N2pc) only appeared 
after a valid compared to an invalid spatial attention cue was consciously perceived but 
was missing when the cue was masked (Giattino, Alam, & Woldorff, 2018). Although 
the latter findings could not rule out task-relevance as confounding factor, both studies 
corroborate the present results that perceptual awareness might emerge within 200 ms 
upon stimulus presentation but not as early as 60 ms.  
For this early time range, however, I reported an attentional modulation of the P50 
and that this modulation was independent of stimulus awareness (study 4). Together 
with the results by Giattino and colleagues (2018), who reported enhanced P1 amplitude 
upon validly relative to invalidly cued targets both for consciously perceived and non-
perceived cues, early attentional modulation of sensory input speaks for a general signal 
gain mechanism. In this sense, the results of the current thesis reject theories that 
envision attention as a gating mechanism putting unconscious perception and selective 
attention at the endpoints of a continuum (Brigard & Prinz, 2010; Dixon, 1971). I.e., 
attention does not shield the brain from faint but principally task-relevant information 
as long as this information proceeds along the same feedforward processing pathway 
where the focus of attention currently rests. Furthermore, this also foils theoretical 
accounts viewing attention to be sufficient for consciousness (Brigard & Prinz, 2010). 
Dividing attention in (1) attention to space and (2) attention to perceptual 
representations, Brigard and Prinz (2010) regard attention necessary and sufficient for 
consciousness “when and only when a perceptual representation of something (a color, 
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shape, object, movement and so on) is modulated by attention” but importantly not 
when attention is spatially focused. Instead, although attention is not a uniform 
phenomenon, and the current results shed some light on one, but arguably central 
aspect of it, namely focused selective attention (W. James, 1890), I think that the early 
P50 modulation under no sign of stimulus awareness triggered by top-down selective 
attention strongly speaks for an independence of attention from consciousness. It is not 
conclusive but seems arbitrary to claim that attention is sufficient for consciousness 
while only referring to one aspect of attention but not the other. 
Furthermore one may question whether “attention selection of perceptual 
representations to be passed onto working memory” (Brigard & Prinz, 2010) is different 
from “items that are in mind and have reportability,” which is taken from the definition 
of consciousness in the introduction put forward by Gilchrist and Cowan (2010). That 
is, passing perceptual representation to working memory might already reflect emerging 
consciousness. In that sense, attentional selection does not gate information but rather 
tries to increase the signal to noise ratio and thereby to boost the chance for stimulus 
reportability. However, that does not mean attention does not gate ignored stimuli. There 
are many studies of inattentional or change blindness showing that quite salient stimuli 
might be overseen (e.g., Rensink, O’Regan, & Clark, 1997; Simons & Chabris, 1999). If 
the stimulation site is attended, gating for perceptual awareness happens at later 
processing stages, starting roughly from 80 ms as previous research (Auksztulewicz & 
Blankenburg, 2013; Auksztulewicz et al., 2012; Cauller & Kulics, 1991; Schubert et al., 
2006; Zhang & Ding, 2009) and the current data indicate (study 3) but does not seem 
to be a function of early selective attention. The referenced research and the current 
data are better explained by two alternative but complementary accounts that describe 
attention selection and awareness as two independent, however, interrelated concepts 
(Dehaene et al., 2006; Kiefer, 2012; Kiefer & Martens, 2010). In the model by Dehaene, 
the extent to which a stimulus is processed and eventually becomes detected depends 
on its bottom-up stimulus strength and the amount of available attentional resources 
deployed to it. In that scheme, weak stimuli go unnoticed regardless how much 
attentional resources are available, which is consistent with the attentional modulation 
of subthreshold stimulus ERPs in study 4. If stimuli are principally strong enough, 
observers still might be unaware of them as long as attention is occupied elsewhere (see 
change blindness above). The attentional sensitization model of Markus Kiefer builds 
 General Discussion 
 3-107 
on Dehaene’s taxonomy and extends it, especially concerning how the attentional 
modulation of undetectable stimulation is implemented. Regardless of whether the 
stimulus is consciously perceived or not, the mechanism for attentional control is the 
same: “processing of task-relevant pathways is enhanced by increasing the gain of 
neurons in the corresponding areas, whereas the processing of task-irrelevant pathways 
is attenuated by a decrease of the gain” (Kiefer, 2012; Kiefer & Martens, 2010). 
Although beyond the scope of the current thesis, it might be worth to reconcile the 
view of facilitation or signal enhancement by tactile attention along the awareness 
spectrum to elaborated models of visual attention that are able to integrate a whole lot 
of different empirical results in vision (Buschman & Kastner, 2015; Carrasco, 2011; 
Reynolds & Heeger, 2009). For a moment putting awareness aside, the increased P50 
amplitude for both undetectable and detectable somatosensory stimuli during attention 
may reflect a contrast gain in the stimulus coding neural population. I.e., neural 
population activity in primary cortices as a function of stimulus intensity increases 
across the whole stimulus intensity range. This neural gain decreases the stimulus 
intensity required for the neural population to respond and is equivalent to the neural 
response following increased stimulus intensity without attention (Carrasco, 2011). 
Computationally, this can be implemented by multiplying the “stimulus drive” (i.e., the 
neural response to the stimulus per se without modulation) with the “attentional field” 
(i.e., the actual gain for each neuron in the population depending on its spatial extent, 
Reynolds & Heeger, 2009). The result is divided by a normalization factor, the 
“suppressive drive,” to scale the neural population response. This suppressive drive 
reflects the amount of suppression due to the activity of other neurons responding to 
the surrounding context (Reynolds & Heeger, 2009) and therefore compete for neural 
representation (Buschman & Kastner, 2015; Desimone & Duncan, 1995). Attention 
then is a mechanism that alters activity across neural populations by shifting the balance 
between excitation and suppression. According to the normalization model of attention 
(Reynolds & Heeger, 2009), the bigger P50 contralateral to the attended finger in study 
4 is due to the multiplicative gain of the attention field and the stimulus drive. Thus, the 
smaller P50 contralateral to the unattended finger is governed by the suppressive drive 
probably resulting from local competitive interactions (Buschman & Kastner, 2015; 
Reynolds & Heeger, 2009) that are not resolved by attention (Desimone & Duncan, 
1995). Unfortunately, it is not possible to prove suppression based on the relatively 
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reduced P50 amplitude alone because study 4 is lacking a neutral baseline. However, 
increased sensory suppression has been argued to correlate with heightened alpha band 
amplitudes (Haegens, Nácher, et al., 2011; Jensen & Mazaheri, 2010; Kelly, Lalor, Reilly, 
& Foxe, 2006; Klimesch, 2012; Pfurtscheller, 1989; Thut et al., 2006) and to reflect the 
neural mechanism for the deployment of attention (Foxe & Snyder, 2011).  
Surprisingly in study 4, there was no statistically reliable difference in event-related 
alpha-band suppression when a suprathreshold stimulus was attended compared to 
when it was ignored. Supporting this finding, van Ede and colleagues (2014) did not 
observe any post-stimulus attention differences after tactile stimulation, too. Thus, post-
stimulus alpha-band amplitude does not seem to indicate attentional deployment. As 
discussed above, suppression is likely due to local competitive interactions that are 
increased the more stimuli compete for processing resources (Desimone & Duncan, 
1995). Thus, if alpha reflects sensory suppression the presence of an amplitude 
difference when comparing attended versus unattended stimuli might depend on the 
number of stimuli that are ignored. This hypothesis gets some support by research from 
visual-spatial and feature-based attention, which did not analyze alpha amplitudes, 
though, but the steady-state-visual evoked potential (SSVEP). For measuring an 
SSVEP, one or more stimuli are tagged with specific presentation frequencies, which 
amplitudes can be analyzed in M/EEG. In a study by Fuchs, Andersen, Gruber, and 
Müller (2008) the SSVEP signal of an unattended flickering bar only became suppressed 
when a second bar was presented close to it. Likewise, work in feature-based attention 
showed that the signal of the unattended feature was reduced compared to a neutral 
baseline when a local competitor was presented (Forschack, Andersen, & Müller, 2016; 
Müller, Gundlach, Forschack, & Brummerloh, 2018). Importantly, these studies could 
not analyze alpha, because SSVEP frequencies were covering the alpha-band range. 
Future studies should center flicker frequencies well above the alpha band to measure 
putative sensory suppression indicated by alpha amplitude increases concurrently with 
SSVEP amplitude reduction. 
Contrary to stimulus-induced alpha amplitude modulation, pre-stimulus alpha 
amplitudes might be relevant for the allocation of attentional resources. This link has 
been shown by relatively larger pre-stimulus alpha-band amplitudes when the finger was 
unattended compared to when it was attended in both van Ede and colleagues’ (2014) 
study and here in study 4. The relationship of alpha and attention regarding early sensory 
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stimulus processing, though, does not seem to be straight forward because the size of 
the P50 is either maximal or minimal for the same alpha amplitude depending on the 
attentional state (Forschack et al., 2017). Indeed, alpha-band modulations have been 
shown to correlate with attentional performance increases, especially for designs 
employing anticipatory attention. Thus, one conclusion is that alpha does not reflect 
attention in general but rather specific aspects of it (Klimesch, 2012), or might be 
indicative of the respective task context (van Ede et al., 2014). 
 
 
3.4 Limits of the current studies and future perspectives 
In the final section, I want to step back a bit and reflect on the scope of my thesis, which 
questions are arising and may trigger new research avenues. For this, I will first discuss 
the investigation of (un-) consciousness in tactile perception and finish with some 
consideration for selective spatial attention in touch. 
Although this thesis provides direct evidence for the effectiveness of unconscious 
content on neural processes and thereby rejects single-process models where only 
conscious processing appears effective (Schmidt & Vorberg, 2006), the current 
experiments have not investigated unconscious effects on obvious behavior as classic 
experimental approaches in the field of unconscious perception do (Merikle, Smilek, & 
Eastwood, 2001). Instead, by concurrently measuring the activity of neural populations 
with EEG, I hope to have demonstrated qualitative differences in the processing of 
consciously perceivable all the way down to non-perceivable stimuli. This approach has 
the potential to reveal effects about unconscious processing that go beyond a 
dichotomous view of perception either regarded as conscious or unconscious (Jacoby, 
1991). It allows investigating the depth of neural processing (Haynes, 2013) and opens 
the perspective on unconscious processing maybe happening mostly in parallel to or 
even independent of conscious processing (Dixon, 1971; Haynes & Rees, 2005). 
Nonetheless, for the effect of subthreshold stimulation on conscious perception, the 
current results provide a precise prediction. A subthreshold stimulus-induced event-
related increase in the alpha band amplitude, as shown in study 4 (section 2.4) should 
result in a decreased detection probability of a subsequent target stimulus under the 
assumption that high alpha band amplitudes correlate with functional inhibition. 
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Empirical support for the latter comes from a repetitive transcranial magnetic 
stimulation study (rTMS) that found decreased sensitivity to a vibrotactile stimulus after 
frequency specific entrainment in the alpha band over contralateral primary 
somatosensory cortex and intraparietal sulcus (Ruzzoli & Soto-Faraco, 2014).  
In the first part of the discussion, I speculated that the divergence of psychophysical 
and sensory receptor threshold for electrical in contrast to mechanical stimulation could 
be explained by an overall dampened cortical response due to mutual inhibition of 
concurrently activated afferent fibers. Of course, my thesis cannot decide on this 
hypothesis because it lacks measurements of the finger receptor afferents. Therefore, it 
would be interesting to compare mechanical and electrical finger nerve stimulation 
concerning the microneurographic activity of the median nerve in combination with a 
signal detection theoretic analysis of the behavioral responses. The prediction would be 
that small mechanical skin indentations only activate fast adaptive afferents of the 
receptive field leading to above chance performance (Vallbo & Johansson, 1984), 
whereas electrical perturbation of the skin at absolute detection threshold results in the 
parallel activation of multiple afferent types. 
The definition of consciousness as referring to stimuli either having objective 
reportability or not is a rather operational constriction. It cannot be concluded, though, 
that the early P50 amplitude after subthreshold stimulation does not relate to subjective 
reports like ratings. However, recent studies that employed peri-threshold median nerve 
stimulation (Auksztulewicz & Blankenburg, 2013) and continuous flash suppression in 
vision (Hesselmann et al., 2011) while asking the participants to rate the stimulus 
intensity/ visibility, provide evidence against this argument. These studies showed that 
only later electrophysiological response, the P300 (Auksztulewicz & Blankenburg, 
2013), and high-order visual areas (Hesselmann et al., 2011) distinguished variations in 
the subjective report but not the early ERP or activity of the lower visual hierarchy, 
respectively. Nevertheless, experimental designs combining both objective and 
subjective reports are a promising account to disentangle further the neural 
underpinnings of the emergence of conscious perception and the participant’s current 
subjective experience (Haynes, 2009). 
The focus on spatially localized signals in the EEG, i.e., ERPs and oscillatory 
activity based on one or a cluster of electrodes, is a further limitation given that 
perceptual awareness has been argued to arise from the interaction between more or 
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less distributed brain areas (e.g., Baars, 1997; Crick & Koch, 2003; Dehaene & 
Changeux, 2011; Lamme, 2004; Lau & Rosenthal, 2011; Tononi & Koch, 2015). This is 
not to say that there is no regional interaction underlying e.g., the N150. In fact, 
Auksztulewicz and Blankenburg, (2013) have shown that the N150 might reflect 
reverberating activity between primary and secondary somatosensory cortex. The study 
by Nierhaus and colleagues (2015, see section 2.3.1) could dissociate subthreshold from 
suprathreshold stimulation during resting-state fMRI where the former evoked a 
functional decoupling of primary somatosensory cortex from fronto-parietal areas. 
Additionally, recent fMRI graph theoretic results by (Grund, Forschack, Nierhaus, & 
Villringer, submitted) reveal a tight relationship of a sparse task-relevant network 
supporting perceptual awareness. Thus, future EEG research may benefit from 
investigating global scale activity and connectivity measures (as already has been done 
by a few groups: Hirvonen & Palva, 2016; Weisz, Wühle, et al., 2014) but, importantly, 
should relate and benchmark it to the accumulated wisdom of past decades of ERP 
experimental designs (Haynes, 2009; King & Dehaene, 2014). 
Contrarily, a much more fine-grained spatial resolution might be needed when it 
comes to interpreting oscillatory data. Invasive research in macaque monkeys found 
functionally dissociable alpha band activity even between different cortical layers 
(Bollimunta, Mo, Schroeder, & Ding, 2011). As discussed in section 2.4, it is possible 
that EEG level oscillations reflect a compound signal from nearby local oscillators and 
thereby obscuring their true functional role about cognitive factors like selective 
attention that arguably act at the scope of receptive field coding single cells (Carrasco, 
2011). Thus, in human research, invasive electroencephalography (iEEG) carefully 
designed to study selective attention would be a reasonable step toward proving the 
functional role of alpha and its relation to attention. 
Regarding the nature of the effect of attention in the somatosensory system, 
research relating it to signal enhancement or external/ internal noise suppression 
(Carrasco, 2011) or computational models of attention (Reynolds & Heeger, 2009) is 
very scarce (see the review by Gomez-Ramirez et al., 2016). The facility to precisely 
adjust parameters makes electrical stimulation a valuable tool to approach these 
questions in psychometric designs. Furthermore, as the concurrent presentation of 
targets and external noise has been shown previously (Iliopoulos et al., 2014), the 
manipulation of external noise levels in combination with attention would leverage this 
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field of research and shed light on the generalizability of attention mechanisms from 
other sensory modalities. 
Indeed, many questions remain to be studied. With the results of the present thesis, 
I hope to have provided new insights into the domain of somatosensation, which is 
central to the way everyone perceives and acts as an individual within a complex and 
continually changing environment.  
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Summary 
 
Introduction 
Humans are in touch with themselves (Metzinger, 2004). With touch, we explore our 
surrounding environment and distinguish us from it. For this, the sense of touch 
provides a unique heterogeneous structure comprised of a variety of mechano-, chemo-
, thermoreceptors as well as noci- and proprioceptors. Continuously exposed to sensory 
input, we may miss tactile stimuli, no matter how much attention we pay to them. Under 
optimal conditions, however, humans may consciously perceive skin indentations of the 
fingertip as small as 11 µm (Johansson & Vallbo, 1979). This thesis examines the 
possibility of sensory events escaping conscious access and the puzzling question 
whether there are correlates of such unconscious sensations in the brain. What do these 
neural markers—or the absence of those that are present during conscious 
perception—tell us about the mechanisms precluding awareness and what is the role of 
cognitive factors, foremost attention, in modulating such perceptual processes. The 
present dissertation comprises four empirical studies investigating behavioral responses 
and neural activity using electroencephalography (EEG) in humans that receive 
somatosensory stimulation. First of all, it is investigated in which range electrical 
impulses on the finger nerves can no longer be detected consciously. Secondly, this 
thesis demonstrates how neuronal correlates of undetectable stimulation dissociate 
from neuronal correlates of detectable stimulation.; and thirdly, it shows that selective 
attention affects the neuronal representation of somatosensory stimuli independently 
of their detectability, which supports the assumption of a general and consciousness-
independent neuronal signature for the distribution of attention (Koch & Tsuchiya, 
2007).  
There are two common ways to render stimuli undetectable. One is backward 
masking, in which a shortly presented target stimulus turns invisible when another non-
target stimulus follows within tens of a seconds (Enns & Lollo, 2000). However, 
masking may preclude observations unique to early neural processes that are unique for 
processing unmasked but undetectable stimulation. Thus, the present studies employ 
another method that limits stimulation energy as a function of stimulus intensity and 
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duration to control the detectability of stimuli (Iliopoulos et al., 2014; Shevrin, 2001). 
Two studies (n = 22) in this thesis, therefore, carefully validate the threshold assessment 
procedure, which sets the stimulation parameters for each observer individually. A 
particular challenge is to show that a specific stimulus intensity cannot be detected, i.e., 
more precisely, that the detection rate for that stimulus is no different from chance. 
Testing this null hypothesis (NH) cannot be carried out with classical test theoretical 
methods, which were constructed to reject the NH, but not to confirm it.. Instead, in 
the present thesis, Bayes factor statistics evaluate the empirical support for the chance 
level performance (i.e., the NH) of putative undetectable stimuli against above chance 
performance (i.e., the alternative hypothesis, AH). 
In two subsequent studies (n = 80), this thesis investigates the neural responses of 
the processing of undetectable stimulation, what the difference is to the processing of 
detectable stimulation, and whether and how selective spatial attention modulates the 
neural signal of stimuli that are adjusted to escape conscious perception. The high 
temporal resolution of the EEG allows studying temporally distinct neural mechanisms 
of stimulus processing and attention: single successive stimulus-locked somatosensory 
evoked potentials (SEP) in the EEG can change along different stimulation intensities, 
with stimulus detection and by different attention states. In addition, brain oscillations 
both before and shortly after a stimulus may mediate the top-down deployment of 
selective spatial attention. In general, this thesis asks to what extent the neural responses 
to different stimulation intensities distinguish from neural responses that correlate with 
stimulus awareness and selective attention. 
 
Experiments and results 
Study I establishes a fast and reliable, manual threshold assessment procedure to 
estimate observers’ absolute detection thresholds (ADTH) below which they provide 
random detection rates. It shows that the intensity of just noticable stimulation (i.e., at 
ADTH) is lower with short repetitive pulse trains than with single pulses. Defining 
subthreshold stimulus intensities relative to the ADTH of pulse trains lowers the 
sensory evidence for the same stimulation intensities of single electrical pulses and thus 
minimizes possible effects of partial consciousness. Therefore, stimulus intensities in all 
subsequent experiments were derived from threshold assessments applying a higher 
repetition rate (here 7 Hz) of electrical pulses than in the actual experiments.  
 Summary 
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Study II validates this threshold assessment procedure by applying a One-
Alternative-Forced-Choice-(1AFC, i.e., yes-no detection) task for stimuli ranging from 
intensities below absolute detection threshold to intensities clearly above but still below 
the pain threshold. Importantly, the design includes trials without any stimulation (catch 
trials) to allow for the estimation of perceptual sensitivity (d-prime) and response bias 
(criterion) according to signal detection theory, and validates the chance performance 
for stimulation intensities below ADTH (i.e., subthreshold) statistically by Bayes factor 
null-hypothesis testing. The results indicate that there is a physical range of electrical 
stimulation intensities that cannot be detected because the statistical evidence for 
detection rates at random level after sub-threshold stimulation indicated by the Bayes 
factor reliably outweighs the statistical evidence for detection rates above random level. 
Study III asks whether there are measurable neural correlates of subthreshold 
stimulation intensities. If so, are there qualitative differences between stimulation below 
and above ADTH concerning the stimulus-evoked response and oscillatory activity that 
could prevent access to conscious experience in the case of subthreshold stimulation? 
Furthermore, this study tests, which features of the earliest neural responses (amplitude 
and latency of the SEP) after somatosensory stimulation are predictive of its detection 
and how these post-stimulus features interact with pre-stimulus intrinsic oscillatory 
activity in the alpha-band that has been surmised to regulate the excitability of sensory 
cortices awaiting stimulus input? Study III was therefore designed as an EEG adaptation 
of study II and investigates these neural stimulus-related responses for various 
stimulation intensities. For the subthreshold stimuli, there was only one P50 component 
50 ms after stimulation, but no further event-related potentials, thereby replicating 
previous research (Libet et al., 1967; Ray et al., 1999; Nierhaus et al., 2015; Forschack 
et al., 2017). The P50 amplitude scaled with increasing stimulation intensities but was 
not predictive for stimulus detection for the two highest stimulation intensities. A 
stronger negative potential 150 ms after stimulus onset (N150) together with the pre-
stimulus somatosensory alpha (i.e., mu) amplitude best explains perceptual awareness 
of somatosensory stimulation. 
Selective attention plays a crucial role in stimulus detection by amplifying the task-
relevant neural responses and suppressing task-irrelevant noise (Desimone & Duncan, 
1995; Hillyard et al., 1973). In addition, attention affects both SEPs and alpha-band 
activity. Therefore, study IV examines the modulatory role of selective spatial attention 
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in somatosensory stimulus processing across awareness conditions by its relation to 
early SEPs and oscillatory mu-alpha activity. The results reveal that attention increases 
the amplitude for the P50 component to both detectable and undetectable stimulation 
and foster the view of attention and awareness being two separate and mostly 
independent mechanisms. In addition, pre-stimulus mu amplitudes (pre-mu) interact 
with stimulus-evoked responses.  
Interestingly, pre-mu activity affects both behavioral responses and SEP 
amplitudes, the latter differentially depending on the attentional state: With spatial 
attention there is a negative quadratic relationship between pre-mu and evoked 
amplitudes whereas without spatial attention the relationship is positive quadratic. I.e., 
Intermediate and higher pre-mu amplitudes go along with large evoked activity during 
spatial attention and small evoked activity without attention. This result pattern suggests 
that pre-mu amplitude and attention are interrelated but are not functionally matching. 
 
Discussion 
This work strongly supports the view that neural responses to undetectable 
somatosensory stimulation are a valid source of information to understand the 
underpinnings of functional brain activity. Undetectable somatosensory stimulation 
applied here was tuned to intensities 30–15% below ADTH and reliably produced 
sensitivity values of zero. Nevertheless, these subthreshold stimuli led to a positive 
potential change about 50 milliseconds after their onset, the P50. Apart from this early 
component, no further significant deflection was observed. The data in the present 
thesis and in earlier collaborative work indicate a qualitative different processing of 
undetectable compared to detectable somatosensory stimulation in several aspects: (1) 
the absence of late components (study 3, 4 and Nierhaus et al., 2015), especially the 
N150 that is indicative of stimulus detection (study 3), (2) increased but not decreased 
stimulus-related somatosensory alpha amplitudes (study 4), (3) decreased instead of 
increased BOLD activity (Blankenburg et al., 2003) and (4) reduced functional 
connectivity of primary somatosensory cortex with areas associated with conscious and 
higher somatosensory processing (Nierhaus et al., 2015). In summary, one can speculate 
that this result pattern indicates a shift in the balance between neural excitation and 
inhibition (Isaacson, Scanziani, 2011) in favor of inhibition, which prevents stimulus 
detection in later processing phases, as Nierhaus et al. (2015) have argued. 
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The absence of the N150 for subthreshold, i.e., undetectable, stimulation then could 
point to an unmodulated connection between primary sensory cortices relative to 
baseline activity or even to reduced connectivity of S1 with the frontal-parietal network 
(Nierhaus et al., 2015) compared to detectable stimulation (Auksztulewicz et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, the presence of the N150 seems to be independent of the experimental 
context since Nierhaus and colleagues (2015) did not require participants to engage in 
a detection task but instead let them passively observe suprathreshold, i.e., detectable, 
stimulation. The presence of the N150 after passively perceived detectable stimulation 
makes this EEG component a candidate for a proper neural correlate of consciousness 
(Aru et al., 2012; Verleger, 2010). 
For an earlier time range, however, this thesis reports an attention modulation of 
the P50, and this modulation is independent of stimulus detection (study 4). In this 
sense, the results reject theories that envisage attention as a gating mechanism that 
places unconscious perception and selective attention on the endpoints of a continuum 
(Brigard & Prinz, 2010; Dixon, 1971). This means that attention does not shield the 
brain from faint but potentially task-relevant information as long as this information 
proceeds along the same feedforward processing pathway on which attention is 
currently focused (Forschack et al., 2017). In addition, this also foils theoretical accounts 
viewing attention sufficient for consciousness (Brigard & Prinz, 2010). Instead, 
although attention is not a uniform phenomenon and the current results shed some 
light on one, but arguably central, aspect of it, namely focused selective attention (James, 
1890), early P50 modulation by attention under no sign of stimulus detection strongly 
speaks for an independence of attention and consciousness. 
The current data is best explained by two alternative but complementary accounts 
that describe attention and consciousness as two independent but interrelated concepts 
(Dehaene et al., 2006; Kiefer, 2012; Kiefer & Martens, 2010). In the Dehaene model, 
the extent to which a stimulus is processed and eventually detected depends on its 
bottom-up stimulus strength and the amount of attention resources available. In this 
scheme, weak stimuli remain unnoticed regardless how much attention resources are 
available, which is consistent with the attentional modulation of subthreshold stimulus 
ERPs in study 4. If stimuli are strong enough in principal, observers may not be aware 
of them yet, as long as attention is occupied elsewhere. Markus Kiefer‘s attentional 
sensitization model builds on Dehaene’s taxonomy and expands on it, especially 
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concerning the question of how attention modulation is implemented in the processing 
of undetectable stimulation. Regardless of whether the stimulus is consciously perceived 
or not, the mechanism of attention control is the same: “processing of task-relevant 
pathways is enhanced by increasing the gain of neurons in the corresponding areas, 
whereas the processing of task-irrelevant pathways is attenuated by a decrease of the 
gain” (Kiefer, 2012; Kiefer & Martens, 2010). 
In contrast to the absence of stimulus-induced mu amplitude modulations by 
attention, pre-stimulus mu amplitudes may be relevant for the allocation of attention 
resources. This link was shown in both the study by Ede, Lange and Maris (2014) and 
here in study 4 as relatively larger pre-Mu amplitudes with unattended compared to 
attended fingers. However, the relationship of alpha and attention regarding early 
sensory stimulus processing does not appear to be proportional, since the size of the 
P50 at the same alpha amplitude is either at maximum or minimum, depending on the 
attentional state (Forschack et al., 2017). In fact, alpha-band modulations have been 
shown to correlate with attentional performance increases, especially for designs 
employing anticipatory attention. Thus, one conclusion is that alpha does not reflect 
attention in general, but can refer to specific aspects of it (Klimesch, 2012), or to the 
the respective task context (van Ede et al., 2014). 
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Zusammenfassung 
 
Einleitung 
Der Tastsinn erlaubt es dem Menschen, die nahe Umgebung zu „begreifen“ und sich 
selbst von dieser zu unterscheiden. Dafür bietet der Tastsinn eine einzigartige 
heterogene Struktur, die aus einer Vielzahl von Mechano-, Chemo-, Thermorezeptoren 
sowie Nozi- und Propriozeptoren besteht. Unablässig dem Strom sensorischer Reize 
ausgesetzt, können diese uns unbemerkt beeinflussen, egal wie viel Aufmerksamkeit wir 
ihnen schenken. Unter optimalen Bedingungen hingegen kann der Mensch eine 
Verformung der Fingerspitze von nicht mehr als 11 µm bewusst wahrnehmen 
(Johansson & Vallbo, 1979). Diese Arbeit untersucht den Bereich der nicht 
bewusstseinsfähigen sensorischen Reize und geht der Frage nach, ob es Korrelate 
solcher unbewussten Empfindungen im Gehirn gibt. Welche Rückschlüsse erlauben 
diese neuronalen Indikatoren—oder das Fehlen derer, die während bewusster 
Wahrnehmung vorhanden sind—auf Mechanismen, welche die bewusste 
Wahrnehmung taktiler Reize verhindern; und welche Rolle spielen kognitive Faktoren, 
vor allem Aufmerksamkeit, bei der Modulation solcher Wahrnehmungsprozesse? Die 
vorliegende Dissertation umfasst vier empirische Studien, die sowohl 
Verhaltensreaktionen als auch neuronale Aktivität—gemessen mittels 
Elektroenzephalographie (EEG)—beim Menschen unter somatosensorischer 
Stimulation untersuchen. Zunächst wird untersucht, in welchem Bereich elektrische 
Impulse an den Fingernerven nicht mehr bewusst detektiert werden können. Zweitens 
zeigt diese Arbeit, wie sich neuronale Korrelate nicht detektierbarer Stimulation von 
neuronalen Korrelaten detektierbarer Stimulation dissoziieren; und drittens, dass 
selektive Aufmerksamkeit die neuronale Repräsentation von somatosensorischen 
Reizen unabhängig ihrer Detektierbarkeit beeinflusst und dies die Annahme einer 
allgemeinen und bewusstseinsunabhängigen neuronalen Signatur für die Verteilung von 
Aufmerksamkeit unterstützt (Koch & Tsuchiya, 2007). 
Es gibt zwei gängige Methoden, Reize so zu präsentieren, dass diese bewusst nicht 
wahrgenommen werden. Eine davon ist die sog. rückwärtsgerichtete Maskierung, bei 
der ein kurz dargestellter Zielreiz unsichtbar wird, wenn innerhalb von 
Zehntelsekunden ein weiterer Reiz folgt (Enns & Lollo, 2000). Dadurch kann die 
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Maskierung jedoch frühe neuronale Prozesse verdecken, die für die Verarbeitung 
unmaskierter aber nicht detektierbarer Stimulation einzigartig sind. Daher wenden die 
vorliegenden Studien eine andere Methode an, welche die Stimulationsenergie als 
Funktion der Stimulusintensität und -dauer einschränkt, um die Detektierbarkeit von 
Reizen zu kontrollieren (Iliopoulos et al., 2014; Shevrin, 2001). Zwei Studien (n = 22) 
dieser Arbeit validieren sorgfältig das Verfahren zur Schwellenwertbestimmung, mit 
dem die Stimulationsparameter für jeden Beobachter individuell eingestellt werden. 
Eine besondere Herausforderung besteht darin, zu zeigen, dass eine bestimmte 
Reizstärke nicht erfasst werden kann, d. h. genauer gesagt, dass sich die Detektionsrate 
auf diesen Reiz nicht vom Zufall unterscheidet. Die Überprüfung dieser Nullhypothese 
(NH) kann nicht mit klassischen testtheoretischen Verfahren durchgeführt werden, 
welche daraufhin konstruiert wurden die NH zurückzuweisen, jedoch nicht zu 
bestätigen. Stattdessen setzen die Bayes-Faktor-Statistiken in der vorliegenden Arbeit 
die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass die Detektionsraten für eine vermeintlich nicht bewusst 
wahrnehmbare Reizintensität auf Zufallsniveau liegen (d. h. die NH) ins Verhältnis zur 
Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass diese über dem Zufall liegen (d. h. die Alternativhypothese, 
AH). 
In zwei weiteren Studien (n = 80) untersucht diese Arbeit die neuronalen Korrelate 
der Verarbeitung nicht detektierbarer Stimulation, was der Unterschied zur 
Verarbeitung detektierbarer Stimulation ist, und ob und wie selektive räumliche 
Aufmerksamkeit das neuronale Signal von Reizen moduliert, die der bewussten 
Wahrnehmung stets entgehen. Die hohe zeitliche Auflösung des EEG ermöglicht die 
Untersuchung zeitlich unterschiedlicher neuronaler Mechanismen der Reizverarbeitung 
und der Aufmerksamkeit: Einzelne somatosensorisch evozierte Potentiale (SEP) im 
EEG können sich entlang verschiedener Stimulationsintensitäten, mit der 
Stimulusdetektion und durch verschiedene Aufmerksamkeitszustände verändern. 
Darüber hinaus könnten Oszillationen des Gehirns sowohl vor, als auch kurz nach 
einem Stimulus den Top-down-Einsatz selektiver räumlicher Aufmerksamkeit 
vermitteln. Im Allgemeinen fragt diese Arbeit, inwieweit sich die neuronalen Reaktionen 
auf verschiedene Stimulationsintensitäten von neuronalen Reaktionen unterscheiden, 
die mit Reizbewusstsein und selektiver Aufmerksamkeit korrelieren. 
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Experimente und Ergebnisse 
Studie I etabliert ein schnelles und zuverlässiges, manuelles Verfahren zur 
Schwellenwertbestimmung, um die absoluten Detektionsschwellen (ADTH) der 
Beobachter abzuschätzen, unterhalb derer sie Detektionsraten auf Zufallsniveau 
erbringen. Sie zeigt, dass die Intensität der eben merklichen Stimulation (d. h. ADTH) 
bei kurzen repetitiven Impulsfolgen geringer ist als bei Einzelpulsen. Die Definition 
von unterschwelligen Reizintensitäten relativ zur ADTH von repetitiven Impulsen 
senkt die sensorische Evidenz für die gleichen Stimulationsintensitäten einzelner 
elektrischer Impulse und minimiert dadurch mögliche Auswirkungen von residualer 
bewusster Wahrnehmung. Daher wurden die Reizintensitäten in allen nachfolgenden 
Experimenten aus Schwellwertbestimmungen mit einer höheren Wiederholrate (hier 7 
Hz) der elektrischen Impulse abgeleitet als in den eigentlichen Experimenten. 
Studie II validiert dieses Schwellenwertbestimmungsverfahren durch die 
Anwendung einer One-Alternative-Forced-Choice-(1AFC, d.h. Ja-Nein-Detektions-) 
Aufgabe für Stimuli, die von Intensitäten unterhalb der absoluten Detektionsschwelle 
bis hin zu Intensitäten deutlich darüber, aber immer noch unterhalb der Schmerzgrenze 
reichen. Wichtig ist, dass das Design Versuchsdurchgänge ohne Stimulation („catch-
trials“) vorsieht, um die Bestimmung der Sensitivität (d-prime) und des Antwort-Bias 
(Kriteriums) gemäß der Signal-Entdeckungs-Theorie zu ermöglichen, und dass 
Detektionsraten auf Zufallsniveau für Stimulationsintensitäten unterhalb von ADTH 
(d. h. unterschwellig) statistisch durch den Bayes-Faktor Null-Hypothesentest 
abgesichert werden. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass es eine physikalische Bandbreite von 
elektrischen Stimulationsintensitäten gibt, die nicht erkannt werden können, da die 
statistische Evidenz für Detektionsraten auf Zufallsniveau nach unterschwelliger 
Stimulation—angezeigt durch den Bayes-Faktors—zuverlässig die statistische Evidenz 
für Detektionsraten über Zufallsniveau überwiegt. 
Studie III fragt, ob es messbare neuronale Korrelate der unterschwelligen 
Stimulationsintensitäten gibt. Wenn ja, gibt es qualitative Unterschiede zwischen 
Stimulation unterhalb und oberhalb der ADTH in Bezug auf das Stimulus-evozierte 
Potential und die oszillatorische Aktivität, die den Zugang zu bewusster Erfahrung im 
Falle der unterschwelligen Stimulation unterbinden könnte? Darüber hinaus testet diese 
Studie, welche Merkmale der frühesten neuronalen Reaktionen (Amplitude und Latenz 
des SEP) nach somatosensorischer Stimulation für deren Detektion prädiktiv sind und 
 146 
wie diese Stimulus-evozierten Merkmale mit der intrinsischen oszillatorischen Aktivität 
unmittelbar vor Stimulation im Alpha-Band interagieren, von dem angenommen wird, 
dass es die Erregbarkeit der sensorischen Kortizes und damit deren Empfänglichkeit 
für die Verarbeitung externer Reize anzeigt. Studie III wurde daher als EEG-Anpassung 
der Studie II konzipiert und untersucht diese neuronalen Stimulus-bezogenen 
Reaktionen für verschiedene Stimulationsintensitäten. Für unterschwellige Reize gab es 
nur eine P50-Komponente 50 ms nach Stimulation, aber keine weiteren evozierten 
Potentiale, wodurch frühere Studien repliziert wurden (Libet et al., 1967; Ray et al., 
1999; Nierhaus et al., 2015; Forschack et al. 2017). Die P50-Amplitude vergrößerte sich 
mit zunehmender Stimulationsintensität, war jedoch für die Stimulusdetektion der 
beiden höchsten Stimulationsintensitäten nicht prädiktiv. Ein stärkeres negatives 
Potential 150 ms nach Beginn des Stimulus (N150) zusammen mit der 
somatosensorischen Alpha-Amplitude (d. h. Mu) vor dem Stimulus erklärt am besten 
die Detektion der somatosensorischen Stimulation. 
Die selektive Aufmerksamkeit spielt eine entscheidende Rolle bei der 
Stimulusdetektion, indem sie die aufgabenrelevanten neuronalen Reaktionen verstärkt 
und aufgabenunabhängiges Rauschen unterdrückt (Desimone & Duncan, 1995; 
Hillyard et al., 1973). Darüber hinaus wirkt sich Aufmerksamkeit sowohl auf SEPs als 
auch auf die Alpha-Band-Aktivität aus. Daher untersucht Studie IV den 
modulatorischen Einfluss der selektiven räumlichen Aufmerksamkeit bei der 
Verarbeitung bewusster und unbewusster somatosensorischer Stimuli anhand ihrer 
Beziehung zu frühen SEPs und der oszillatorischen Mu-Aktivität. Die Ergebnisse 
zeigen, dass die Aufmerksamkeit die Amplitude der P50-Komponente auf detektierbare 
und nicht detektierbare Stimulation erhöht und festigen die Vorstellung von zwei 
getrennten und größtenteils unabhängigen Mechanismen für Aufmerksamkeit und 
Bewusstsein. Darüber hinaus interagiert die Prä-Stimulus-Mu-(Prä-Mu) Amplitude mit 
den Stimulus-evozierten Reaktionen. 
Interessanterweise beeinflusst die Prä-Mu-Aktivität sowohl Verhaltensreaktionen 
als auch SEP-Amplituden, wobei letztere je nach Aufmerksamkeitszustand differenziert 
sind: Mit räumlicher Aufmerksamkeit besteht eine negative quadratische Beziehung 
zwischen Prä-Mu und evozierten Amplituden, während ohne räumliche 
Aufmerksamkeit die Beziehung positiv quadratisch ist. D. h., mittlere und höhere Prä-
Mu-Amplituden gehen mit großer evozierter Aktivität während räumlicher 
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Aufmerksamkeit einher und mit geringer evozierter Aktivität ohne Aufmerksamkeit. 
Dieses Ergebnismuster deutet darauf hin, dass Prä-Mu-Amplitude und Aufmerksamkeit 
interagieren, jedoch funktional nicht identisch sind. 
 
Diskussion 
Diese Arbeit unterstützt nachdrücklich die Ansicht, dass neuronale Reaktionen auf 
nicht detektierbare somatosensorische Stimulationen eine valide Informationsquelle 
sind, um die Grundlagen funktioneller Gehirnaktivität zu verstehen. Die 
unterschwellige somatosensorische Stimulation in dieser Arbeit wurde auf Intensitäten 
von 30–15% unter ADTH eingestellt und erzeugte zuverlässig Sensitivitätsswerte von 
Null. Nichtsdestotrotz führen diese nicht detektierbaren Reize etwa 50 Millisekunden 
nach ihrem Auftreten, zu einer positiven Potentialänderung, der P50. Neben dieser 
frühen Komponente wurde keine weitere signifikante Potentialveränderung 
beobachtet. Die Daten in der vorliegenden Dissertation und in früheren kooperativen 
Arbeiten deuten auf eine qualitativ unterschiedliche Verarbeitung nicht detektierbarer 
im Vergleich zu detektierbarer somatosensorischer Stimulation in mehreren Aspekten 
hin: (1) das Fehlen späterer Komponenten (Studie 3, 4 und Nierhaus et al., 2015), 
insbesondere der N150, welche die Stimulusdetektion anzeigt (Studie 3), (2) erhöhte, 
nicht aber verringerte Stimulus-bezogene somatosensorische Alpha-Amplituden 
(Studie 4), (3) verringerte statt erhöhter BOLD-Aktivität (Blankenburg et al., 2003) 
sowie (4) verringerte funktionelle Konnektivität des primären somatosensorischen 
Kortex mit Bereichen, die mit bewusster und höherer somatosensorischer Verarbeitung 
verbunden sind (Nierhaus et al., 2015). Zusammenfassend kann man spekulieren, dass 
dieses Ergebnismuster eine Verschiebung des Gleichgewichtes zwischen neuronaler 
Erregung und Hemmung (Isaacson, Scanziani, 2011) zu Gunsten neuronaler Hemmung 
anzeigt, was die Stimulusdetektion in späteren Verarbeitungsphasen verhindert, wie 
Nierhaus et al. (2015) argumentiert haben. 
Das Fehlen der N150 für unterschwellige, d. h. nicht detektierbare Stimulation, 
könnte dann auf eine unmodulierte Verbindung zwischen primären sensorischen 
Kortizes relativ zur Basisaktivität oder sogar auf eine verringerte Konnektivität von S1 
mit dem frontal-parietalen Netzwerk (Nierhaus et al., 2015) im Vergleich zu 
detektierbarer Stimulation hinweisen (Auksztulewicz et al., 2012). Darüber hinaus 
scheint die Anwesenheit der N150 unabhängig vom experimentellen Kontext zu sein, 
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da Nierhaus und Kollegen (2015) die Teilnehmer ihrer Studie keine Detektionsaufgabe 
durchführen ließen, sondern diese passiv die überschwellige, d. h. detektierbare 
Stimulation wahrnahmen. Die Anwesenheit der N150 nach passiv wahrgenommener 
detektierbarer Stimulation macht diese EEG Komponente zu einem Kandidaten für ein 
reines neuronales Korrelat des Bewusstseins (Aru et al., 2012; Verleger, 2010). 
Für eine frühere Phase der neuronalen Verarbeitung berichtet diese Arbeit jedoch 
eine Aufmerksamkeitsmodulation der P50, und diese Modulation ist unabhängig von 
der Stimulusdetektion (Studie 4). In diesem Sinne weisen die Ergebnisse Theorien 
zurück, die sich Aufmerksamkeit als einen „Gate“-Mechanismus vorstellen, der 
unbewusste Wahrnehmung und selektive Aufmerksamkeit auf die Endpunkte eines 
Kontinuums platziert (Brigard & Prinz, 2010; Dixon, 1971). Das heißt, die 
Aufmerksamkeit schirmt das Gehirn nicht vor schwachen, aber potentiell 
aufgabenrelevanten Informationen ab, solange diese Informationen denselben 
Verarbeitungspfad beanspruchen, auf dem der Fokus der Aufmerksamkeit derzeit liegt 
(Forschack et al., 2017). Darüber hinaus werden auch theoretische Darstellungen, die 
Aufmerksamkeit als ausreichend für das Bewusstsein betrachten, verworfen (Brigard & 
Prinz, 2010). Obwohl Aufmerksamkeit kein einheitliches Phänomen ist und die 
aktuellen Ergebnisse etwas Licht auf einen, wohl aber zentralen Aspekt davon werfen, 
nämlich fokussierter selektiver Aufmerksamkeit (James, 1890), spricht die frühe P50-
Modulation durch Aufmerksamkeit in Abwesenheit von Stimulusdetektion stark für 
eine Unabhängigkeit von Aufmerksamkeit und Bewusstsein. 
Die aktuellen Daten lassen sich am besten durch zwei alternative, aber 
komplementäre Modelle erklären, die Aufmerksamkeit und Bewusstsein als zwei 
unabhängige, jedoch miteinander verbundene Konzepte beschreiben (Dehaene et al., 
2006; Kiefer, 2012; Kiefer & Martens, 2010). In dem Modell von Dehaene hängt das 
Ausmaß, in dem ein Stimulus verarbeitet und schließlich detektiert wird, von seiner 
Stimulusintensität und der Menge verfügbarer Aufmerksamkeitsressourcen ab. In 
diesem Schema bleiben schwache Reize unbemerkt, unabhängig davon, wie viele 
Aufmerksamkeitsressourcen verfügbar sind, was mit der Aufmerksamkeitsmodulation 
der ERPs nach unterschwelligen Reizen in Studie 4 übereinstimmt. Wenn Stimuli 
prinzipiell stark genug sind, sind sie den Beobachtern möglicherweise noch nicht 
bewusst, solange die Aufmerksamkeit an anderer Stelle liegt. Das Aufmerksamkeits-
Bewusstseinsbildungs-Modell von Markus Kiefer baut auf der Taxonomie von Dehaene 
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auf und erweitert diese insbesondere hinsichtlich der Frage, wie die 
Aufmerksamkeitsmodulation bei der Verarbeitung nicht detektierbarer Stimulation 
umgesetzt wird. Unabhängig davon, ob der Reiz bewusst wahrgenommen wird oder 
nicht, ist der Mechanismus der Aufmerksamkeitskontrolle derselbe: „aufgabenrelevante 
Verarbeitungspfade werden, durch die Erhöhung der neuronalen Reaktion 
entsprechender Bereiche im Gehirn, verstärkt, wohingegen aufgabenirrelevante 
Verarbeitungspfade, durch eine Verringerung der neuronalen Reaktion, abgeschwächt 
werden“ (übersetzt aus Kiefer, 2012; Kiefer & Martens, 2010). 
Im Gegensatz zum Ausbleiben Stimulus-induzierter Mu-Amplitudenmodulationen 
durch Aufmerksamkeit können die Mu-Amplituden vor dem Stimulus für die 
Zuweisung von Aufmerksamkeitsressourcen relevant sein. Dieser Zusammenhang 
wurde sowohl in der Studie von Ede, Lange und Maris (2014) als auch hier in Studie 4 
als relativ größere Prä-Mu-Amplituden bei unbeachtetem im Vergleich zu beachtetem 
Finger gezeigt. Die Beziehung zwischen Alpha und Aufmerksamkeit bei der frühen 
sensorischen Stimulusverarbeitung scheint jedoch nicht proportional zu sein, da die 
Größe der P50 bei gleicher Alpha-Amplitude je nach Aufmerksamkeitszustand 
entweder maximal oder minimal ist (Forschack et al., 2017). Tatsächlich wurde gezeigt, 
dass Alpha-Band-Modulationen mit der Verbesserung von Verhaltensleistungen durch 
Aufmerksamkeit korrelieren, insbesondere bei Experimenten zur zeitlichen 
Aufmerksamkeitssteuerung. Eine Schlussfolgerung lautet daher, dass Alpha nicht die 
Aufmerksamkeit im Allgemeinen widerspiegelt, sondern spezifische Aspekte davon 
(Klimesch, 2012), oder auf den jeweiligen Aufgabenkontext hinweisen kann (van Ede 
et al., 2014). 
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